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WAS KATYN A GENOCIDE?
Maria Szonert-Binienda, Esq.*
On April 13, 1990, after five decades of lies and cover-ups, the
Union of Soviet Republics put forward a Communiqué on Katyn that stated:
“The archival materials that have been discovered, taken together, permit
the conclusion that Beria and Merkulov and their subordinates bear direct
responsibility for the evil deeds in Katyn Forest. The Soviet side, expressing
deep regret in connection with the Katyn tragedy, declares that it represents
one of the most heinous crimes of Stalinism.”1 This announcement of
profound historical significance was made in the midst of turbulent demise
of the mighty Soviet Union. Thus the world that was rejoicing in the
prospects of democratic Russia was eager to close the books on Katyn and
once again brushed aside the cry of the Katyn victims for justice. It was not
until April 10, 2010 when the Polish presidential plane on its way to Katyn
crashed on landing in Smolensk, Russia, killing the President of Poland,
First Lady, and eighty seven top Polish officials including nine generals of
the Polish Armed Forces, that the world had to turn its attention once again
to Katyn. What the world learned as a result of this crash was neither
comforting nor encouraging. With respect to Katyn, justice has not been
served and Russia has not been forthcoming in meeting its basic obligation
of post-conflict reconciliation through full disclosure, compensation and
remembrance. Hence, the mistrust and tension between Poland and Russia
has been growing steadily.

*
Maria Szonert-Binienda is the Founder and President of Libra Institute, Inc., an NGO
dedicated to building lasting friendship between the people of Poland and the United States.
As a law graduate of the University of Warsaw and Rutgers University with post-graduate
scholarship in journalism, she publishes extensively, focusing on legal, historical, and current
affairs issues. She is the author of WORLD WAR II THROUGH POLISH EYES (2002) and NULL
AND VOID; POLAND: CASE STUDY ON COMPARATIVE IMPERIALISM (2008). She also serves as
President of Kresy-Siberia Foundation, USA.
1
The Communiqué on Katyn was announced by the official news agency, Telegraphic
Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS), and published in the Russian newspaper Izvestia on
April 13, 1990. It was reprinted as Upheaval in the East: Soviets Admit Blame in Massacre of
Polish Officers in World War II, N.Y.TIMES, Apr. 13, 1990.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Katyn crime, commonly understood as the murder of Polish
prisoners of war (POWs) of officer rank in the Katyn forest near Smolensk,
casts an ominous shadow over the legacy of Nuremberg justice by bringing
to the forefront the fundamental question: can justice be served when a
powerful empire does harm to a smaller country? As long as the Katyn
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crime remains unpunished, the international justice system born out of
Nuremberg does not meet this basic standard.
The Katyn crime attracted international attention in 1943 when the
Nazi troops advancing towards Moscow discovered mass graves of Polish
officers in the Katyn forest.2 It took historians decades to realize that Katyn
was only one of many sites of mass murder of Polish nationals by the Soviet
regime between 1939 and 1941. Today the Katyn massacre symbolizes the
Soviet policy of mass persecution of the Polish nationals during World War
II. For fifty years, the Soviet Union covered up the Katyn atrocity,
banishing the memory of the crime and the memory of the victims by
effectively suppressing any mention of Katyn at home and abroad. 3
In this paper, I will explore whether the leadership of the Soviet
Union committed genocide on the Polish national group, as such, during the
period between September 17, 1939 and June 20, 1941, when the Soviet
Union acted in alliance with Nazi Germany pursuant to the
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 23, 19394 and the Friendship and
Boundary Treaty of September 28, 1939.5 The author is mindful of the
daring character of a genocide charge. After half a century of denial and
twenty years of minimizing the significance of the Katyn crime, the people
in Russia and in the West are not prepared to absorb the Katyn crime in its
entirety. Upon murdering the Poles, the Soviets committed “memoricide”
by destroying the memory of the victims. The complicity of the Western
democracies in covering up the Katyn crime makes the truth about Katyn
much harder to accept. As much as Katyn continues to represent the
inconvenient truth of that complicity, the notion that Katyn may constitute
genocide makes the inconvenient truth much more uncomfortable.
Accordingly, the psychological phenomenon of genocide denial comes to
forefront with full force in this instance, both in Russia and in the West.
In judging any genocide, two opposite forces come to play: interests
that aim at restricting the charge of genocide, often in order to preserve the
status quo for political expediency, and interests that demand it in the name
of justice and long-term well-being of the international community. The
unwillingness of the international courts in the early International Criminal
Court (ICC) era to pursue genocide charges because of their powerful
2
See GEORGE SANFORD, KATYN AND THE SOVIET MASSACRE: TRUTH, JUSTICE, MEMORY, 1
(2005) (“After the German invasion of the U.S.S.R. Goebbels announced the discovery of
the bodies with much propaganda fanfare in April 1943.”).
3
See id. at 3 (“Only the Soviet admission of guilt in 1990 and the release of their documents, however, made it possible to establish the truth about the whole of the 1940 massacre
. . . .”).
4
See id. at 7 (explaining how Germany and the Soviet Union formed a secret pact to
partition Poland).
5
Id. at 21.

File: Szonert 2

636

Created on: 7/4/2012 2:02:00 PM

Last Printed: 9/21/2012 8:33:00 PM

CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 44:633

political impact and stigmatizing effect limited the applicability of
genocide. Also, some scholars warned that overusing the charge of genocide
could lead to trivializing this crime, considered as the crime of crimes, or
advocated a complete shift away from genocide and recommend replacing it
with the charge of crimes against humanity as “an elegant and rather
moving encapsulation of the tendency towards universalism and
cosmopolitanism.”6 However, the proponents of limiting the applicability of
genocide disregard the trivializing effect this approach has on genocide
when the genocidal crime that aims at destroying protected human groups is
not recognized as such.7 If pursued too far, such approach may lead to
challenging the underlying premise of the genocide crime by questioning
whether the protected national, ethnic and religious groups are worth
protecting.
It shall be noted that most scholars agree that genocide denial is a
harmful and dangerous phenomenon. They recognize that genocide denial
tends to be deeply entrenched, often representing a societal consensus where
“individual and collective narcissism plays a pivotal role.”8 They point out
that genocide denial can pay well since it fortifies the status quo and serves
powerful and prosperous constituencies, while failure to deny genocide may
result in painful economic and social consequences.9 Frequently that is the
key reason why two people who process the same facts come to opposite
conclusions: one recognizes genocide while the other views the events as
“an unfortunate but understandable effort to quell a security threat.”10
However, genocide denial conceals the horror of the crime, helps preserve
the distortion of history, and prevents healing of the wounds inflicted by
genocide for many generations to come.11 It also poses a threat to humanity
for the future.
In considering the facts of the Katyn case, it is important to keep in
mind that both the scholarship and jurisprudence contribute to the shared
consciousness and therefore have profound implications for the struggle of
humanity in dealing with large, disturbing and deadly historical events.
Nowhere is scholarship more demanding of civic courage than in
6

ADAM JONES, GENOCIDE: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 540 (2d. ed. 2011).
See Roger W. Smith et al., Professional Ethics and the Denial of Armenian Genocide, 9
HOLOCAUST GENOCIDE STUD. 1, 13–14 (1995) (discussing how genocidal denial attempts to
re-write history and conceals the horror of such crimes).
8
JONES, supra note 6, at 518.
9
Id.
10
SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 13
(2002).
11
See Smith et al., supra note 7, at 12–13 (explaining how genocidal denial distorts the
facts, harms survivors and family of the decedents, and attacks the victim peoples’ cultural
identity).
7
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challenging one of the most powerful countries in the world. And nowhere
is scholarship more significant than with respect to genocide where
extremity of human harm brought about by genocidal policies and actions
raises the stakes to the highest level.12 Let us hope that the scholarship on
genocide will be, above all, a quest for truth.

II. PRESENTATION OF FACTS
A.

Poland Reborn

As a result of three consecutive partitions of Poland by Russia,
Prussia and Austria between 1772 and 1795, Poland, that was one of the
largest countries in Europe at the time, disappeared from the map for 123
years.13 Owing to the matchless leadership of Marshal Josef Pilsudski,
Poland reemerged from the chaos of World War I as an independent state.14
But there was a price to pay for the reclaimed independence: Poland was the
first country ever required to sign the Minority Protection Treaty with the
League of Nations.15 While this first modern treaty on minority protection
assured protection to numerous ethnic groups living within the new Polish
borders, the powerful neighbors that partitioned Poland at the end of 18th
century effectively used the Minority Protection Treaty as a tool to infiltrate
and destabilize resurrected Poland.16 Furthermore, no reciprocal minority
protection was given to the Polish minorities left outside the new Polish
borders in Germany and in the Soviet Union.17 While no mass murder of
any minority took place in pre-war Poland, the Soviet Union murdered at
least 111,000 ethnic Poles living in the Soviet Union only in the Polish
Operation of 1937–1938, while Germans only in August 1939 arrested two
12

See id. at 16–17 (explaining why it is important for scholars to recognize and discuss
genocide).
13
SANFORD, supra note 2, at 5.
14
See generally id. at 8–9 (discussing Pilsudski’s war for independence).
15
Also known as “The Little Treaty of Versailles,” this document was signed by Poland
on June 28, 1919. The Polish Minority Treaty served as a template for future such treaties.
Through this mechanism, the victorious powers of Great Britain, France, Italy, the U.S., and
Japan imposed conditions which severely limited Poland’s sovereignty and its ability to
defend itself. The Minority Protection Treaty emboldened Nazi paramilitary groups disguised as minorities and encouraged German subversive operations in Poland. States of the
Entente were not bound by similar obligations and both Germany and the Soviet Union openly persecuted the Polish minority on their territories. See generally STANISLAW MACKIEWICZ,
COLONEL BECK AND HIS POLICY 54–58 (1944) (providing an overview of the restrictions and
obligations imposed on states party to this treaty).
16
See id. at 54–55 (discussing how the treaty limited Polish sovereignty and imposed rules
regarding the treatment of Jews).
17
See id. at 55 (explaining how Poland was obligated to help minorities within its borders
assimilate, while Germany organized an anti-Polish campaign on minority grounds).
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thousand ethnic Poles living in Germany.18 Furthermore, both Germany and
the Soviet Union justified their 1939 aggression on Poland by the need to
protect their “persecuted minorities” living in Poland.19 Accordingly, the
minority protection argument served as a pretext to start World War II,
whereby both aggressors reclaimed the territory they lost as a result of the
rebirth of Poland in 1918.20
By attacking Poland, the Soviet Union violated a number of
bilateral and multilateral treaties. In particular, the U.S.S.R. violated the
Treaty of Riga signed on March 18, 1921, which established the permanent
border between Poland and the Soviet Union.21 The border so-established
was subsequently approved on March 15, 1923 by the resolution of the
Conference of Ambassadors acting under Article 87.3 of the Treaty of
Versailles.22
To strengthen neighborly friendship in 1932, Poland signed a NonAggression Treaty with the Soviet Union. This treaty was initially binding
for three years, but within two years it was extended until December 31,
1945.23 In an effort to further the cause of peace, Poland, together with other
countries bordering the Soviet Union, also signed the Convention for the
18
See TIMOTHY SNYDER, BLOODLANDS: EUROPE BETWEEN HITLER AND STALIN 103 (2010)
(“Of the 143,810 people arrested under the accusation of espionage for Poland, 111,091 were
executed.”). Poland withdrew from the Minority Treaty in 1934, due to the admission of the
Soviet Union to the League of Nations. See also MACKIEWICZ, supra note 15, at 54–55 (discussing how Germany aimed to discredit Poland politically and launched an anti-Polish
campaign).
19
See MACKIEWICZ, supra note 15, at 55 (explaining that Germany and Russia had previously harassed Poland about its minority treaty obligations).
20
See BRONISŁAW KUŚNIERZ, STALIN AND THE POLES: AN INDICTMENT OF THE SOVIET
LEADERS 25–26 (1949) (explaining that the invasion of Poland in September 1939 was the
result of a secret agreement between Germany and Russia made under the guise of the NonAggression Pact).
21
Article 3 of the Treaty of Riga provided that:
Russia and Ukraine explicitly abandoned all rights and claims to the territories situated to the west of it. The two Parties also undertook to respect each other’s sovereign rights and not to interfere in the domestic affairs of the other.
At the time of the signing the Treaty the head of the Polish delegation said, “we
have endeavored to settle all problems in a spirit of fairness and justice, making
concession not only in order to reach agreement, but also to facilitate our future relations,” and Mr. Joffe, the leader of the Soviet delegation, replied: “We have concluded a Peace Treaty giving full satisfaction to the vital legitimate and necessary
interest of the Polish Nation.”
Id. at 22. The Treaty of Riga was signed after the Polish Army defeated the Red Army in the
1920 Battle of Warsaw. Id.
22
Id. at 22–23.
23
The Polish-Soviet Nonaggression Treaty was signed on July 25, 1932, and extended on
May 5, 1934. See id. at 24.
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Definition of Aggression with the Soviet Union.24 This pioneering peace
treaty put forward for the first time ever the most comprehensive definition
of the aggressor.25
Two other documents that regulated Polish-Soviet relations in the
years leading up to World War II are also relevant. The Kellogg-Briand
Pact, adopted on August 27, 1928, renounced the war of aggression,
prohibiting the use of war as “an instrument of national policy.”26 It was the
first ever multinational tool that sought to prevent wars of aggression. This
pact provided the legal basis for the crime against peace that was
subsequently adopted and developed by the Nuremberg Tribunal.27 Poland
and Germany were the initial signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, while
the Soviet Union became its signatory by the time it went into effect on July
24, 1929.28
One more international agreement comes to play in this context. On
February 26, 1938, Poland and the Soviet Union signed a special Protocol in
Moscow, whereby both countries affirmed that the existing treaties and
agreements between them constituted a guarantee of the inviolability of the
peaceful relations between the two countries.29
One and a half years later, on August 23, 1939, the Soviet Union
violated all the above-mentioned international treaties and agreements by
signing the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact with Nazi Germany that included a
secret protocol to partition Poland.30 In the Secret Additional Protocol to the
Soviet-German Nonaggression Treaty known as the Ribbentrop-Molotov
Pact, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany addressed the destruction of
Poland “in strictly confidential terms,” and tentatively agreed upon the
future boundaries of their respective “spheres of influence” that cut Poland
in half.31 Article 2 of the Secret Additional Protocol to the
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact stated:
24

Id.
This convention was signed on July 3, 1933. Id. Similarly, on January 26, 1934 Poland
signed a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany. Id. In this bilateral agreement the contracting parties stated that their relations shall be governed by the Kellogg Pact and declared that
“in no case [they would have] recourse to violence to settle the disputes.” Id. at 24–25.
26
Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 U.N.T.S. 57,
available at www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/kbpact.htm.
27
See KUŚNIERZ, supra note 20, at 1–2 (listing the different types of punishable crimes).
28
Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, supra note 26.
29
KUŚNIERZ, supra note 20, at 24.
30
See Paul Halsall, Modern History Sourcebook, The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 1939,
FORDHAM UNIV., http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1939pact.html (last visited June 6,
2012) (providing the text to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact as well as the text of the Secret
Additional Protocol).
31
Id. (quoting Article IV of the Secret Additional Protocol).
25
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In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas
belonging to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the
U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew,
Vistula, and San.
The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the
maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be
bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political
developments.
In any event both Governments will resolve this question by means of a
friendly agreement. 32

This protocol constitutes direct proof of Soviet-German conspiracy to
commit a crime against peace. While Nazi Germany was prosecuted for
crimes against peace and for violations of international treaties and
agreements during the Nuremberg Trial, the Soviet Union was never
prosecuted for crimes against peace and for violating binding international
treaties and bilateral agreements with Poland.33

B.

German-Soviet Attack on Poland

On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland from the north,
west and south in flagrant violation of all international treaties and
agreements.34 On September 3, 1939, France and Great Britain declared war
on Germany in accordance with guarantees of security given to Poland.35
However, neither Great Britain nor France offered military assistance to
Poland as was required by the security guarantees.36
On September 17, 1939, the Soviet Union attacked Poland from the
east. This aggression that constituted crime against peace was implemented
in accordance with the Secret Additional Protocol to the
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. The Soviet attack on Poland occurred at the time
when Warsaw effectively resisted German onslaught and the Polish Army
was in the process of consolidating its forces in the east in preparation for
the counteroffensive. Thus, the Soviet attack on Poland took place at the
most critical juncture of Poland’s defensive campaign against Germany.
32

See id. (quoting Article II of the Secret Additional Protocol). This secret protocol constitutes direct proof of Soviet-German conspiracy to commit a crime against peace.
33
See ROBERT CONQUEST, STALIN: BREAKER OF NATIONS 278–279 (1991) (describing
rejected efforts at the Nuremberg trials to introduce evidence of the 1939 Secret Protocols to
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and calling the result “more than a success” for Stalin).
34
SNYDER, supra note 18, at 116.
35
GEOFFREY ROBERTS, STALIN’S WARS: FROM WORLD WAR TO COLD WAR, 1939–1953, at
36 (2006).
36
SNYDER, supra note 18, at 120 (“Poland fought alone. France and Britain declared war
on Germany, as promised, but took no meaningful military action during the campaign.”).
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This premeditated act of aggression was undertaken in violation of at least
seven binding bilateral and multilateral treaties and pacts.37
At 2:00 AM on September 17, 1939, Vladimir Potiomkin, Deputy
People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs summoned Waclaw Grzybowski,
Polish Ambassador in Moscow, and read him a note of the Soviet
Government.38 The note stated that the Polish State had collapsed and no
longer existed because Poland had lost all its industrial and cultural centers
and Warsaw no longer existed as the capital of Poland; the Government of
Poland had fallen apart and did not show any signs of life.39 Therefore all
agreements with Poland, including the non-aggression treaty, were void and
the Red Army was about to cross the Polish border to bring peace and
stability to its Ukrainian and White Russian brothers. Ambassador
Grzybowski recalled:
I was prepared for a bad news. I thought the Soviets would, under some
pretext, repudiate the non-aggression pact. What was about to happen was
much worse.
Potiomkin slowly read me a note signed by the Chairman of the Council of
the People’s Commissars, Mr. Molotov. When he finished, I immediately

37

KUŚNIERZ, supra note 20, at 26–27 (listing the seven separate agreements that were
violated, including the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Covenant of the League of Nations).
38
The Soviet note stated:
The Polish-German war disclosed internal bankruptcy of the Polish State. In 10
days of military operations Poland lost all its industrial and cultural centers, Warsaw no longer exists as the capital of Poland; the Government of Poland fell apart
and does not show any signs of life. All this indicates the Polish State and its Government in reality ceased to exist. Left to its own devices and deprived of the leadership, Poland became a convenient ground for all sorts of activities and disruptions that may threaten the Soviet Union. Therefore the Government of the Soviet
Union that has remained neutral to this point can no longer continue its neutrality
in face of such facts.
Furthermore, the Government of the Soviet Union can no longer remain neutral at
the time when the kindred Ukrainian and White Russians living within the territory
of the Polish State are left to fend for themselves without any protection.
Considering this situation the Government of the Soviet Union issued an order to
the Commander of the Red Army for its units to cross the border and take under
their protection the life and livelihood of the people of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia.
The Soviet Government also intends to undertake all efforts to release the Polish
people from the tragic war which was forced upon them by their irresponsible
leaders and to give them the opportunity to exist in peace. People’s Commissar for
Foreign Affairs - Viacheslav Molotov.
JERZY ŁOJEK, AGRESJA 17 WRZEŚNIA 1939: STUDIUM ASPEKTÓW POLITYCZNYCH 186–187
(1990).
39
Id.

File: Szonert 2

642

Created on: 7/4/2012 2:02:00 PM

Last Printed: 9/21/2012 8:33:00 PM

CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 44:633

stated that I refuse to accept this note and that I categorically object to its
contents and form.40

Grzybowski pointed out that the statements in the note were false
because the Polish Government did not collapse. To the contrary, it led the
organized defense of the country on the ground. “I understand,” he said,
“that I have the obligation to inform my Government about the aggression
that most likely is under way but I will do nothing else.”41 Potiomkin tried
to persuade Grzybowski to accept the note to which Grzybowski replied:
“Even the most pessimistic reports of military attachés cannot constitute the
basis for repudiating international treaty.” He also added that in 1812 when
the French Army entered Moscow no one concluded that Russia ceased to
exist. Grzybowski left the note on the table. It was 4:30 AM Moscow time
and 1:30 AM Warsaw time. Half an hour later he sent a telegram alerting
the Polish Government to the Soviet aggression.42
Facts presented in the Soviet note were false indeed. Far from being
defeated, Poland was bracing for long resistance. Many key political centers
and military posts successfully resisted the initial German attack. The
capital city of Warsaw led by charismatic President Starzynski effectively
fended off numerous German attacks and was holding on without any signs
of conceding defeat. Other strategic centers like the key Baltic Sea military
outpost Hel or the Modlin fortress were in a position to fight for much
longer.43 The Polish Army was in the process of regrouping in the east in
preparation for counteroffensive. Vast stocks of armaments were amassed
and concentrated in eastern Poland in preparation for the counter-attack.
The Polish Central Command was in control of the situation in eastern
Poland including its troops and key armament.
For Poland, the Soviet attack represented a stab in the back. It was
the Soviet aggression that forced the Polish Commander-in-Chief to order
evacuation of the Polish Army to Romania and Hungary.44 But many cities
on the Soviet side of the Ribbentrop-Molotov line organized a spontaneous
defense against the Soviet forces. An eyewitness from the city of Grodno
recalls that several kilometers from Grodno bodies of about one hundred

40

Id. at 73.
Id.
42
Id. at 74.
43
See ATLAS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 39 (John Keegan ed., 2003) (Modlin surrendered on September 28, 1939, Hel on October 2, 1939, and Kock, site of the surrender of the
last Polish combatants, on October 6, 1939).
44
1 SAMUEL W. MITCHAM, JR., THE RISE OF THE WEHRMACHT: THE GERMAN ARMED
FORCES AND WORLD WAR II 210 (2008) (“For Marshal Rydz-Smigly, the Polish commanderin-chief, [the Soviet invasion] was the last straw.”).
41
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Poles killed in the fighting were buried in three graves.45 When Red Cross
representatives talked to the gravediggers they were told that one grave was
for the soldiers, the second for the civilians, and the third one for the state
employees.46
The Soviets took 250,000 Polish soldiers as prisoners of war.47 It is
estimated that in resisting the Soviet aggression at least 5,000 Polish
soldiers died and about 10,000 were wounded. The Soviets also captured
massive armaments of the Polish Army including 900 artillery guns, close
to one million artillery shells, more than 10 thousand automatic rifles, over
300,000 regular rifles, with munitions in the millions.48 These numbers
proudly presented by Molotov in his victory speech on October 31, 1939,
clearly prove that the Polish Army was far from being defeated by the
Germans at the time of the Soviet aggression.49 Accordingly, the Soviet
argument that the Polish State ceased to exist had nothing to do with the
reality on the ground. However, in light of aggressive anti-Polish
propaganda jointly launched by both the Nazi and Soviet war machines, this
“justification” for war on Poland sounds plausible to many to this day.
However, the British and American diplomats were not fooled by
the Nazi-Soviet propaganda plot. The American intelligence report prepared
in London in 1943 included the following observation:
It is interesting to juxtapose the text of the Soviet note of September 17,
1939, with the texts of the notes of Catherine the Great, sent between 1766
and 1795 to a number of European powers with a view to justifying the
three consecutive partitions of Poland. The argumentation used is
incredibly similar. Both Catherine and M. Potemkin refer to the alleged
state of anarchy in Poland and both of them extend their protection to the
Ukrainians and White Ruthenians, with the sole distinction that the
Empress speaks of followers of the Orthodox Church while the Soviet
diplomat refers to nationalities.50

45

GRAŻYNA LIPIŃSKA, JEŚLI ZAPOMNĘ O NICH 37 (1988).
Id.
47
See W. ANDERS, AN ARMY IN EXILE: THE STORY OF THE SECOND POLISH CORPS 11
(1949) (describing “Soviet intervention” as preventing “the escape of from 200,000 to
300,000 soldiers”).
48
ŁOJEK, supra note 38, at 106.
49
Id.
50
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, CONFIDENTIAL P-66020 REPORT, SOVIET DEPORTATION OF THE
INHABITANTS OF EASTERN POLAND IN 1939–1941 (Dec. 1943), reprinted in THE POLISH
DEPORTEES OF WORLD WAR II: RECOLLECTIONS OF REMOVAL TO THE SOVIET UNION AND
DISPERSAL THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 211 (Tadeusz Piotrowski ed., 2004). In his speech from
November 7, 1941 Stalin indeed made reference to the Great Russian Empire and great ancestors, all of them Russians. SNYDER, supra note 18, at 227.
46
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This analogy was by no means accidental. Vladimir Potiomkin who
handed down the note to Ambassador Grzybowski was the editor of a
compendium of history of diplomacy in which Catherine the Great was
quoted. Her political strategy was described as follows:
Of the old methods of diplomatic action one especially widely in use in
Catherine’s time was demagogic agitation among the Orthodox population
in foreign states. In fact everywhere where Christians were concerned ‘the
Tsars could adopt the pose of liberators’ so as to further their own aims. 51

On the night of September 16, 1939, the Soviet forces crossed the
Polish border with six armies divided into Ukrainian and Belorussian fronts,
with 620,000 soldiers, 4,700 tanks and 3,300 planes.52 On the day of the
Soviet attack, the Polish Government and the Central Command were
located in Eastern Poland. At 4:00 PM on September 17, 1939, the Polish
Commander-in-Chief Rydz-Śmigły issued a directive to the Polish troops
not to fight the Soviets and evacuate to Romania and Hungary.53 The Polish
Government refused to surrender or negotiate with the Soviets and the next
day crossed the Polish-Romanian border with the intent to move to France
to continue the struggle for Poland from abroad.
On September 19, 1939, the British Government expressed its
deepest reservations towards the statement that the Polish State and its
Government ceased to exist and towards the reasons announced by the
Soviet Government for this portrayal of the matter. The statement read:
On its part the British Government continues to recognize the Polish
Government as a legitimate government of the Republic of Poland and
therefore cannot accept the view by which the current circumstances
justify the repudiation by the Soviet Union of its treaty with Poland or the
resulting thereof Soviet invasion of Poland.54

In the meantime, the Soviets decided to arrest diplomats from the
Polish diplomatic missions in the Soviet Union. In blatant violation of the
Geneva Convention, the Soviet Union concluded that since Poland no
longer existed, the Polish diplomats lost their immunity and therefore
51

U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, supra note 50, at 212.
PAWEŁ PIOTR WIECZORKIEWICZ, KAMPANIA 1939 ROKU 87 (2001).
53
Directive of Commander-in-Chief Rydz Śmigły, issued on September 17, 1939:
The Soviets crossed the border. I order general evacuation towards Romania and
Hungary using the shortest paths. Do not fight Bolsheviks unless they attack or order disarmament of the troops. Orders for Warsaw and other cities fighting against
Germans remain the same. Cities approached by Bolsheviks should try to negotiate
with them regarding the passage to Hungary and Romania.
Id. at 90.
54
ŁOJEK, supra note 38, at 192–93.
52
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should be arrested as the enemies of the Soviet State. Ironically, it was the
German Ambassador Schulenburg who personally secured the release of the
Polish Ambassador Grzybowski from the Soviet Union. But Consul General
of the Republic of Poland in Kiev Jerzy Matusiński was not that lucky.
Summoned on September 30, 1939 by the Soviet secret police (the NKVD),
he disappeared without a trace.55
On September 28, 1939, the Soviet Union signed the Boundary and
Friendship Treaty with Nazi Germany. It was only minutes before the final
signing ceremony that the capital city of Warsaw finally surrendered,
defying all German-Soviet plans.56 The German-Soviet Boundary and
Friendship Treaty provided that Germany and the Soviet Union “consider it
as exclusively their task, after the collapse of the former Polish state, to
re-establish peace and order in these territories.”57 The treaty partitioned
Poland between the two aggressors with 51.5% of the Polish territory and
37% of the Polish population (13,199,000 Polish citizens) being annexed to
the Soviet Union.58 The Confidential Protocol to this treaty provided for
transfer of the German minority from the Soviet Union to western parts of
Poland outright incorporated to the German Reich, and the same transfer
rights were granted to the Ukrainians and White Russians living on the
55
Based on the same logic of non-existence of the Polish State, soldiers of the Polish
Army were denied the status of prisoners of war although all Soviet internal documents,
including the key execution order of March 5, 1940, clearly referred to them as prisoners of
war. See RESOLUTION NO. P13/144 OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE AUCP(b) – MARCH 5, 1940, available at http://www.electronicmuseum.ca/PolandWW2/katyn_memorial_wall/kmw_politburo_resolution.html (last updated Feb. 28, 2012)
(referring to the “people remaining in the prisoner-of-war camps” and the “former Polish
Army officers”).
56
Polish General Tadeusz Kutrzeba and German General Johannes Blaskowitz signed a
document of Warsaw surrender and hostilities ceased at 2:00 pm Warsaw time on September
27, the same day the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty was executed..
MITCHAM, supra note 44, at 212.
57
Article 1 of the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty dated September 28,
1939 reads: “The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the U.S.S.R.
determine as the boundary of their respective national interests in the territory of the former
Polish state the line marked on the attached map, which shall be described in more detail in a
supplementary protocol.” German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty, Ger.-U.S.S.R.,
art. I, Sep. 28, 1939, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/gsbound.asp (last
visited June 6, 2012).
58
TADEUSZ PIOTROWSKI, POLAND’S HOLOCAUST: ETHNIC STRIFE, COLLABORATION WITH
OCCUPYING FORCES AND GENOCIDE IN THE SECOND REPUBLIC, 1918–1947, at 9 (1998). Nazi
Germany grabbed 48% of Poland’s lands (187,644 square kilometers) containing twenty-two
million people. Out of this booty, they directly incorporated into the Third Reich four Polish
provinces with nearly 92,000 square kilometers and over ten million people. The Nazis also
formed a German colony named the Government General with nearly 96,000 square kilometers and about twelve million people, and transformed some Polish provinces to Slovakian
control. Id. at 8.
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German side of the partition line. It shall be noted that no transfer rights
were guaranteed to the Poles or the Jews as these ethnic groups became the
primary targets of persecution.59

C.

German-Soviet Collaboration Against Poland 1939–1941

A formal declaration of close cooperation between Nazi Germany
and the Soviet Union was spelled out in Article III of the
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 23, 1939.60 The need for such close
cooperation rapidly intensified in early September once it became clear that
the defeat of Poland could be assured only through a joint effort of both
aggressors.
In preparation for the Soviet aggression on Poland, a great deal of
attention was paid to the coordination of military operations between the
German and Soviet armies along the Ribbentrop-Molotov partition line. On
September 15th, Ribbentrop wrote to his Ambassador in Moscow:
[A] representative of each Government, as well as German and Russian
officers on the spot in the area of operations, should have a meeting in
order to take the necessary steps, for which meeting we propose to
assemble at Bialystok by air.61

In another secret protocol, this time attached to the German-Soviet
Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28, 1939, the Polish people

59

The Confidential Protocol reads:
The Government of the U.S.S.R. shall place no obstacles in the way of Reich nationals and other persons of German descent residing in the territories under its jurisdiction, if they desire to migrate to Germany or to the territories under German
jurisdiction. It agrees that such removals shall be carried out by agents of the Government of the Reich in cooperation with the competent local authorities and that
the property rights of the emigrants shall be protected. A corresponding obligation
is assumed by the Government of the German Reich in respect to the persons of
Ukrainian or White Ruthenia descent residing in the territories under its jurisdiction.
German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty, supra note 57 (quoting the Confidential
Protocol).
60
Article III of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact dated August 23, 1939 provides: “The Governments of the two High Contracting Parties shall in the future maintain continual contact
with one another for the purpose of consultation in order to exchange information on problems affecting their common interests.” Treaty of Nonaggression Between Germany and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ger.-U.S.S.R., art. III, Aug. 23, 1939 [hereinafter Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact], available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/nonagres.asp
(last visited June 6, 2012).
61
Telegram No. 360 from Joachim von Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister of Ger., to Friedrich
Werner von der Schulenberg, Ambassador of Ger. to the U.S.S.R., (Sep. 15, 1939) [hereinafter Telegram No. 360], available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns072.asp.

File: Szonert 2

2012]

Created on: 7/4/2012 2:02:00 PM

Last Printed: 9/21/2012 8:33:00 PM

WAS KATYN A GENOCIDE?

647

were once again singled out for special treatment and “suitable measures”
by both the Nazi and Soviet war machines. This protocol read as follows:
Both parties will tolerate in their territories no Polish agitation which
affects the territories of the other party. They will suppress in their
territories all beginnings of such agitation and inform each other
concerning suitable measures for this purpose.62

Over the period of six months following the aggression, at least four
high level meetings between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union took place
on the territory of Poland. The first meeting took place on September 27,
1939, in the city of Brest while the Polish Army was still fighting.63 Not
much is known about the second meeting that took place at the end of
November 1939 in Przemyśl.64 The third meeting began on February 20,
1940 in Zakopane, southern Poland, and lasted several weeks.65 The fourth
high level NKVD–Gestapo meeting took place in March 1940 in
Kraków.66 Some historians point out that it is likely that Stalin’s decision to
murder Polish officers was related to these meetings, although few
documents exist to shed more light on this issue.67
62
German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty, supra note 57 (quoting the Secret
Supp. Protocol).
63
Josef A. Dembinski, Decyzja władz sowieckich z 5 marca 1940 r. o zagładzie polskich
jeńców wojennych [The Soviet Government's Decision of March 5, 1940 About the Extermination of Polish Prisoners of War], NIEDZIELA, http://www.voskresenie.niedziela.pl/artykul.
php?lg=pl&nr=200409&dz=z_historii&id_art=00005 (last visited June 11, 2012) (describing
the Sep. 27 meeting in Brest and its focus on ways to combat the Polish insurgency and
sabotage campaigns).
64
See id. So little is known about this conference that some commentators fail to mention
it at all. See ALLEN PAUL, KATYŃ: STALIN’S MASSACRE AND THE TRIUMPH OF TRUTH 68
(2010).
65
Dembinski, supra note 63. The German side was represented in Zakopane by Adolf
Eichmann and the Soviet side Grigory Litvinov. Id. The final report from this meeting presumably stated that the Polish ethnic group was to be liquidated by 1975 through extermination and deportation. Such document was reported to exist by the Polish underground, however it has not been located. Some historians like Norman Davies, argue that the NKVDGestapo meetings facilitated the coordination of repressive actions such as Katyn and “Action AB” (Ausserordentliche Befriedungsaktion). Norman Davies, Między Swastyką a
Gwiazdą [Between the Swastika and the Star], 15 APOKRYF (1999), available at
www.tygodnik.com.pl/apokryf/15/davies.html.
66
See TADEUSZ BÓR-KOMOROWSKI THE SECRET ARMY 46 – 47 (1951) (discussing that in
March 1940 the Polish underground reported that a special commission of NKVD arrived in
Kraków to discuss with Gestapo common strategy against the Polish underground); TADEUSZ
BÓR-KOMOROWSKI, ARMIA PODZIEMNA 174 (1951) (mentioning the development of a common propaganda strategy around that same time).
67
See CONQUEST, supra note 33, at 229 (discussing a Soviet investigation linking the
Katyn massacre with the conference in Zakopane); George Watson, Rehearsal for the Holocaust, 71 COMMENT 60–61 (1981) (discussing the possibility that the fate of the interned
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What exactly was discussed at these meeting may never be known.
Some believe that documents demonstrating the cooperation of the Soviet
NKVD with the Nazi Gestapo during the Katyn-Siberia operations68 are the
reason that Russia keeps many documents related to the Katyn crime as
classified. What is known for sure is this: The actions of Nazi Germany and
the Soviet Union towards the Polish nation were remarkably similar during
the period of Nazi-Soviet collaboration between September 1939 and June
1941.69
Upon invading Poland from the west, German special extermination
squads called Operational Groups (Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommando)
consisting of Gestapo and self-defense forces70 had followed the German
Army into Poland, undertaking a housecleaning of Polish intelligentsia,
clergy and nobility. A preliminary study conducted in 1945 revealed

that 714 mass executions conducted by the Einsatzgruppen execution
squads claimed the life of 16,336 Polish civilians during the first
fifty-five days of German occupation.71 Many of the victims were
identified and captured according to special lists prepared by members of
the German minority living in Poland.72 From day one of the Polish
campaign, the Germans were implementing the “Intelligenzaktion,” that is,
an extermination operation directed at members of the Polish elite.73 For
example, on November 6, 1939, the 183 members of the faculty and staff of
the Jagiellonian University in Kraków were arrested and sent to
Sachsenhausen and Dachau concentration camps.74 In a note dated
Polish officers might have been decided at this conference); but see KATYN: A CRIME
WITHOUT PUNISHMENT 143 (Anna M. Cienciala, Natalia S. Lebedeva & Wojciech Materski
eds., Marian Schwartz, Anna M. Cienciala & Maia A. Kipp trans., 2007) (referencing historians’ dispute regarding the German-Soviet meetings and the Katyn massacre, pointing to the
lack of documentary evidence confirming any direct cooperation on this issue).
68
Norman Davies is one such historian. See 2 NORMAN DAVIES, GOD’S PLAYGROUND: A
HISTORY OF POLAND 329 (2005).
69
Id.
70
Self-defense units called Selbstschutz consisted of paramilitary groups formed by the
German minority in Poland.
Klaus-Peter Friedrich, Collaboration in a “Land Without a Quisling”: Patterns of Cooperation with the Nazi German Occupation Regime in Poland during World War II, 64 SLAVIC
REV. 711, 725, 727 (2005).
71
SZYMON DATNER, 55 DNI WEHRMACHTU W POLSCE [55 DAYS: WEHRMACHT IN POLAND]
619 (1967).
72
See RICHARD RHODES, MASTERS OF DEATH: THE SS-EINSATZGRUPPEN AND THE
INVENTION OF THE HOLOCAUST 5 (2002).
73
ANNA MEIER, DIE INTELLIGENZAKTION: DIE VERNICHTUNG DER POLNISCHEN
OBERSCHICHT IM GAU DANZIG-WESTPREUßEN [THE INTELLIGENZAKTION: THE DESTRUCTION
OF THE POLISH ELITE IN THE GAU DANZIG-WEST PRUSSIA] (2008).
74
See JAN S. PRYBYLA, WHEN ANGELS WEPT 134 (2010).
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September 12, 1939, on a discussion with Hitler regarding Poland, General
Erwin Lahousen wrote down that the goal of mass executions of the Polish
intelligentsia was “national extermination.”75
As the Germans were hunting down the Polish elites on the western
side of the Ribbentrop-Molotov line, in the east, squads of special NKVD
operational groups had followed the Soviet Army into Poland. The NKVDCheKa groups furthering “vengeance of the oppressed classes” were
cleansing ethnic Poles, including intelligentsia, clergy, and nobility, from
the Soviet half of Poland.76 These special operational NKVD units, formed
in accordance with NKVD order dated September 8, 1939, consisted of
operational officers of the central and regional organs of NKVD and
political-operational employees of the border guard for special tasks.
Deputy People’s Commissar Merkulov coordinated activities of these
special operational forces with the military formations of the Red Army in
Ukraine while Bochkov coordinated this cooperation in Belarus.77
According to NKVD documents, during the first two months of operations
these NKVD special operational groups arrested on the conquered Polish
territory 11,817 persons, accusing them of espionage, diversionary and antiSoviet activities, terrorism, banditry, sabotage and other crimes.78 Many of
them were killed either during interrogations or later pursuant to March 5,
1940 Execution Order.
The mass killing campaigns of Polish nationals on both sides of the
Ribbentrop-Molotov partition line focused on the same categories of people.
All those who could resist the occupation of Poland as well as those who
fought for Poland’s independence between 1918 and 1920 were at the top of
the Nazi and Soviet death lists.

75
ZBRODNIA KATYŃSKA W KRĘGU PRAWDY I KŁAMSTWA [THE KATYN MASSACRE: IN THE
CIRCLE OF TRUTH AND LIES] 63 (Sławomir Kalbarczyk ed., 2010).
76
Id.
77
The NKVD operational groups were responsible for conducting mass arrests and roundups, investigations, and preparation of conscript lists for future arrests and deportations.
These groups were also responsible for the formation on the Polish territory of the Soviet
administration including setting up NKVD branches in all major Polish cities. NKVD special
operational groups were taking over state buildings, office, banks, newspapers, and publishing house, confiscated documentation of the Polish Government, its archives and valuables.
See generally 1–2 POLSKIE PODZIEMIE NA TERENACH ZACHODNIEJ UKRAINY I ZACHODNIEJ
BIAŁORUSI W LATACH 1939–1941 [THE POLISH UNDERGROUND IN AREAS OF WESTERN
UKRAINE AND WESTERN BELARUS IN THE YEARS 1939–1941] (Wiktor Komogorow et al. eds.,
2001).
78
NKVD document dated November 27, 1939. Among arrested Polish citizens were
Polish officers, member of Polish resistance, refugees from Western Poland, members of
Polish police and gendarmerie, merchant, landowners, public employees, Ukrainians nationals, members of various Polish political parties. See id.
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The mass killings of the Polish elites on both sides of the
Ribbentrop-Molotov line were supplemented by the forced removal of the
Polish populations from the conquered Polish territory. Lands taken over by
the Germans were divided into western territories, which were outright
incorporated to the Third Reich, and the area around Warsaw, which was
designated as the General Government.79 Ethnic Poles from the area
incorporated to the Reich were expelled from their homes and either sent to
slave labor camps into the Old Reich or deported to the General
Government that served as the German equivalent of the Soviet Siberia.80 In
all, approximately one million Polish citizens were forcibly removed from
the Polish territories annexed to the Third Reich to make room for the
German settlers.81
The Polish territory taken over by the Soviets was either directly
incorporated to the Soviet Union or transferred to Lithuania, leaving no
residual Poland. The Polish elites in Soviet-controlled territory were
arrested and killed, while the entire families of ethnic Poles were expelled
from their homes and shipped to the wilderness of Siberia or deserts of
Kazakhstan.
Both killings and deportations were implemented by Nazi Germany
and the Soviet Union in accordance with the proscription lists prepared by
their people on the ground. In the case of Germany, the German minority in
Poland led the effort to identify their Polish neighbors for murder or
expulsion. In the Soviet Union various minorities cooperated with the
communist organizations in compiling lists of undesirable Poles and their
sympathizers.
The Soviet deportation lists were prepared in accordance with
Beria’s instructions implementing the Deportation Resolution of the Soviet
Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom) dated December 5, 1939.82
To implement this resolution, Beria issued a number of orders and
instructions. For example, on December 29, 1939, he issued a special
instruction on the order of deportations from western Ukraine and
Belorussia.83 Another regulation on special penal camps and procedures of
employment for deportees soon followed.84 All these documents formed the
basis for the mass deportation action that began the night of February 10,
79

SNYDER, supra note 18, at 127–28.
See SNYDER, supra note 18, at 127–28 (discussing the use of the General Government
territory as a “dumping ground for unwanted people”).
81
PIOTROWSKI, supra note 58, at 22.
82
KATHERINE R. JOLLUCK, EXILE AND IDENTITY 14 (2002). Beria appointed Tsanava and
Serov to prepare lists of families to be deported in early January. Id.
83
See id. at 14–16.
84
See id. at 16.
80
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1940, expelling Polish citizens from their homes in Poland to the wilderness
of Siberia.
While meetings between German and Soviet high officials were
taking place in Zakopane and Kraków in February and March of 1940, in
Berlin and Moscow critical decisions were made with respect to Polish
nationals. One such decision was made by Hitler on March 2, 1940, to
exterminate people regarded as Polish leaders.85 Known as the AB Aktion
(Extraordinary Pacification Action), this mass killing operation was aimed
at eliminating the leadership elements of the Polish society in the Germanoccupied part of Poland.86 About 7,000 leaders and professors, teachers
and priests considered suspects of criminal activity were subsequently
massacred at various locations throughout Nazi-occupied Poland.87 By the
summer of 1940, more than 61,000 Polish activists, intelligentsia,
scholars, actors, officers of the Polish Army, and other leaders were
murdered.88
At the time when Hitler ordered the AB Aktion, Stalin and his
Politburo made a decision to execute by shooting 25,700 Polish POWs and
persons arrested on the conquered Polish territory, mostly officers of the
Polish Army and local leaders.89 This order to murder 25,700 Poles,
prepared by Beria, signed by Stalin, and approved by the Soviet Politburo
on March 5, 1940, was most likely made between February 28 and March 2,
1940.90 Thus, Stalin’s decision to murder 25,700 Polish officers held in
POW camps and prisons was made at exactly the same time as Hitler’s
decision to authorize AB Aktion to exterminate the Polish intelligentsia on
the German side of the Ribbentrop-Molotov partition line.
85

SNYDER, supra note 18, at 146–47. Hitler directed Hans Frank, the Governor of the
General Government, that “leadership elements” had to be “eliminated.” Id. The list Frank
drew up included the educated, clergy, and politically active individuals. Id.
86
Id. at 147. Special Einsatzgruppen formations with some help from regular Wehrmacht
units took part in Operation Tannenberg in the first two months of German operations in
Poland. See id. at 126; PIOTROWSKI, supra note 58, at 23. In addition, a special formation was
created from the German minority living in Poland called Selbstschutz, whose members had
trained in Germany before the war in diversion and guerilla fighting. The formation was
responsible for many massacres and due to its bad reputation was dissolved by Nazi authorities after the September Campaign. DATNER, supra note 71, at 108–22. The AB Extraordinary Pacification Action that began on March 30, 1940 was viewed as continuation of the
Intelligentsia Action from fall 1939. See SNYDER, supra note 18, at 147.
87
See RICHARD C. LUKAS, THE FORGOTTEN HOLOCAUST 9 (1997).
88
BOGUSIA J. WOJCIECHOWSKA, WAITING TO BE HEARD 22 (2009) (referring to the Sonderfahndungsbuch Polen (Special Prosecution Book Poland) listing 61,000 Polish leaders).
89
See SNYDER, supra note 18, at 147 (explaining that the German’s AB Aktion was announced on March 2, three days before the Soviet’s March 5 decision).
90
See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 475 n.290 (explaining
the confusion over the dates and bringing Natalia Lebedeva’s conclusion of the date coming
earlier than March 5, 1940 but before February 28, 1940).
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Katyn Killings

The best-known Katyn forest massacre represents only one of many
mass murder sites of the Polish citizens conducted throughout the Soviet
Union pursuant to the execution order issued by the Soviet Politburo on
March 5, 1940 (March 5th Execution Order).91 Altogether, 25,700 Polish
nationals were condemned to death by this order. They represented two
distinct groups. The first group consisted of 14,700 Polish POWs taken
from the battlefield; mainly officers, policemen and border guards who were
held in three special POW camps in Kozielsk, Starobelsk, and Ostashkov .92
The second group of condemned men included 11,000 Polish citizens
arrested on the conquered Polish territory in the aftermath of the Soviet
invasion, mostly local leaders and members of the Polish administration.93
Killings of the rank and file members of the Polish Army sent to the slave
labor camps has not even been touched by the historians. According to the
Russian Memorial Society, 800 burial sites had been catalogued and “what
appeared to be remains of Poles” had been found in almost all of them.94
While mass graves from the Kozielsk camp were discovered in the
Katyn forest in the spring of 1943 by the German Army advancing towards
Moscow, the burial sites of the Polish POWs from Starobelsk and
Ostashkov camps became known fifty years later.95 Bodies of the Polish
officers held in the Starobelsk camp were found in mass graves in
Piatichatki near Kharkov,96 while bodies of those held in the Ostashkov
camp were identified in Mednoye near Kalinin/Tver.97
Executions of Ostashkov prisoners were conducted by a special
operational force under the command of Stalin’s chief executioner, Major
91
For a translated copy of the Execution Order, see Beria Memorandum to Joseph Stalin
Proposing the Execution of the Polish Officers (Mar. 5, 1940), in KATYN; A CRIME WITHOUT
PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 118–20.
92
See PIOTROWSKI, supra note 58, at 15. On December 3, 1939, the Soviet Politburo issued an order to arrest all registered regular officers of the former Polish Army. See Politburo
Decision to Arrest All Registered Regular Officers of the Former Polish Army (Dec. 3,
1939), in KATYN; A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 89. They were condemned to death by March 5, 1940 Execution Order. Id. at 118–20.
93
See PIOTROWSKI, supra note 58, at 15.
94
PAUL, supra note 64, at 351.
95
See id. at 348–49 (explaining that forty-seven years after the first mass graves were
found the Soviet Union acknowledged the prisoners at the Three Special Camps, and the
construction of memorials at them).
96
SANFORD, supra note 2, at 99.
97
It is likely that the video footage from the executions of the Polish officers exists. There
are reports that such a movie was shown near the end of the war for training purposes.
George Sanford, The Katyn Massacre and Polish-Soviet Relations, 1941–43, 41 J. CONTEMP.
HIST. 95, 95 (2006).
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Vasil Blochin, whom Stalin sent from Moscow to Kalinin specifically for
this purpose.98 Together with Andrej Rubanov from Kalinin NKVD,
Błochin developed a detailed plan of execution for the Ostashkov prisoners
and fully implemented it.99 To minimize resistance, he made sure that the
victims did not suspect anything. In March of 1991, Chief of Kalinin
NKVD, Dmitri Tokariev testified before the Russian prosecutor on the
details of these executions.100 Tokariev recalled that Blochin was amused
when asked about grave diggers. “We don’t need grave diggers, we need
heavy equipment,” he replied.101 Indeed the graves in Mednoye were four to
six meters deep. Twenty-three mass graves with about 250 bodies each were
identified in Mednoye for a total of about 5,750 victims; not enough to
account for the total number of murdered Ostashkov prisoners known to be
6,314.102 The first executions of the Ostashkov prisoners began on April 5,
1940. Tokariev recalled that day as follows:
Blochin put on his special clothing: brown leather cap, long leather
protective garment, brown leather gloves with cuffs above elbows. It made
a tremendous impact on me: I recognized the executioner! 103

Blochin and his team worked with great precision and incredible
efficiency, killing 250 Ostashkov prisoners per day—extinguishing one life
every two minutes. Tokariev observed that “it was a true industrial
undertaking.”104
Bodies of the Polish POWs from the Starobelsk camp were
discovered at mass burial sites in Piatichatki, near Kharkov. 105 After the
demise of the Soviet Union, Ukraine made available to Poland documents
related to the Piatichatki mass graves. This documentation revealed that on
June 5, 1969, General Piotr Fieszczenko reported to Moscow106 that
villagers of Piatichatki near Kharkov discovered mass graves in the nearby
forest. One grave was opened and buttons with the Polish eagle emblem
were found. General Fieszczenko reported that people who learned about
this discovery were saying that the enemies from the war were buried there.
He also reported that in the event further rumors would spread as to the
98

DONALD RAYFIELD, STALIN AND HIS HANGMEN 378–79 (2004).
Id.
100
KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 124–25.
101
Id. at 126.
102
Id. at 440.
103
See id. at 124 (describing Blochin’s special uniform as a leather cap, apron and gloves
that extended beyond the elbow).
104
Id. at 124–25 (describing the shooting and killing of the prisoners).
105
WESLEY ADAMCZYK, WHEN GOD LOOKED THE OTHER WAY: AN ODYSSEY OF WAR,
EXILE, AND REDEMPTION 231 (2004).
106
ZBRODNIA KATYŃSKA W KRĘGU PRAWDY I KŁANSTWA, supra note 75, at 228.
99

File: Szonert 2

654

Created on: 7/4/2012 2:02:00 PM

Last Printed: 9/21/2012 8:33:00 PM

CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 44:633

character of these graves, he would use disinformation measures.107 Later
Fieszczenko reported that 112 mass graves containing about 13,000 bodies
were identified in the Piatichatki forest. He then recommended that these
mass graves be immediately destroyed by using appropriate chemicals and
heavy equipment.108 The destruction of the mass graves involved grinding of
the bones with heavy equipment. It was conducted over the four-year period
under the guise of preparing the area for the construction of a KGB
facility.109
The burial places of the second category of victims—the Polish
civilians arrested after the invasion—remain mostly unknown. This
category of victims included Polish citizens captured or arrested by the
NKVD Special Forces in the months following the Soviet invasion of
Poland. Most of the bodies of these civilians have not been found or
identified. According to internal Soviet documents, at least 7,305 Polish
citizens were murdered in this category.110 According to the documents
released in 1994 by Ukraine, 3,435 Polish civilians were murdered by the
Ukrainian NKVD in the dungeons of NKVD in Kiev, Kharkov and
Cherson. The victims are buried in various still-undisclosed locations; one
of them being Bykovnia near Kiev.111
It is believed that between 3,870 and 4,465 Polish prisoners were
murdered by the Belorussian NKVD but no list of victims murdered in
Belorussia has been found or released. It is believed that some of the Polish
victims from the so-called “Belarusian Katyn List” were murdered in the
prisons of NKVD in Minsk and buried in Kurapaty, on the outskirts of
Minsk.112

107

Id. at 231–36 (reproducing a report of a group leader of KGB Kharkov Region, General
Fieszczenko, to Chairman of KGB USRS on the discovery in the Piatichatki forest near
Kharkov of the burial sites of the murdered Polish officers).
108
Id. at 228
109
Id. at 235.
110
A note by Shelepin to Khrushchev dated March 3, 1959, with recommendation to destroy the documents of the operation sanctioned by the Politburo on March 5, 1940 is reproduced in KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 332.
111
Arrangement of Polish Cemetery of NKVD Victims in Bykovnia May Start in 2011,
UKRANIANS.CA (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.ukrainians.ca/hot/37563-arrangement-of-polishcemetery-of-nkvd-victims-in-bykovnia-may-start-in-2011.html.
112
KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 136 (explaining the lack of
details regarding prisoners in the NKVD prisons of the western region of the Ukraine and
Belorussia, many of whom were shot and buried in unknown graves); see also Belarusian
‘Katyn List’ Does Exist, Says a Belarusian Historian, EASTERN PARTNERSHIP COMMUNITY
(Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.easternpartnership.org/daily-news/2012-01-17/belarusian-katynlist-does-exist-says-belarusian-historian (explaining that the “Katyn list” contains 3,870
names of murdered Polish citizens).
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Mass Deportations from Soviet-Controlled Poland

On March 2, 1940, at exactly the same time as the decision to
execute Polish POWs was made, the Soviet Politburo issued a resolution on
guarding state borders, whereby the NKVD was directed to deport to
Kazakhstan all families of repressed Polish citizens and POWs.113 This
resolution targeted for repression mostly wives, children, and parents of the
men sentenced to death by the March 5th Execution Order.
On March 7, 1940, two days after issuing the March 5th Execution
Order, Beria issued a directive to Soprunenko, head of the NKVD
Administration for POWs, to prepare the compilation of precise lists of
soldiers held in special POW camps, including the composition of the
family of each POW and their exact addresses. The directive specified that
family members are: the wife and children, as well as parents, brothers and
sisters, if they reside with the family of the POW.114 The directive was
supplemented by the “Record Form” to be used to collect detailed addresses
of the family members of the Polish POWs.115
On the same day Beria issued a directive to NKVD Chiefs Serov in
Ukraine and Canawa in Belorussia on deportation to Kazakhstan of the
families of the POWs and prisoners. In this directive Beria stated that all
members of the families of former officers of the Polish Army, policeman,
prison guards, gendarmerie, intelligence servicemen, former landowners,
businessmen, and higher state employees of the former Polish state
apparatus who were held in the POW camps and in prisons in western parts
of Ukraine and Byelorussia must be deported by April 15 to the regions of
Kazakhstan for a period of ten years. To accomplish this task, Beria
ordered:
1. Immediately begin and finish by March 30 of this year the preparation,
according to the enclosed form, registration of all family members of the
above listed categories of prisoners-of-war and persons arrested. Note:
Family members include by definition wives, children, as well as parents,
brothers and sisters if they happen to live in the same location as the rest of
the family of the POW’s or prisoners. . . .
5. c) In all Western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, the operation is to be
carried out in one day beginning at dawn. You will be informed of the day
of the operation separately. . . .
5. e) All property and businesses of the deported families are to be
confiscated. The family has the right to carry with them personal items not

113
114
115

KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 114.
Id. at 149–50.
Id. at 150.

File: Szonert 2

656

Created on: 7/4/2012 2:02:00 PM

Last Printed: 9/21/2012 8:33:00 PM

CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 44:633

exceeding a total of 100kg per person (including children) to the
deportation destination.116

Accordingly, just before sending the Poles to their deaths, the NKVD
collected detailed information about their family members in order to expel
their women and children from homes in occupied Poland to the desert of
Kazakhstan.
On March 20, 1940, Beria issued yet another directive on the
resettlement in Kazakhstan of Polish POW families “to be deported from
western oblasts of Ukraine and Belorussia.”117 This directive was addressed
to Major Semyon Burdakov, Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Kazakh
Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR).118 It alerted Burdakov that 25,000 families
of the “repressed former officers of the Polish army, police, prison guards,
gendarmes, intelligence agents, former landowners, manufacturers and
prominent officials of the former Polish apparatus” were subject to
deportation to the northern oblasts of Kazakhstan.119 Beria estimated that the
indicative number of these family members was approximately 75,000 to
100,000 people,120 implying three to four members per family.
Contemporary research indicates that deported Polish families consisted on
average of five to seven members.121
On the night of April 12-13, thousands of people in Soviet-occupied
Poland were disturbed in their sleep, forced to undergo brutal searches,
randomly allowed to gather a few belongings, then transported to train
stations, locked inside cargo cars, and sent eastward, across the Polish
border to Kazakhstan. According to various sources, between 60,000 to
320,000 Polish civilians were forcibly removed from their homes during
these two nights and sent to the deserts of Kazakhstan. Women and children
represented 80% of these deportees.122
The April wave of deportations was already the second such mass
deportation action directed at the Polish population. The first such wave of
deportations took place on February 10, 1940 and affected between 140,000
and 220,000 people, mostly representatives of the Polish administration,
116

1 KATYN DOKUMENTY ZBRODNI 43–46 (Rudolf G. Pichoja & Aleksander Gieysztor eds.,
1995).
117
KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 153.
118
Id.
119
Beria’s Directive to the Commissar of Internal Affairs, Kazakh SSR, GB Senior Major
Semyon Burdakov on the Resettlement in Kazakhstan of Polish POW Families to be Deported from the Western Oblasts of Ukraine and Belorussia; Moscow, March 20 1940. Id.
120
Id.
121
See generally Survivor Testimonies, KRESY SIBERIA VIRTUAL MUSEUM, http://kresysiberia.org/hot/?lang=en (last visited June 11, 2012).
122
See JOLLUCK, supra note 82, at 12.
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military families, railroad workers and forestry workers. These people were
awakened in the middle of the night, put on sleds, shipped to the railroad
stations, loaded into cattle trains, and sent on a three to six week-long
journey to Siberia.123 As reported, 110 trains took part in this operation, each
containing between 1,000 and 2,000 deportees. The weather at the time was
severe; temperatures were recorded as low as negative 40ºC.124 It is believed
that the death rate in this first wave of mass deportations was the highest.
The Polish citizens from the first wave of deportations were sent to penal
camps in Siberia pursuant to the December 5, 1939 Resolution of the
Politburo.125
The third wave of deportations took place on June 29, 1940, and
involved between 80,000 and 240,000 people. This deportation impacted
many refugees from western Poland occupied by Nazi Germany. The
majority of these refugees were of Jewish origin. In addition, small
merchants, professionals, and individuals who refused to accept the Soviet
passport were subject to this deportation.126
The fourth wave of deportations took place one year later, in May
and June of 1941. This deportation action was implemented in accordance
with Resolution No. 1299-526 of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party127 which called for cleansing of the regions incorporated to the Soviet
Union in 1939–1940. This wave of deportations also affected the Baltic
Republics, Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, areas which had been
incorporated to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1940.
On the Polish territory this fourth wave of deportations impacted
people who successfully evaded previous deportations: mostly
intelligentsia, military families, public officials and civil servants. On the
Polish territory incorporated to the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic the
first transports of the fourth wave of mass deportations of Polish citizens
left on May 22, 1941, while in Belorussia the fourth wave of deportations
began on the night of June 19.128 This deportation coincided with the
123

See id. at 9.
KUŚNIERZ, supra note 20, at 69.
125
See JOLLUCK, supra note 82, at 24, 34, 118; see also Nicolas Werth, Mass Crimes Under
Stalin (1930-1953), ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MASS VIOLENCE (Mar. 14, 2008),
http://www.massviolence.org/mass-crimes-under-stalin-1930-1953.
126
JOLLUCK, supra note 82, at 15. Similarly to the first group of deportees, this group of
deportees called “spiecpieriesieliency-bezhentsy” was considered as dangerous to the Soviet
power and therefore was sent to penal camps mostly in Siberia. Id.
127
See STANISLAW CIESIELSKI ET AL., MASOWE DEPORTACJE RADZIECKIE W OKRESIE II
WOJNY ŚWIATOWEJ 65 (1994) (explaining that this was a joint resolution).
128
See Soviet Deportations from the Baltic States, CHILDREN OF THE ICE, http://www
.childrenoftheice.eu/en/soviet-deportations-baltic-states (last visited June 11, 2012); Benjamin B. Fischer, The Katyn Controversy: Stalin’s Killing Field, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/
124
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German attack on the Soviet Union. As the Polish people where shipped
eastward, the German army crossed the Ribbentrop-Molotov line and began
its attack on the Soviet Union. The Soviet railway system became the
primary target for the German Luftwaffe. Consequently, deportation trains
moving eastward with Polish expellees became the easy prey. 129 As a result
of the Luftwaffe bombardment of the deportation trains, many expellees lost
their lives. It is estimated that this forth wave of deportations affected up to
300,000 people.130 Many of them lost their lives as a result of Luftwaffe
attacks.
Comparing Deportation Order issued by the People’s Commissar
for the Interior Affairs of the Soviet Lithuania dated November 28, 1940131
with the deportations of the Polish citizens conducted in Ukraine and
Belorussia between February 1940 and June of 1941, the following
observation was made in the U.S. intelligence report prepared in London in
1943:
On carefully examining the categories of deportees it will be seen that they
include the majority of persons active in political, social and even
economic life. The lists for Lithuania occupied by the Soviets in 1940
included about 700,000 out of a total population of three million. The
extent of this action in South-Eastern Poland, Polesie and the Grodno
district exceeded the limits laid down in the order we have just quoted.
The following were added to the list of socially dangerous elements:
university professors, teachers, doctors, engineers, the forestry service,
well-to-do peasants, and even poor peasants and certain categories of
workmen, the families of soldiers of all ranks who went abroad, refugees
from other parts of Poland, and “speculators,” which was a term applied to
small traders and merchants. Thus the registers included three to four
million people out of a total population of thirteen million.

library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter9900/art6.html (last updated June 27, 2008).
129
See JAMES S. CORUM & RICHARD R. MULLER, THE LUFTWAFFE’S WAY OF WAR: GERMAN
AIR FORCE DOCTRINE, 1911–1945, at 8, 230–31 (1998) (discussing the war against the Soviet
railway system).
130
See Polacy na Syberii, INST. NAT’L REMEMBRANCE, http://www.ipn.gov.pl/ftp/wystawy/
polacy_na_sybierii/html/wstep.html (last visited June 11, 2012); see also JOLLUCK, supra
note 82, at 13 (expressing the deportation of 240,000 Polish in the fourth wave of mass exile). Termed as “exiled settlers” (ssylno-poselentsy), the June 1941 group was sentenced to
outlying places of exile under NKVD supervision for twenty years. Unlike the previous
deportees, they were given the rights of free Soviet citizens, including a choice of job and
place to live, and thus occupied a status between that of special settler of the first and third
deportations and administratively exiled people from the second deportation. Id. at 16.
131
Strictly Secret Order of the People’s Commisssar Serov for the Interior of Lithuanian
SSR in 1940, Order No. 0054, 34 LITHUANIAN Q. J. ARTS & SCI., Winter 1998 (designating
policemen, citizen of foreign countries, priests, former noblemen and merchants among
others were targeted for deportation in Lithuania).
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The registrations and deportations that followed extended also over the
families of the persons enumerated [sic] above. . . . Thus the register of
persons to be deported included even relatively distant connections,
sometimes even friends and collaborators, etc. Hence the mass scale of the
deportations and the large number of women and children they affected. 132

The Polish Government in London estimated that the total number
of Polish citizens transported against their will from the Polish territory
under Soviet occupation into the U.S.S.R. during the twenty-one-month
period of the Soviet-German cooperation was greater than 1.8 million.133
These estimates included the following numbers for mass deportations:
220,000 deported in the February 10 wave; 320,000 deported in the April
13th wave, 240,000 deported in May–July 1940, and 300,000 deported in
May–June 1941. These estimates also included 250,000 people arrested in
the first months of the occupation and 230,000 Polish citizens forced to
serve in the Red Army. About 250,000 Polish citizens were taken as
prisoners-of- war.134 Some of them were released, but most of those released
were later captured and either imprisoned, sent to gulags, or forced to serve
in the Red Army.135
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, some NKVD documents
were declassified. Using lists of NKVD convoy troops responsible for
transporting Polish deportees and lists of institutions charged with receiving
and placement of the Polish deportees, Alexander Guryanov concluded that
132

THE POLISH DEPORTEES OF WORLD WAR II: RECOLLECTIONS OF REMOVAL TO THE SOVIET
UNION AND DISPERSAL THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 217 (Tadeusz Piotrowski ed., 2004).
133
See POLISH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, POLISH-SOVIET RELATIONS: 1918–1943, at 17–21
(1943) [hereinafter POLISH-SOVIET RELATIONS] (providing the estimate of number of Polish
deported exceeding one million based on figures of deportation by region); BOHDAN
PODOLSKI, POLSKA WSCHODNIA W 1939–1940, at Doc. No. 62c (Hoover Inst. Archives); see
also 3 KOMISJA HISTORYCZNA POLSKIEGO SZTABU GŁÓWNEGO, POLSKIE SILY ZBROJNE W
DRUGIEJ WOJNIE ŚWIATOWEJ: ARMIA KRAJOWA 33–34 (1950). According to the Polish Historical Commission of the General Command of the Polish Armed Forces, 1,200,000 Polish
citizens were expelled from the Polish lands to the Soviet Far East during all four waves of
mass deportation actions conducted between1939 and 1941 by the Soviet Union on the
Polish territory under Soviet occupation. Id. See generally KUŚNIERZ, supra note 20.
134
Press Release, The Institute of National Remembrance, Decision to Commence Investigation into Katyn Massacre (Jan. 12, 2004), available at http://www.ipn.gov.pl
/portal/en/2/77/Decision_to_commence_investigation_into_Katyn_Massacre.html [hereinafter Decision to Commence Investigation]. According to Polish sources, the population of
Poland under Soviet control decreased by at least 1.7 million during the first twenty months
of the Soviet occupation. These estimates were made from material gathered and analyzed by
the Polish Army formed in the U.S.S.R. in 1941, from the testimonies of Polish citizens
released from Soviet detention, and from information collected by the Polish Embassy and
social welfare delegates who provided relief to the amnestied Poles between February 1942
and January 1943. JOLLUCK, supra note 82, at 10.
135
Decision to Commence Investigation, supra note 134.
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the total number of deportees affected by four waves of mass deportations
was in the range of 320,000.136
Calculations based on declassified NKVD documents raise many
issues, the most obvious being whether the declassified documents represent
a complete set of deportation records. Unfortunately, the process of
declassification was conducted in a highly selective manner. Also, the
released records do not reflect deaths that occurred during the several weeks
of the transportation process since they were made at the receiving end of
the deportation journey. Furthermore, these numbers do not correspond with
the Soviets’ own reports, made in connection with the 1942 evacuations of
the Polish citizens to Iran or with the numbers of Polish citizens remaining
in the U.S.S.R. as of May 1944, or with records of the Polish citizens
returning from the U.S.S.R. after the war. 137
Mass deportations were conducted simultaneously with mass arrests
of the “enemies of the Soviet state.” In March and April of 1940, at least
7,305 officers of the Polish Army and community leaders were selected
from all the Polish prisoners held in the Soviet prisons and exterminated on
the authority of the March 5th Execution Orders. However, the majority of
the Polish prisoners were sentenced to hard labor and shipped to slave labor
camps in Siberia. Furthermore, small batches of several dozens of people
were continually being banished to the interior of the U.S.S.R. throughout
136

Compare JOLLUCK, supra note 82, at 10, 13, with Deportacje Polaków do ZSRR: Liczba
deportowanych [The Deportations of Poles to the U.S.S.R.: Number of Deportees], DZIEJE
NAJNOWSZE, available at http://www.sciesielski.republika.pl/sov-dep/polacy/index.html (last
visited June 11, 2012) (noting revised estimates of 320,000 Polish deportation in the four
waves compared to estimates of 309,000 to 327,000). Similarly, Albin Glowacki who reviewed the released documents stated that according to these documents “the mass deportations of the years 1940-41 encompassed approximately 325,000 Polish citizens.” These
numbers are closer to the numbers given to the Polish ambassador by Deputy Commissar of
Foreign Affairs Andrei Vyshinsky in 1941, of a maximum of 400,000. JOLLUCK, supra note
82, at 10.
137
See Deportacje Polaków do ZSRR, supra note 136; see also JOLLUCK, supra note 82, at
10. Some estimate of deportations and persecutions are as follows:
a) On February 10, 1940, people from rural areas were sent to Siberia in 110 cattle trains.
b) On April 13, 1940, around 300,000 people, mostly women & children were sent to Kazakhstan and Altai Kraj in 160 cattle trains.
c) In June and July 1940, around 400,000 people were sent to camps in Archangelsk, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk.
d) In June 1941, around 280,000 people were deported to various part of the U.S.S.R. The
Polish Government estimated that some 500,000 Poles had been arrested by the Soviets
between 1939 and 1941, mostly the government officials, judges, teachers, lawyers, intellectuals, writers, etc. Thus, at least 1.7 million Poles were in captivity in the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1941. Ryszard Antolak, Iran and the Polish Exodus from Russia 1942, PARS
TIMES, http://www.parstimes.com/ history/polish_refuge es/exodus_russia.html (last visited
June 11, 2012).
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the entire 21 month period.138 The mortality rate in these prison-camps was
estimated between 30% and 70%, with 50% per year considered average.139

F.

Exodus from the Soviet Union

As a result of the German attack on the Soviet Union on June 22,
1941, Stalin decided to join the Allied coalition. In this ironic twist of
history, the Polish Government in London suddenly became a Soviet ally.
Strongly encouraged by Great Britain, the Polish Government entered into
negotiations with the Soviet Union and on July 30, 1942 Polish Prime
Minister Wladyslaw Sikorski and Russian Ambassador in London Ivan
Mayski signed a cooperation agreement known as the Sikorski-Mayski
Agreement.140 In this cooperation agreement, the Soviet Government
declared that “the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 as to territorial changes
in Poland lost their validity.”141 Furthermore, the governments of Poland
and the Soviet Union agreed to render support to each other in the war
against “Hitlerite” Germany.142 Also, the Soviet Union consented to the
formation of the Polish Army on its territory, and officially granted
“amnesty” to all Polish citizens “detained on the Soviet territory either as
prisoners-of-war or on other sufficient grounds.”143 The only lasting result
of the Sikorski-Mayski Agreement was the return to freedom of at least one
million Polish citizens repressed in the Soviet Union. All other provisions of
the Sikorski-Mayski Agreement were violated by the Soviet Union as their
confidence in resisting the German attack grew. Once the Soviet Army
reentered the Polish lands on its way to Berlin in 1944, the Soviets
recaptured the eastern half of Poland from the Germans and never returned
it.

138

THE POLISH DEPORTEES OF WORLD WAR II, supra note 132, at 4.
See KUŚNIERZ, supra note 20, 80–81, 86 (noting the mortality rate may be skewed due
to Soviet authorities minimizing the figure of Polish nationals detained by 25%). Norman
Davies estimates that the mortality rate in the deportation settlements was about 50% per
year. See 2 DAVIES, supra note 68, 334 (1982); see also KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT
PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 84–86 (showing that unsanitary conditions, lack of adequate
resources and starvation affected the mortality rate); Director’s Statement, THE OFFICER’S
WIFE
(Goats
Hill
2010),
available
at
http://www.theofficerswifemovie.com/DirectorsStatement.htm (showing Katyn as an example that the mortality rate among Polish nationals deported may be higher than reported due
to the withholding of documents).
140
POLISH-SOVIET RELATIONS, supra note 133, at 107 (presenting the Polish-Soviet Union
Agreement, which is commonly referred to as the Sikorski-Mayski Agreement)
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
139
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As a result of the Sikorski-Mayski Agreement, on August 12, 1941,
the Soviet Union officially granted the so-called “amnesty” to all Polish
citizens detained in the Soviet Union.144 Despite extensive efforts by the
Soviet government to prevent the departure of the Poles from detention
camps by offering them incentives such as jobs and housing, the so-called
“Polish amnesty” set in motion a mass exodus of the entire Polish
settlements from remote gulag and labor sites located mostly in the north
towards the south.145 It was there that the Polish Army was to be formed in
order to reach the protection of the Polish Government. Polish citizens,
wherever they found themselves, undertook desperate efforts to travel
towards the south in hope of finding shelter under the umbrella of the Polish
Army. Military families were given priority in this process but every Polish
citizen was desperate to reach the Polish Army, considering it to be their
only safe heaven and hope for survival.
In October 1941, Beria reported to Stalin that out of 391,575 Polish
citizens kept as of September 27, 1941 in various detention zones and
deportation regions, 50,295 were released from prisons and camps, 26,297
were released from POW camps and 265,248 were released from special
settlements and deportation regions.146 In October 1941, Beria also reported
that a significant group of the released Polish citizens declared their desire
to join the Polish Army. For instance, in the Komi region, 9,000 individuals
signed up for the Polish Army, while 7,000 headed for the formation centers
of the Polish Army in the south.147 Beria noted that:
According to fragmentary information from NKVD Road-Transportation
Detachments of September 30, 1941, over 10,000 individuals were on their
way to the centers of the Polish detachments formation. . . .
[T]he newcomers were deprived of whatever means of existence, are
poorly dressed and in conditions of crying shame of hygiene. For this
reasons [sic] tooth diseases, avitaminosis and gastric diseases are widely
spread among them.148

144

Id.; see also THE POLISH DEPORTEES OF WORLD WAR II, supra note 132, at 9; WOJCIECH
MATERSKI, POLSCY JEŃCY WOJENNI W ZSSR 1939–1941 (1992); INSTYTUT STUDIÓW
POLITYCZNYCH, Z ARCHIWÓW SOWIECKICH 77 (1992).
145
THE POLISH DEPORTEES OF WORLD WAR II, supra note 132, at 8–11 (discussing the mass
Polish exodus to settlements in Iran and India).
146
The Note of the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the U.S.S.R. L. Beria to J.
Stalin Concerning the Procedure of Releasing Polish Prisoners of War and Other Polish
Citizens from Prisons to Camps, in KREMLIN VERSUS POLAND 1939–1945: DOCUMENTS FROM
THE SOVIET ARCHIVES 16–25 (Wojciech Materski ed., 1996) [hereinafter KREMLIN VERSUS
POLAND].
147
Id. at 21.
148
Id.
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Continued friction between the Poles and the Soviets over the
whereabouts of the Polish officers taken prisoner by the Soviet Union, who
could not be located at this critical juncture,149 and over shortages of
weapons, food and clothing in the formation of the Polish Army eventually
led Stalin to agree to the evacuation of the Polish Army from the Soviet
Union to the Middle East. General Wladyslaw Anders, who was in charge
of the formation of the Polish Army in the Soviet Union, led the evacuation
of the Polish citizens from the Soviet Union through Krasnovodsk via the
Caspian Sea to in Iran.150 This mass exodus of thousands of human ghosts
took place between March and October of 1942 in the most dramatic
circumstances.
After traveling across the Soviet Union for months in the most
dehumanizing conditions, between 115,000 and 120,000 Polish citizens
made it to the shores of Persia before the door to freedom was shut
forever.151 This odyssey of the Polish people required the sacrifice of
thousands of Polish lives. We will never know how many of them paid the
ultimate price in the quest for freedom. One of them recalled this exodus as
follows:
Exhausted by hard labour, disease and starvation—barely recognizable as
human beings—we disembarked at the port of Pahlavi (Anzali). There, we
knelt down together in our thousands along the sandy shoreline to kiss the
soil of Persia. We had escaped Siberia and were free at last.152

On September 7, 1942, the Soviet Consul General in Pahlavi, Iran,
sent a report to Stalin on the termination of the evacuation of the Polish
Army from the U.S.S.R., stating that by September 1942, at least 4,239
persons died of various diseases. People most frequently suffered from
typhoid fever, marsh fever, and dysentery.153

149

See STEVEN ZALOGA, THE POLISH ARMY 1939–45 17 (1982) (discussing the conflict
with the Polish allying with the Soviet Union while the Soviets refused to disclose the location of Polish soldiers held prisoner); see also MICHAEL ALFRED PESZKE, THE POLISH
UNDERGROUND ARMY, THE WESTERN ALLIES, AND THE FAILURE OF STRATEGIC UNITY IN
WORLD WAR II, at 72–73 (2005) (summarizing another Soviet theory that the missing Polish
soldiers may have escaped and fled to Mongolia).
150
HOOVER INST., WAR THROUGH CHILDREN’S EYES: THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF POLAND
AND THE DEPORTATIONS, 1939–1941, at xxiv (1981) [hereinafter WAR THROUGH CHILDREN’S
EYES]; see THE POLISH DEPORTEES OF WORLD WAR II, supra note 132, at 10 (stating that a
total of 115,000 people were evacuated to Iran).
151
THE POLISH DEPORTEES OF WORLD WAR II, supra note 132, at 10.
152
Antolak, supra note 137.
153
Telegram from Mikhail Koptelov, Counsul General of the U.S.S.R. in Pahlavi, to Stalin
on the Completion of the Polish Army’s Evacuation from the U.S.S.R. (Sept. 5, 1942), reprinted in KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 304–05.
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From Iran, the Polish Army and its military personnel relocated to
central Iraq, northeast of Baghdad.154 The civilians remained in Iran.155 They
were placed in four large camps: one in Isfahan and three in Teheran.156 In
February of 1943, the Isfahan camp housed 2,600 Polish orphans. Over time
the civilian refugees, including thousands of Polish orphans, were
transferred from Iran via Ahvaz and Basra to various refugee camps in
every corner of the world. Settlements of Polish refugees went up in the
jungles of Africa, and in the mountains of India. The Poles were sent in
thousands to Lebanon (Zouk Mikael), Palestine (Jerusalem, Ain-Karem,
Barbara, Nazareth) India (Bandra, Balachadi, Valivade, Karachi, Malir)
Kenya (Makindu), Uganda (Masindi, Koya), Tanganyika (Tengeru,
Kondoa, Kidugala, Ifunda, Morogoro), Rhodesia (Lusaka, Abercorn,
Rusape, Diggleford, Marandella), South Africa (Oudtshoorm), New Zealand
(Pahiatua), and Mexico (Santa Rosa).157 After the war, once the U.S.,
Canada and Australia began to accept war refugees, many of them settled in
the western U.S.158
The Polish deportees left their loved ones buried in large cemeteries
in Tehran, Anzali and Ahvaz.159 Among those who found their eternal
resting place in Teheran was Henry Synowiec, a six-year-old boy from
Szemiotowka near Kobryn in Polesie, Eastern Poland. Henry was deported
with his family to Siberia in the bitter cold of February 1940. His
grandmother died in the Lesopunkt settlement in Siberia, his mother died on
their journey to join the Polish Army, his father died soon after reaching
Teheran and little Henry succumbed to neglect and disease six months later.
Henry was survived by two older siblings who were sent to the orphanage in
Teheran. These two only surviving children of the Synowiec family were
subsequently sent to the Polish orphanage in India; from there the children
154

See THE POLISH DEPORTEES OF WORLD WAR II, supra note 132, at 97 (discussing Polish
evacuation to the Middle East).
155
Id. at 10.
156
Id. at 97; see ANNA D. JAROSZYNŚKA-KIRCHMANN, THE EXILE MISSION: THE POLISH
POLITICAL DIASPORA AND POLISH AMERICANS, 1939–1956, at 27 (2004).
157
THE POLISH DEPORTEES OF WORLD WAR II, supra note 132, at 27 (expressing that the
Polish settlements were intended to be temporary until after their homeland was liberated).
More than 2,900 Polish refugees (soldiers and civilians) died in Iran soon after arrival. They
were buried in two Polish cemeteries and six Polish plots in memorial parks of other nations.
1,937 Poles were buried in the major Polish cemetery in Tehran (Dulab), fifty-six in a Jewish
cemetery in Tehran and ten in a British Gholhak cemetery. Individual tombs of Polish refugees can be found in the memorial sites of other nations, such as France or Italy. See, e.g.,
ANDRZEJ PRZEWOŹNIK, POLSKIE CMENTARZE WOJENNE W IRANIE [POLISH WAR CEMETERIES IN
IRAN] (2002).
158
See THE POLISH DEPORTEES OF WORLD WAR II, supra note 132, at 13, 173, 195.
159
WAR THROUGH CHILDREN’S EYES, supra note 150, at xxiv. It is estimated that 2,119
Polish refugees died in Teheran by the end of 1943. Id.
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were shipped via the U.S. to Mexico, and later were brought to the U.S. by
Catholic nuns. Sixty-six years after Henry’s death, his sister Joanna—for
the first time ever—saw a picture of the Polish cemetery in Teheran where
her little brother was buried. “This picture is the most precious thing I ever
had,” Joanna explained, showing a dark picture of the Dulab Cemetery in
Teheran where Henry and thousands of other Polish deportees were buried
from 1942–1943.160 Joanna and her second brother, Joseph, settled in the
U.S.161 They are among many Polish Siberian orphans who were brought to
the U.S. by Catholic nuns after the war.162 The places they called home
where incorporated into the Soviet Union as a result of the Yalta
agreements. Most of them never visited Poland, but they all cultivate the
Polish language and the Polish traditions.163
Most of the Polish men who left the Soviet Union joined the 2nd
Polish Corps formed in Iraq under the command of General Anders.164
Fighting alongside Allies forces, General Anders led the 2nd Polish Corp
into the victorious battle of Monte Cassino that opened the passage to Rome
for the Allied armies.165 They went on to win many more battles, but after
the war could not return to their homes in Poland. Betrayed and
discriminated against for speaking the inconvenient truth about Katynism,
they spread around the globe. Over time many of them moved to the United
States, Great Britain, and Canada, but virtually none of them returned to
their native lands. Today very few ethnic Poles live in the territories of
Eastern Poland incorporated to the Soviet Union. Those who remained had
every incentive not to identify themselves as Poles.

G.

Those Left Behind

The evacuations of the Polish citizens from the Soviet Union with
the Anders army were halted in October 1942.166 Hundreds of thousands of
Polish citizens released from gulags who were not able to reach the Polish
Army by the fall of 1942 remained trapped in the Soviet Union. General
160

In Tehran’s Dulab Cemetery, situated in a rundown area of the city, there are graves of
thousands of Polish men, women and children. It is not the only such cemetery in Iran, but it
is the largest and best known. See generally Antolak, supra note 137.
161
See generally PRZEWOŹNIK, supra note 157.
162
See generally id.
163
Survivor Testimonies, KRESY SIBERIA VIRTUAL MUSEUM, http://kresy-siberia.org/hot/?
lang=en (last visited June 11, 2012). The video recording of Joanna Synowiec is on file with
the author.
164
THE POLISH DEPORTEES OF WORLD WAR II, supra note 132, at 89.
165
See LT.-GENERAL W. ANDERS, AN ARMY IN EXILE: THE STORY OF THE SECOND POLISH
CORPS 163–85 (1949) (describing Polish role at the battle of Monte Cassino).
166
KEITH SWORD, DEPORTATION AND EXILE: POLES IN THE SOVIET UNION, 1939–48, at 83
(1994).
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Anders, while fighting on the military front, also fought on the political
front for the release of the Poles left behind in the Soviet Union who were
unable to reach Iran during the six-month window open to them for
evacuations.
Although formally the Poles were set free by the decree of August
12, 1941, the Soviets made every effort to prevent them from leaving their
deportation sites.167 Beria recommended: “In order to forestall spontaneous
moves of the Polish citizens from camps, prisons, special settlement zones,
deportation regions . . .” temporary employment should be offered to them
immediately.168 Those who would declare their willingness to work and stay
there for good should receive housing, living essentials, and
remuneration.169 Many Polish citizens never learned of the recruitment to
the Anders Army. Only some Polish detainees were told that they could join
the Polish Army. On January 24, 1942, Stalin issued a top secret directive to
halt in the countryside all spontaneous departures of the Polish citizens from
places of their employment in the northern oblasts of U.S.S.R.170 Only upon
reaching the Polish Army, led by General Anders, did the Polish people
realize they would be able to leave the Soviet Union.171
The Poles who were trapped in the Soviet Union became a handy
source of manpower in Stalin’s struggle with Nazi Germany. After severing
diplomatic relations with the Polish Government in London as a result of
the discovery of the mass graves in Katyn,172 Stalin could build a Polish
Army directly under the Soviet command without any interference from the
Polish Government or the Allied Coalition. In May of 1944, Beria sent a
memo to Stalin entitled “On the evidence of the citizens of the Second
Polish Republic who found themselves on the territory of the U.S.S.R.”173
According to this memo, a new Polish army that was formed in the Soviet
Union under the Soviet command included 36,510 men.174 Excluding
soldiers of the new Polish army under the Soviet command, about 221,000

167

Id. at 34, 39. The released detainees were often told they could travel anywhere in Russia but could not return to Poland. See POLISH DEPORTEES OF WORLD WAR II, supra note 132
at 96.
168
KREMLIN VERSUS POLAND, supra note 146, at 17.
169
Id.
170
MATERSKI, supra note 144, at 103.
171
THE POLISH DEPORTEES OF WORLD WAR II, supra note 132, at 96.
172
KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 219 (discussing a letter from
Soviet leader Viacheslav Molotov to Polish Ambassador Tadeusz Romer on April 25, 1943
breaking off Soviet relations with Poland).
173
KREMLIN VERSUS POLAND, supra note 146, at 73–79.
174
Id. at 73.

File: Szonert 2

2012]

Created on: 7/4/2012 2:02:00 PM

Last Printed: 9/21/2012 8:33:00 PM

WAS KATYN A GENOCIDE?

667

Polish citizens remained in the Soviet Union as of May 1944.175 In this
memo, Beria also stated that forty orphanages boarding 3,523 Polish
children operated in the Soviet Union.176 In addition, fifty-four primary
schools boarded 2,587 Polish children, twenty-four houses for disabled
Poles housed 1,822 persons and nine Polish hospitals were listed.177

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.

Definition of Genocide

Although various definitions of genocide exist, this analysis is
based on the definition of genocide adopted by the Genocide Convention of
1948 and subsequently incorporated into the Statute of Rome. The
definition of genocide formulated in Article 2 of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide178 that was adopted
without changes as Article 6 in the Statute of Rome provides that:
“[G]enocide” means any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 179

Article 9.1 of the Statute of Rome provides that Elements of Crime
shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application of Article 6 that
defines genocide.180 Several types of repressive actions described in the
Presentation of Facts above meet the standard of genocidal acts enumerated
in the definition of genocide.181 For purposes of this analysis, the first type
175

That number included 76,110 soldiers and 43,755 members of their family. Id. Beria
also stated that 11,516 people died between 1941 and 1943. Id.
176
Id. at 79.
177
Id.
178
GA Res. 260 (III), U.N. Doc. U.N. GOAR, 3rd Sess., A/RES/260(III)A (Dec. 9, 1948)
(U.N. General Assembly Resolution adopting The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide).
179
Id. art. 2; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 6, Aug. 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
180
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 179, art. 9.
181
See supra Part II.B (describing the invasion of Poland and destruction of major cultural
and political centers that would destroy the Polish way of life); supra Part II.C (identifying
hundreds of mass executions and deportations to concentration camps); supra Part II.D (de-
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of a genocidal act, that is, “killing members of the group” will be examined
step by step in accordance with Article 6(a) of the Elements of Crime. The
remaining four types of genocidal acts will be examined by analogy to the
analysis of genocide by killing, as reflected in Articles 6(b)–(e) of the
Elements of Crime of Genocide.
The elements of the crime of genocide by killing pursuant to Article
6(a) of the Elements of Crime are as follows:
1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons belonged to a particular national, ethnical,
racial or religious group.
3. The perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part, that national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.
4. The conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar
conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could itself effect
such destruction.182

B.

Killing and Causing Death183

Among many pieces of evidence in the Katyn crime, a
memorandum prepared by Lawrenti Beria, signed by Joseph Stalin, and
approved by the Soviet Politburo on March 5, 1940 (March 5th Execution
Order) stands out. This document proves that the Soviet leadership ordered
the shooting of 14,700 Polish POWs and 11,000 Polish citizens arrested on
the conquered Polish territory in the months following the aggression on
Poland.184 The March 5th Execution Order set in motion the conduct of
mass killing of at least 21,857 185 Polish prisoners of War and members of
the Polish elite throughout the Soviet Union.186
scribing the systematic Katyn killings); supra Part II.E (detailing a number of official Soviet
orders to deport Poles); supra Part II.G (noting that once the Poles were released from concentration camps, they were still prohibited from returning to Poland).
182
Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Addendum,
Part II, Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, Mar. 13–30, June 12–30, 2000, U.N.
Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000) [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes].
183
Provisions of the General Introduction to the Elements of Crimes provide, inter alia,
that the term “killed” is interchangeable with the term “caused death.” Id. The General Introduction, paragraph 9, also provides that “a particular conduct may constitute one or more
crimes.” Id.
184
Letter from Lavrenty Beria to Joseph Stalin (Mar. 5, 1940), reproduced and translated
in PAUL, supra note 64, at 361–63.
185
Fischer, supra note 128. Katyn was detailed in the Shelepin Memo to Khrushchev in
March 1959, which warned against the release of documents relating to Katyn. MATTHEW J.
OUIMET, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY 126
(2003).
186
PAUL, supra note 64, at 361–63. According to American intelligence sources, the
NKVD filmed some executions pursuant to the March 5th Execution Order. During the Ko-
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It has been proven that 4,410 bodies discovered in eight mass
graves in the Katyn forest were identified as the bodies of Polish officers
who were taken as POWs by the Soviet Union following the Soviet
aggression on Poland on September 17, 1939, and were held in the Kozielsk
POW camp in the Soviet Union until April 1940.187 Accordingly, it can be
proven beyond all reasonable doubt that mass killing of the Polish POWs
took place.188
In addition, internal Soviet documents and exhumations conducted
in the 1990s have proven that Polish citizens were murdered pursuant to
March 5th Execution Order in numerous other locations throughout the
Soviet Union. Polish POWs from the Starobelsk camp were murdered in the
NKVD facility in Kharkov and were buried in the Piatichatki forest near
Kharkov. The KGB in Kharkov deliberately destroyed mass graves of the
Polish citizens in the Piatichatki forest between 1969 and 1973 by burning
the remains and grinding the bones.189 Polish POWs held in the Ostashkov
camp were murdered in Kalinin/Tver as described in the testimony of
NKVD Chief Tokariev and were buried in mass graves in Mednoye near
Kalinin.190
The burial locations of the civilian victims of the March 5th
Execution Order, those held in prisons on the conquered territory, have not
been fully identified to this day. According to the Ukrainian list made
available to Poland in 1994, at least 3,435 Polish civilians arrested on the
conquered Polish territory incorporated to the Ukrainian SSR were
murdered pursuant to the March 5th Execution Order.191 Some of the
victims were buried at the mass burial site in Bykovnia near Kiev in
Ukraine.192 Polish civilians arrested on the conquered Polish territory
incorporated into the Belorussian SSR were murdered in Minsk. Some mass
graves of the Polish citizens were discovered in the Kurapaty forest near

rean War, the Soviets gave North Korea a copy of the film for instructional purposes. Fischer, supra note 128.
187
2 EUROPE SINCE 1945: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 711–12 (Bernard Cook ed., 2001).
188
According to German exhumation records, 4,143 bodies were identified by June 1943.
The Polish investigators who worked on identifying Katyn victims in the spring and summer
of 1943 positively identified 2,916 bodies by June 1, 1943. LISTA KATYŃSKA: JEŃCY OBOZÓW
KOZIELSK–OSTASZKÓW–STAROBIELSK ZAGINIENI W ROSJI SOWIECKIEJ (Adam Moszyński ed.,
1989) [hereinafter LISTA KATYŃSKA].
189
ZBRODNIA KATYŃSKA W KRĘGU PRAWDY I KŁAMSTWA, supra note 75, at 231–35 (detailing the discovery of and decision to “decommission” the site).
190
Id.
191
Paweł Styrna, Bulletin of the Institute of National Remembrance, reprinted in 31
SARMATIAN REV. 1558, 1559 (2011).
192
KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at x.
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Minsk.193 However, a list of victims from the so-called Belorussian Katyn
List has not yet been found or released.
According to a note that Shelepin sent to Khrushchev on March 3,
1959, a total of 21,857 Polish citizens were killed pursuant to the March 5th
Execution Order. 194 According to Shelepin’s note, this number included
14,552 Polish POWs and 7,305 Polish civilians killed in prisons.195 Shelepin
recommended, and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union approved, the destruction of all the
records on the operation carried out in accordance with the March 5th
Execution Order except the protocols of the meeting of the Troika of the
NKVD, U.S.S.R.196
In light of the above evidence, the first element of the crime of
genocide, the killing and causing death of one or more persons—in this
instance the killing of Polish POWs and Polish civilians arrested on the
conquered Polish territory—is met.

C.

Do Katyn Victims Belong to a Protected Group?

The March 5th Execution Order explicitly states that 14,736 POWs
are “more than 97 percent Polish by nationality” and sentences 14,700 of
them to death.197 When referring to the second group of victims, that is,
18,632 persons arrested on the conquered Polish territory in the first months
of the Soviet occupation, the order specifies that this number includes
10,685 Poles. Referring to this group of 18,632 in its next paragraph, the
order states that 11,000 of them shall be executed. Accordingly, this
document proves that the perpetrators of the Katyn crime perceived the
persons they sentenced to death through the March 5th Execution Order as
belonging to the Polish national group, which is a protected group under the
Genocide Convention.
Some scholars argue that since various ethnic groups were
represented among the murdered officers of the Polish Army and persons
arrested on the conquered Polish territory, the victims of the March 5th

193

Alexandra Goujon, Memorial Narratives of WWII Partisans and Genocide in Belarus,
24 E. EUR. POL. & SOC’Y 6, 7 (2010).
194
Note from Shelepin, Chairman of the Comm. for State Security of the Council of Ministers of U.S.S.R., to Khrushchev (Mar. 3, 1959), in KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT,
supra note 67, at 332.
195
See id. (noting that a total of 21,857 were shot in the Katyn forest).
196
See id. at 333.
197
The determination that “the Polish nationals represent 97% of the prisoners-of-war” was
based on Beria’s inquiry and the NKVD Report on the Nationality of Polish POW Officers
dated February 28, 1940, prepared by Major Soprunenko. See NKVD UPV Report on the
Nationality of Polish POW Officers Held in Starobelsk and Kozelsk Camps, in id. at 112.
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Execution Order do not represent the Polish national group.198 In
anticipation of this problem, the drafters of the Genocide Convention added
ethnic groups to the protected categories and pointed out that the national
groups in the ethnically mixed populations are often comprised of several
different ethnic groups.199 Therefore the “national group” does not coincide
with the “ethnic group,” but is characterized by a common wish to live
together, a common ideal, a common goal and common aspirations.200 The
Polish national group on the Polish territory conquered by the Soviet Union,
while comprised of various ethnic groups, was distinct in its common
language, tradition, values, ideals, goals and aspirations. It was comprised
of people of various ethnic groups who supported Polish nationhood and the
Polish State.
The case law provides further important clarification on how to
define the protected group under the Genocide Convention. The Trial
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the
Rutaganda case held that for the purposes of applying the Genocide
Convention membership in a group is, in essence, a subjective rather than
objective test.201 The Rwanda Tribunal thus held that a group may be
identified as such by others, including perpetrators of the crime.202 The
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia has taken the same
approach, although there have been arguments made that the subjective
approach alone is not sufficient to determine victim groups.203 Striking a
balance between the subjective and objective approach, the Rwanda
Tribunal subsequently held:
198

See, e.g., PIOTROWSKI, supra 58, at 17 (presenting the different nationalities of those in
the Soviet-Occupied Poland).
199
See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES
118–20 (2d ed. 2009) (noting the groups protected by the convention).
200
See Special Rapporteur, Fourth Rep. on the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace
and Security of Mankind, Int’l Law Comm’n, ¶ 57, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/398 (March 11, 1986)
(by Doudou Thiam). The Rwanda Tribunal held that national groups refer to a collection of
people who are perceived to share a legal bond based on common citizenship coupled with
reciprocity of rights and duties. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 511 (Sept. 2, 1998).
201
See Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 55
(Dec. 6, 1999), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Rutaganda/judgement/991206.
pdf (noting concepts of national, ethnical, racial, and religious groups).
202
Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-I-T, Judgment, ¶ 524 (May
21, 1999), http://www.ictrcaselaw.org/docs/doc9039.pdf (noting that the Rwandans had to
carry identification cards which placed them in a group).
203
See SCHABAS, supra note 198, at 124 (referring to the Krstic trial in which “Bosnia
Muslims” were included in “national groups,” a matter which was not challenged on appeal).
See Prosecutor v. Krstic. Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 560 (Aug. 2, 2001), http://www.
icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf.
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A group may not have precisely defined boundaries and there may be
occasions when it is difficult to give a definitive answer as to whether or
not a victim was a member of a protected group. Moreover, the
perpetrators of genocide may characterize the targeted group in ways that
do not fully correspond to conceptions of the group shared generally, or by
other segments of society. In such a case, the Chamber is of the opinion
that, on the evidence, if a victim was perceived by a perpetrator as
belonging to a protected group, the victim could be considered by the
Chamber as a member of the protected group, for the purposes of
genocide.204

The explicit references to the Polish national group in the March 5th
Execution Order represent direct evidence that the perpetrators of the Katyn
murders perceived the victims of the March 5th Execution Order as
belonging to the Polish national group. This perception of the perpetrators is
further confirmed by Beria’s Directive dated March 20, 1940 that calls for
“[r]esettlement in Kazakhstan of Polish POW families.”205 This directive
also defines the condemned men as “former officers of the Polish Army,
police, prison guards, gendarmes, intelligence agents, former landowners,
manufacturers, and prominent officials of the former Polish state apparatus .
. . .”206 The list of categories of people demonstrates that the condemned
men were people of stature, wealth and patriotism on whom the future of
independent Poland depended.
In light of the above circumstances, the victims of the March 5th
Execution Order belonged to the Polish national group, which is the
protected group under the Genocide Convention and the Statute of Rome.
The “protected group” test is therefore met.

D.

“In Whole or In Part”

Article 6(a)(3) of the Elements of Crime requires intent to destroy
“in whole or in part” the protected group.207 As U.N. Secretary Kofi Anan
pointed out, “genocide begins with the killing of one man—not for what he
has done, but because of who he is.”208 Thus, the term “in whole or in part”
204

Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR- 95-1A-T, Judgment, ¶ 65 (June 7, 2001).
See also Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 161–62
(Jan. 27, 2000), http://www.ictrcaselaw.org/docs/doc15264.pdf (defining groups as provided
by the Genocide Convention).
205
Record From for a Polish Prisoner of War (Mar. 16, 1940), in KATYN: A CRIME
WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 153.
206
See id.
207
ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 182, art. 6(a)(3).
208
Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec’y Gen., Nobel Lecture at the Nobel Peace Prize Award Ceremony in Oslo, Norway (Dec. 10, 2001); see also JONES, supra note 6, at 24.
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does not establish some quantitative threshold where mass murder turns into
genocide but rather focuses on the intent of the perpetrator.209 As the Trial
Chamber in the Krstic case declared, this term refers to the intent as
opposed to the actual destruction.210 The question is whether the intent
existed and not whether such intent was in fact realized. In determining
whether destruction “in whole or in part” took place for purposes of
genocide, the courts consider various factors, including the quantitative
extent of destruction in proportional terms (substantial part test) and
qualitative extent of destruction in terms of destroying the significant part of
the group necessary for its survival such as its leadership (significant part
test).211 The intent to destroy a multitude of persons because of their
membership in a particular group constitutes genocide even if these persons
constitute only part of a group either within a country or within a region or
within a single community.212
In order to evaluate to what extent the Soviet Union destroyed the
Polish national group, as such, a point of reference must be established as to
the population and territory affected. As a result of the Nazi-Soviet partition
of Poland,213 Germany incorporated 48% of Polish territory with twenty-two
million Polish citizens while the Soviet Union incorporated 52% of the
Polish territory with over thirteen million people.214 Accordingly, the
analysis of the Soviet destruction of Polish nationals does not include Polish
nationals under Nazi occupation as it applies to the Polish citizens who
found themselves on the Polish territory controlled by the Soviet Union.
This territory during the applicable period of September 1939 to June 1941
went through important rearrangement however. Within one month of the
invasion, the Soviet Union transferred part of the Wilno district from its
209

W. Schabas, The International Legal Prohibition of Genocide Comes of Age, in 5
GENOCIDE AT THE MILLENNIUM, GENOCIDE: A CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW 169, 172–
74 (S. Totten ed., 2005).
210
Prosecutor v. Krstic. Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 584.
211
According to Rafael Lemkin, the founding father of the Genocide Convention, the enemy nation must be destroyed, disintegrated and weakened in different degrees for decades to
come so that the oppressor nation will be in the position to deal with other people from the
vantage point of biological superiority. RAPHAËL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE
81 (1973).
212
Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-PT, Prosecutor’s Pre-Trial Brief Pursuant To Rule 65 ter (E)
(i), ¶ 101 (Feb. 25, 2000). See Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT 95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 83
(Dec. 14 1999), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/tjug/en/jel-tj991214e.pdf
(noting that “international custom admits the characterization of genocide even when the
exterminatory intent only extends to a limited geographic zone”).
213
The partition of Poland was the result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 23,
1939, implemented through the war of aggression on Poland and the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28, 1939. See cf. PIOTROWSKI, supra note 58, at 160
(explaining the Soviet occupation in Lithuania).
214
Id. at 8–9.
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share of Polish booty to Lithuania.215 Although Lithuania and the Wilno
district were annexed to the Soviet Union just nine months later, during the
first nine months of the most intense persecutions, the Wilno district served
as a safe haven for Polish nationals hunted down by NKVD forces in the
Soviet-controlled part of Poland.216
The remaining Polish lands under Soviet control were divided into
two pieces, with the central part of Poland transferred to the Byelorussian
Socialist Soviet Republic, and the southern part of Poland transferred to the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.217 Thus, officially the conquered Polish
territory was parceled out among Lithuania, Belorussian SSR and Ukrainian
SSR.218 However, for the first nine months of the Soviet occupation, the
Polish areas incorporated to the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics
remained sealed off from the rest of the Soviet Union and from Lithuania in
order to assure proper implementation of repressive measures against the
Polish nationals.219 In June 1940, the Soviet Union took over the Baltic
Republics together the Polish areas incorporated to Lithuania.220 Only then
the Soviet persecutions reached the Polish nationals living or hiding in the
Wilno district. Thus, the evaluation of the scope of destructive actions
undertaken by the Soviet Union against the Polish nationals shall refer to
the geographic area of the Polish State under Soviet control between
September 17, 1939 and June 20, 1941, with appropriate consideration for
the situation of the Wilno district.
1.

Quantitative evaluation

Destructive Soviet policies towards Polish nationals were conducted
in a territory inhabited by a total of 13.199 million people.221 In this group,
ethnic Poles represented 5.274 million (39.9%); Ukrainians 4.529 million

215

The Soviet Union transferred part of the Wilno District to Lithuania on October 10,
1939. See id. at 161 (noting the transfer of territory was in exchange for Soviet military bases).
216
See id. (noting the different groups seeking refuge in Wilno).
217
See KUŚNIERZ, supra note 20, at 54. Formally these two annexations were made by two
decrees issued by the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. on November 1 and 2, 1939, in response to petitions of the National Assemblies of Ukrainian and Belorussian Socialist Soviet
Republics. Id.
218
Similarly, Nazi-occupied Poland was parceled out between the Reich, General Government and Slovakia. See PIOTROWSKI, supra 58, at 8 (explaining the divisions of Poland under
the German and Soviet occupation).
219
See KUŚNIERZ, supra note 20, at 185–89 (explaining the reasoning for sealing off the
territory).
220
Id. at 44.
221
PIOTROWSKI, supra 58, at 14.
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(34.4%); Byelorussians 1.945 million (14.7%); and Jews 1.109 (8.4%).222
The Wilno district that was given to Lithuania accounted for approximately
573,000 people with 371,000 ethnic Poles.223 Between October 1939 and
August 1940, these people as well as refugees from other parts of conquered
Poland were not subjected to the Soviet repressive measures, as they resided
on the territory of a still-sovereign State of Lithuania. The destructive
measures against the Polish nationals were first implemented on the Polish
territory incorporated to the Ukrainian and Belorussian Socialist Soviet
Republics. All Polish citizens who worked in the administrative, military,
law enforcement and security structures of the Polish State as well as civic
and academic institutions, regardless of their ethnicity, were subjected to
persecution. However the Soviet hatred campaign conducted on this
territory was specifically directed against ethnic Poles and resulted in ethnic
violence directed primarily at the Poles.
In the first months of the Soviet invasion, special NKVD
operational groups conducted drastic “purges” of dangerous anti-Soviet
elements through mass murders and mass arrests.224 The number of people
outright murdered was never determined. What remains of these atrocities
are eyewitness testimonies from various locations.225 According to the
Soviet records, at least 11,817 Polish citizens were arrested by NKVD
Special Forces during the first two months of Soviet occupation.226
Out of about 250,000 Polish soldiers taken as prisoners of war, the
Soviets separated officers and subsequently murdered them pursuant to the
March 5th Execution Order.227 They also selected 25,000 noncommissioned officers, certain rank and file soldiers, policemen,
gendarmerie and refugees for slave labor and sent them to gulags.228 Many
222

Id.
STANISŁAW CIESIELSKI, KRESY WSCHODNIE II RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ: PRZEKSZTAŁCENIA
STRUKTURY NARODOWOŚCIOWEJ 1931–1948, at 48 (Stanisław Ciesielski ed., 2006). According to the 1931census, the Wilno district consisted of 1,275 million people with 766 thousand
ethnic Poles. Only part of this district was given to Lithuania. Id.
224
See generally PIOTROWSKI, supra 58, at 215–20 (noting the different incidents of arrest
and killings in the Soviet invasion).
225
Mass murders of military and civilian population took place in Rohantyn, Grodno,
Nowogrod, Sarny, Tarnopol, Wolkowysk, Oszmian, Swislocz, Molodeczn, Kosow Poleski,
Chodorow, Zlczow and Stryj. In Grodno and some other locations soldiers of the Red Army
murdered Polish POWs. See 3 WŁADYSŁAW POBÓG-MALINOWSKI NAJNOWSZA HISTORIA
POLITYCZNA POLSKI, 1939–1945 (2004). It is impossible to determine today the number of
people murdered by the Soviets in the first three months of the Soviet occupation of Poland.
It is estimated that in September 1939 between 1,000 and 2,500 civilians were killed in Soviet occupied Poland. Id.
226
See id.
227
See id.
228
The most well-known gulag was the slave labor camp in Rowne, also known as the
Lvov camp, which began operation in December 1939. The Rowne camp consisted of a
223
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Polish officers and leaders sought shelter in the Wilno district officially
transferred to Lithuania. Thanks to this safe haven, some Polish officers
survived the Katyn slaughter, but after the annexation of Lithuania in June
of 1940, they were hunted down and sent to the Kozielsk camp that had just
been emptied as a result of the Katyn massacre.229 According to Soviet
estimates, 4,767 Poles from Lithuania and 913 from Latvia were to be
transferred to the Kozielsk camp in the summer of 1940.230 Their
whereabouts remain unknown.
On the authority of the March 5th Execution Order, almost half of
the Polish Officer Corps were murdered.231 In view of the fact that in
partitioning Poland with Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union took over only
37% of the Polish population, it means that in proportion to the Soviet share
of the conquered Polish population, the Soviet Union murdered more than
100% of its share of the Polish Officer Corps.
The March 5th Execution Order that condemned 25,700 Polish
POWs and prisoners to death represents only one of many repressive
measures directed at the Polish national group under Soviet occupation
between September 1939 and June 1941. On the authority of the March 20
Directive,232 on April 13, 1940, the families of the condemned Polish
officers were forcibly removed from their homes, placed on cattle trains,
and sent to the deserts of Kazakhstan.233 On the authority of the December
system of about 20 detention locations along the strategic Nowograd-Wołyń road that detained about 15,500 people. The second group of labor camps serviced iron ore mines of ,
Nikopol-Marganiec” and detained about 10,300 Poles. See MATERSKI, supra note 144; see
also Piotr H. Kosicki, The Katyn Massacres of 1940, ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MASS
VIOLENCE, 2–8 (Sep. 8, 2008), http://www.massviolence.org/IMG/article_PDF/The-KatynMassacres-of-1940.pdf.
229
See STANISŁAW CIESIELSKI, WOJCIECH MATERSKI & ANDRZEJ PACZKOWSKI, REPRESJE
SOWIECKIE WOBEC POLAKÓW I OBYWATELI POLSKICH (2d ed. 2002).
230
It is estimated that 4,380 Polish nationals were sent to the Kozielsk camp from Lithuania and Latvia in 1940.
231
The Polish officers targeted in Beria’s March 5th execution order were drawn from a
broad cross-section of the Polish military and government. Those targeted included generals,
colonels, majors, captains, lieutenants and ensigns, as well as civil servants and private citizens such as police officers, police gendarmes, prison guards, intelligence officers, landowners and clergymen. Fischer, supra note 128.
232
See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 153–156 (describing the
deportation of Poles on the orders of “Beria’s Directive to the Commissar of Internal Affairs,
Kazakh SSR, GB Senior Major Semyon Burdakov, on the Resettlement in Kazakhstan of
Polish POW Families to Be Deported from the Western Oblasts of Ukraine and Belorussia”
(Mar. 20, 1940)).
233
See id.; see also Natalia S. Lebedeva, The Deportation of the Polish Population to the
USSR, 1939–41, in FORCED MIGRATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, 1939–1950, 28,
32–36 (Alfred J. Rieber, ed., 2000) (describing the typical conditions to which deportees
shipped into the Soviet interior were subjected).
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5, 1939 Resolution of the Politburo, on February 10, 1940, between 140,000
and 220,000 people, mostly representatives of the Polish administration,
military families, railroad workers and forestry workers were forcibly
removed from their homes and expelled to Siberia.234 By the time the Nazi
army attacked the Soviet Union in June of 1941, two more expulsions of
Polish civilians from Soviet-occupied Poland pursuant to elaborate plans
and procedures had taken place. The third wave of mass deportations
affected people escaping Nazi occupation in Western Poland, mostly Polish
citizens of Jewish origin, while the fourth wave of deportations was aimed
primarily at Polish intelligentsia. The Nazi attack on the Soviet Union
caught the Soviets—preoccupied with mass deportations—by surprise,
interrupting the fourth massive deportation action of the Polish nationals to
the Soviet Far East. This genocidal practice of forced removal of Polish
civilians from their homes brought enormous despair and suffering to those
affected. It resulted in mass deaths and serious physical and mental harm to
hundreds of thousands of Polish citizens. These deportations affected at
least half a million Polish civilians, mostly women, children and the elderly,
inflicting on them conditions of life calculated to bring about their physical
destruction.
The destruction of the Polish national group through mass arrests,
mass murders, deportations, slave labor and conscription to the Soviet Army
was carried out in accordance with carefully laid down plans and numerous
decrees and orders. The lists of “anti-Soviet elements” singled out for
destruction included a substantial part of the entire population of Sovietoccupied Poland.235 A confidential report prepared by the U.S. State
Department in London in 1943 concluded that, based on careful
examination of the categories of deportees “it will be seen that they include
the majority of persons active in political, social and even economic life.”236
According to this report, the register of categories of deportees for Sovietoccupied Poland included three to four million people out of the total
population of 13 million people.237 It must be noted that ethnic Poles
represented about five million in this ethnically mixed population; hence,
the mass scale of deportations that primarily affected Polish women and
children.
The Soviet leadership supplemented mass killings of the Polish elite
and mass deportations of their families and other civilians suspected of
loyalty to Poland with additional measures aimed at the destruction of the
234

See id. (providing a detailed breakdown of the deportations).
KUŚNIERZ, supra note 20, at 68.
236
PIOTROWSKI, supra note 58, at 217.
237
Id. (“[A]n individual is the product of his environment, and therefore if a certain environment produces criminals it must be destroyed.”).
235
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Polish national group. In violation of Articles 43, 44 and 45 of the fourth
Hague Convention, on November 29, 1939, the Soviet Union stripped all
Polish citizens under its control of their Polish citizenship and considered
them as the citizens of the Soviet Union.238 In December of 1939, the
Soviets ordered conscription for military service to the Soviet Army of all
men from eighteen to fifty years of age on the territory of Soviet-occupied
Poland.239 It is estimated that by June of 1941, between 150,000 and
250,000 Polish nationals were forced to serve in the Soviet Army.240
2.

Qualitative evaluation

The officers of the Polish Army were initially separated from the
group of Polish prisoners of war in accordance with a decision of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party on prisoners of war dated
October 2, 1939.241 Article II of this decision specified: (a) to place generals,
lieutenants colonels, prominent military and state officials, and all other
officers in the South (in Starobelsk); and (b) to place intelligence agents,
counterintelligence agents, gendarmes, police, and prison guards in
Ostashkov camp, Kalinin Oblast.242 According to a report on the situation in
the Kozielsk NKVD POW camp dated December 1, 1939, the Polish POW
officer contingent that arrived at the Kozielsk camp around November 1,
1939 consisted of 3,420 officers, 654 captains, 258 majors, seventy-nine
lieutenant colonels, forty-three high state officials, twenty-four colonels,
seventeen naval captains, seven military clergy, four generals, one admiral,
three landowners, one prince, and eighty-five rank-and-file soldiers subject
to being sent away.243 Clearly the Soviet extermination policy targeted
officers of the Polish Army.

238

The Nazi German leadership made a similar citizenship decision respecting Polish nationals at approximately the same time. George Ginsburgs, Option of Nationality in Soviet
Treaty Law: The War-Time and Post-War Record, 49 IOWA L. REV. 1130, 1150–51(1963);
see also KUŚNIERZ, supra note 20, at 55. Articles 43 through 45 forbid occupying forces from
forcing local citizens to betray their armed forces or renounce their citizenship or allegiance
to their native country. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, TS No. 539 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910).
239
See Ginsburgs, supra note 238, at 1150 (noting that all Polish nationals meeting Soviet
enlistment requirements and of Ukrainian, Byelorussian or Jewish heritage were merged into
the Soviet Army).
240
KUŚNIERZ, supra note 20, at 57.
241
See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 26–27 (noting that the
higher level officers were separated from their enlisted counterparts and other militaryrelated government personnel).
242
Id. at 63.
243
Id. at 84.
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Out of concern that some Polish officers evaded capture as POWs,
the Politburo issued a special order on December 3, 1939 to arrest all Polish
Army officers registered in NKVD files.244 Within only one month on the
Polish lands incorporated to the Ukrainian SSR, 1,057 Polish Army officers
were hunted down and arrested.245 The hunt for Polish Army officers also
continued after the March 5th Execution Order. On April 4, 1940 Beria
issued yet another directive to arrest all non-commissioned officers of the
Polish Army.246
On the authority of the March 5th Execution Order, at least 7,305
Polish citizens arrested on the territory of Soviet occupied Poland were
murdered in the Ukrainian and Belorussian Socialist Soviet Republics. In
1994, Ukraine turned over to Poland a list of 3,435 Polish citizens murdered
on its territory pursuant to the March 5th Execution Order.247 Of those
murdered in Western Ukraine, 19% represented local leaders such as
lawyers, judges, businessmen and members of elective bodies such as
councilmen, town mayors and parliamentarians.248 Law enforcement
employees including policemen, gendarmes, border guards, agents and
“spies” represented 29%; Polish Army officers and non-commissioned
officers represented 14%; and other agents and enemies including military
families and refugees represented 10%. About 28% of the names from the
Ukrainian list remain unidentified.249
3.

“In whole”

The first question that needs to be addressed is whether the Soviet
leadership intended to destroy the Polish national group “as a whole.” The
case law on genocide considers the “selective killing” of certain segments of
a group as evidence of intent to destroy the group as a whole, assuming it is
predicated on a calculation that destruction of the significant members of
the group will irrevocably compromise the existence of what remains.250
Accordingly, selective killings of patriotic segments of the Polish society,
244

See Lebedeva, supra note 233, at 32.
See id.
246
KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 161
247
Styrna, supra note 191, at 1559.
248
KRZYSZTOF PERSAK, THE ROAD TO KATYN (forthcoming 2012).
249
Id.
250
See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened
for signature Dec. 9 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951)
[hereinafter Genocide Convention] (noting that the crime of genocide includes targeting a
group “in whole or in part” as alternate components of the same offense); see also WILLIAM
SCHABAS, THE U.N. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 171 (2006) (discussing the elements of the crime of genocide in
the broader international criminal tribunal context).
245
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including higher ranking members of the Polish Armed Forces, officials of
national and local administration and judiciary, members of the law
enforcement system, including policemen, gendarmes, prison guards and
border guards, intellectual elite, and community and civic leaders serve as
proof of the intent to destroy the Polish national group as a whole. The
Soviet leadership believed that the destruction of a significant part of the
Polish national group irrevocably compromised the ability of the remaining
part of the Polish national group to survive on the Polish territory
incorporated to the Soviet Union.251 The destruction of the patriotic elite
was to prevent the rebirth of the Polish nationhood based on the intellectual
potential of its leadership group. It had a decisive lasting impact upon the
survival of the entire Polish national group and, as such, on the Polish
territory incorporated to the Soviet Union. By destroying significant and
influential members of the Polish national group, the Soviet Union
irrevocably compromised the ability of the remaining part of this protected
group to survive. Therefore, the Soviet Union acted with specific intent to
destroy the “whole” Polish national group on the Polish territory
incorporated to the Soviet Union.
One could argue that the reemergence of Poland after the war stands
as proof that the Soviet Union did not intend to destroy Poland. This
argument is contrary, however, to the intention of the drafters of the
Genocide Convention who never regarded the complete destruction of a
group as a prerequisite to finding genocide.252 It contradicts most, if not all,
court opinions with respect to genocide, and it disregards ample evidence of
specific intent of the Soviet leadership to destroy the Polish national group,
as such, on the Polish territory incorporated to the Soviet Union between
1939 and 1941. However, in light of well-known resistance on the part of
contemporary international tribunals, the political establishment, and some
scholars to qualify acts aimed at destroying protected groups as genocide
regardless of the evidence presented and gravity of the crime,253 and in
consideration of the fact that the Katyn crime implicates a great power of
the contemporary world, such an argument must be addressed with due care.
First, it must be noted that between September 1939 and June 1941,
the Soviet Union attacked Poland as an ally of Nazi Germany in accordance
with Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 23, 1939 and partitioned Poland in
accordance with the Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28,
251

Cf. PIOTROWSKI, supra note 58, at 9–13 (describing Soviet plans to eradicate Polish
culture and history alongside its systematic destruction of important groups and institutions
in Polish society).
252
See Genocide Convention, supra note 250 (noting that partial destruction of a group was
sufficient to meet the requirements of the crime of genocide).
253
See POWER, supra note 10 at 43, 57–58.
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1939.254 After the June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union, the
bewildered Soviet Union joined the allied coalition thus indirectly became
an ally of Poland.255 Therefore, the Soviet intent towards Poland while
working in alliance with Nazi Germany cannot be equated with the Soviet
intent towards Poland while working in alliance with the United States,
Great Britain and Poland.
Second, it shall be clarified that contemporary Poland is located on
the lands of the western half of pre-war Poland, in other words primarily on
the territory of Nazi-occupied Poland. The Polish national group living on
the Polish territory conquered, incorporated and controlled by the Soviet
Union between 1939 and 1941 was subjected to significant destruction and
effectively weakened during the first twenty-one months of the Soviet
occupation. As a result of German aggression, Eastern Poland was taken
over by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in the Sikorski-Majski
agreement of July 1941 expressly relinquished its rights to Eastern Poland
in exchange for Allies’ help in fighting the Nazis.256 However, once the Red
Army reclaimed the territory of Eastern Poland three years later on its way
to Berlin, the Soviet Union never returned these lands to Poland and
subsequently liquidated the Polish national group on these lands
completely.257 Thus, the Soviet Union incorporated eastern Poland in 1939,
relinquished its right to this territory in the aftermath of German aggression,
but reincorporated these lands back into the Soviet Union upon its victory
over Germany and completed the process of destroying and liquidating the
Polish national group on these lands in 1944 and thereafter.258
The Soviet genocidal policies in Eastern Poland between 1939 and
1941 as outlined above weakened the Polish national group on the eastern
side of the Ribbentrop-Molotov line to such extent that the subsequent
reincorporation of these lands to the Soviet Union in 1944 was achieved
without much resistance. The process of “de-Polonization” of those lands
that followed after the war through population transfers and further

254

See GEOFFREY ROBERTS, STALIN’S WARS: FROM WORLD WAR TO COLD WAR, 1939–53,
at 30, 36–37 (2006).
255
Id. at 82, 92 (referencing Operation Barbarossa, the codename for the German invasion
of the Soviet Union beginning on June 22, 1941, involving over 150 German military divisions spread across a 1,000 mile front).
256
SWORD, supra note 165, at 29–31.
257
Behind Closed Doors: The Struggle for Poland, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/behind
closeddoors/in-depth/struggle-poland.html (last visited June 11, 2012).
258
Id.; see also R. Gerald Hughes, Unfinished Business from Potsdam: Britain, West Germany, and the Oder-Neisse Line, 1945–1962, 27 INT’L HIST. REV. 259, 262–64 (2005) (describing the debate over and ultimate concession of substantial Polish territory, namely lands
east of the Oder and Neisse rivers, to the Soviet Union).
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discrimination of the Polish national group led to the total and complete
destruction of the Polish national group, as such, on these lands.
To illustrate the combined effect of various destructive policies
directed at the Polish national group over a considerable period of time,
certain statistics are in order. The lost Polish lands included, inter alia, the
city of Lwów that represented the third most significant cultural,
educational and economic center of pre-war Poland, home to 62.5% ethnic
Poles, 23.5% Jews and 7.8% Ukrainians according to 1937 records.259 By
2010, ethnic Poles represented only 4% of Lviv population.260 The city of
Wilno was the fifth largest city in pre-war Poland with 66% ethnic Poles,
28% Jews and 1% Lithuanians.261 In 2009, ethnic Poles represented 18.7%
of the Vilnius population, Jews represented 0.5% and Lithuanians
represented 58%.262 The city of Grodno in pre-war Poland consisted of 60%
ethnic Poles, 37.5% Jews, and 3% Lithuanians and Byelorussian together.263
By 2010, ethnic Poles in the Grodno region represented 24.8% of the
population.264 These radical shifts in composition of the population on these
lands were made possible in part by policies of mass destruction
implemented by the Soviet Union towards the Polish national group
between 1939 and 1941.
4.

“In part”

Although the Katyn crime meets the legal definition of destruction
“in whole,” as shown above, it also meets the test of destruction “in part.”
Four types of tests have been advanced by legislators, case law and scholars
to evaluate destruction “in part.”265 The first approach assumes that “while
the result may only be partial destruction [of the protected group], the intent
259

In October 1944, approximately 66% of Lwów’s citizens were ethnic Poles. This proportion dropped to 46% by the end of November 1944, a product of the Soviet plan to improve its territorial claim to Lwów. As a result of the Yalta Agreement of February 10, 1945,
Poland lost the political battle to preserve its eastern territory, including the cities of Lwów,
Grodno, and Nowogródek, to the Soviet Union. See generally GRZEGORZ HRYCIUK,
PRZEMIANY NARODOWOŚCIOWE I LUDNOŚCIOWE W GALICJI WSCHODNIEJ I NA WOŁYNIU W
LATACH 1931–1948 (2005).
260
Id.
261
Id.
262
Id.
263
Id.
264
Alexander Gurko, Cooperation Between the Union of Poles in Belarus and the Local
and State Government to Satisfy the Educational and Cultural Needs of Polish Minority
(1988–2000 and Beyond), Republic of Belarus, LOCAL GOV’T & PUB. SERV. REFORM
INITIATIVE, http://lgi.osi.hu/ethnic/csdb/results.asp?idx=no&id=250 (last visited June 11,
2012).
265
SCHABAS, supra note 198, at 277.
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must be to destroy the entire group.”266 This approach advanced by the
Truman administration is not supported by the legislative work or by the
language of the definition of genocide.267 However, as shown by the test for
destruction “in whole” discussed above, the intent to destroy the entire
Polish national group “in whole” is inferred from the acts of selective
killings of the influential part of the Polish national group. Therefore the
Katyn case meets the test “in part” as advanced by the Truman
administration.
The second approach defines “the part” as “substantial part,” in
other words “a part of a group of such numerical significance that the
destruction or loss of that part would cause the destruction of the group as a
viable entity within the nation of which such group is a part.”268 What
constitutes the “substantial part” is open to debate. Some argue that it is “a
multitude of persons of the same group” as long as the number is
“substantial.”269 However, the drafters of the Statute for the International
Criminal Court were of the opinion that destruction of more than a small
number of individuals who are members of the protected group is
sufficient.270 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda stated that “in
part” required the intent to destroy a considerable number of individuals.271
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia stated that
the “substantial part” means “a reasonably substantial number relative to the
group as a whole.”272
The genocidal acts directed at the Polish national group on the
conquered Polish territory consisted of at least the following: (a) mass
killings during the invasion (between 2,500–5,000 killed); b) mass killings
through the March 5th Execution Order (25,700 killings intended, at least
21,857 actually killed); (c) mass arrests and sentencing to slave labor camps
and gulags (150,000–900,0000); (d) four waves of mass deportations
(320,000–1,200,000);273 (d) prisoners of war sent to slave labor camps
266

Id.
Id.
268
United States Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1093(8)
(1987).
269
SCHABAS, supra note 198, at 278 (referencing a statement by Nehemiah Robinson); see
NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, GENOCIDE CONVENTION 63 (1960).
270
SCHABAS, supra note 198, at 278–79.
271
Id. at 279 (referring to the case of Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No.
ICTR-95-I-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 97 (May 21, 1999)).
272
Id. (referring to the case of Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al., Case No. IT-95-8-I, Judgment
on Defence Motions to Acquit, ¶ 65 (Sept. 3, 2001)).
273
See THE POLISH DEPORTEES OF WORLD WAR II, supra note 132, at 5 (according to railroad records, from 120 to 150 trains were used for each wave of deportations, each train
carrying an average of 2,000 persons).
267
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(25,000–250,000); and (e) Polish citizens forced to serve in the Red Army
(150,000–230,000).274 These numbers do not account for mortality rates,
known to be in the range of 50% per year in many of these groups. When
viewed in proportion to the multiethnic population of about thirteen million
with ethnic Poles representing about five million, these numbers are
substantial on its face. They are reasonably substantial relative to the group;
they are also “considerable” and clearly represent “more than a small
number of individuals.”275 The categories of people targeted for repressive
measures constituted “a distinct part” as noted by the Krstic case,276
whereby the elimination of these groups targeted the very existence of the
entire group, as such. They represented the “substantial” part of the Polish
national group on the Soviet controlled Polish territory, and their destruction
caused the destruction of the Polish national group as a viable entity within
the multiethnic population of thirteen million people.277
It shall be considered further that, as demonstrated by the Soviet
proscription lists prepared for the conquered Polish territory, the intent was
to subject three to four million members of the Polish national group to
repressive measures.278 Taking into account that mass deportations carried
out in June of 1941 were interrupted by the Luftwaffe attacks and in all
likelihood would have continued, there is overwhelming evidence that the
Soviet Union carried out the destruction of “a substantial part” of the Polish
national group between 1939 and 1941 on the Polish territory occupied by
the Soviet Union.279 It shall be also noted that a number of scholars argue
that the customary international rule, as codified in Article 6 of the ICC

274

Id. at 6
Roberta Arnold, The Mens Rea of Genocide Under the Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 14 CRIM. L. FORUM 127, 133 (2003).
276
Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 590.
277
JOANNA B. MICHLIC, POLAND'S THREATENING OTHER: THE IMAGE OF THE JEW FROM 1880
TO THE PRESENT 139 (2006) (summarizing territorial and population control of Soviet Union
in Poland).
278
See Alexander B. Rossino, Nazi Anti-Jewish Policy During the Polish Campaign: The
Case of the Einsatzgruppe von Woyrsch, 24 GERMAN STUD. REV. 35, 37–38 (2001) (detailing
how proscription lists, also known as “Wanted Person Lists” were used); Alexander V. Prusin, A Community of Violence: The SiPo/SD and Its Role in the Nazi Terror System in Generalbezirk Kiew, 21 HOLOCAUST & GENOCIDE STUD. 1, 5 (2007) (describing the special proscription lists that the Gestapo and SD prepared on the eve of the German invasion of Poland).
279
See e.g., Major Lonnie O. Ratley III, A Lesson of History: The Luftwaffe and Barbarossa, AIR UNIV. REV., Mar.–Apr. 1983, at 2 (detailing how Luftwaffe air strike devastated the
Red Air Force); Polish Experts Lower Nation’s WWII Death Toll, EXPATICA (Aug. 30,
2009), http://www.expatica.com/de/news/german-news/Polish-experts-lower-nation_s-WWII
-death-toll--_55843.html (estimating 150,000 Poles perished, and 320,000 deported, under
the Soviets).
275
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Statute, does not require that the victims of genocide be numerous.280 The
only thing that can be clearly inferred from the language of this article is
that genocide cannot be held to occur when there is only one victim.281
However, as long as the other required elements are present, the killing or
commission of the other enumerated offenses against more than one person
may amount to genocide.282
The third approach to evaluate destruction “in part” focuses on the
qualitative, as opposed to quantitative, aspect of the destruction by putting
emphasis on the word “significant” as opposed to “substantial.”283 It focuses
on the viability of a group not in a numerical sense, but rather on
“irreparable impact upon a group’s chances of survival when a stratum of its
population, generally political, social, or economic, is liquidated.”284 The
U.N. Commission of Experts stated in its Final Report on the investigation
of violations of humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia that “intent to
destroy a specific part of a group such as its political, administrative, and
intellectual or business leaders may be a strong indication of genocide
regardless of the actual numbers killed.”285 The “extermination specifically
directed against law enforcement and military personnel may affect a
‘significant section of a group in that it renders the group at large
defenseless against other abuses of a similar or other nature’” particularly if
the leadership is being eliminated as well.286 The groups singled out for
extermination by the March 5th Execution Order correspond exactly to the
groups noted above as “significant.” They represent high-ranking military
officials, law enforcement personnel, civil servants, members of the
administrative structure of the Polish state, community leaders, intellectuals,
businessmen and teachers.287

280

AND

E.g., CHANDRA LEKHA SIRIAM, ET AL., WAR, CONFLICT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THEORY
PRACTICE 216 (2010); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note

178.
281

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 178 (providing examples
of genocide as acts against multiple people in a group).
282
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 146 (2d ed. 2008).
283
SCHABAS, supra note 198, at 281.
284
Id.
285
Final Rep. of the Commission of Experts, II.I.1, UN Doc. S/1994/674 (May 24, 1994) (a
Security Council Resolution established the Commission of experts to investigate humanitarian law violations in the former Yugoslavia).
286
Final Rep. of the Commission of Experts, supra note 284, at II.I.1; see also SCHABAS,
supra note 198 at 282.
287
SCHABAS, supra note 198 at 282.
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The U.N. Commission of Experts also noted in its Final Report that
the destruction “must be viewed in the context of the fate of what happened
to the rest of the group.”288
“If a group suffers extermination of its leadership and in the wake of that
loss, a large number of its members are killed or subjected to other heinous
acts, for example deportation, the cluster of violations ought to be
considered in its entirety in order to interpret the provisions of the
Convention in a spirit consistent with its purpose.”289

This scenario directly applies to the Katyn case, as the mass killing of the
Polish leadership was conducted simultaneously with mass deportations of
their family members and the families of other leaders and pillars of the
Polish society. These deportations were conducted in traumatic
circumstances and resulted in severe hardship deliberately inflicted on
hundreds of thousands of Polish civilians, mostly women, children, and the
elderly.290 The living conditions during deportation and at the destination
locations, including—but not limited to—starvation, cold, infectious
diseases, and hard labor, were calculated to bring about their physical
destruction.291
Finally, the fourth test to evaluate destruction “in part” focuses on a
group in a geographic sense.292 A Trial Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal
noted that:
In view of the particular intent requirement, which is the essence of the
crime of genocide, the relative proportionate scale of the actual or
attempted physical destruction of a group, or a significant section therefore
should be considered in relation to the factual opportunity of the accused
to destroy a group in a specific geographic area within the sphere of his
control, and not in relation to the entire population of the group in a wider
geographic sense.293

In another case, the Trial Chamber held that “the physical destruction may
target only a part of the geographically limited part of the larger group
288

Final Rep. of the Commission of Experts, supra note 284, at II.I.1; see also SCHABAS,
supra note 198, at 283.
289
SCHABAS, supra note 198, at 283; see also Final Rep. of the Commission of Experts,
supra note 284, at II.I.1.
290
FROM PEACE TO WAR: GERMANY, SOVIET RUSSIA, AND THE WORLD, 1939–1941, at 78
(Bernd Wegner ed., 1997) (describing the brutal deportations and the deaths of children and
elderly caused by harsh weather).
291
Id. (listing the causes of death, such as dehydration during the summer months and
freezing to death during the winter months).
292
SCHABAS, supra note 198, at 285.
293
Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, Case No. IT-95-18-R61 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia June 27, 1996).
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because the perpetrators of the genocide regard the intended destruction as
sufficient to annihilate the group as a distinct entity in the geographic area at
issue.”294 Furthermore, the International Court of Justice held “that it is
widely accepted that genocide may be found to have been committed where
the intent is to destroy the group within a geographically limited area.”295 In
the Katyn case, the Soviet Union directed its policies of destruction at the
Polish national group located on Polish territory conquered, incorporated,
and controlled by the Soviet Union between September 1939 and June
1941.296
In light of the above analysis, the Katyn case meets the test of
destruction “in whole” and destruction “in part.”

E.

Intent to Destroy

Material elements of the crime of genocide must be committed with
intent and knowledge.297 Such intent and knowledge can be proven by
explicit evidence of perpetrator’s own words and acts, and “can be inferred
from relevant facts and circumstances.”298
1.

Direct proof

The March 5th Execution Order clearly spells out the intent to
destroy 14,700 Polish POWs and 11,000 persons arrested on the conquered

294

Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. ICTR-98-33-T, Judgement, ¶ 590 (Dec. 2, 2001), http://
www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf; see also Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al.,
Case No. ICTR-95-8-T, Judgement on Defence Motion to Acquit, ¶ 68 (Sept. 3, 2001)
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/sikirica/tjug/en/010903r98bis-e.pdf (“[T]he intent to destroy a
multitude of persons belonging to a group may amount to genocide, even where these persons constitute only part of a group within a given geographical area: a country or a region or
a single community.”).
295
Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43,
¶ 199 (Feb. 26).
296
KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 112 (exposing that 97% of
all prisoners of war during 1940 were Poles).
297
See Genocide Convention, supra note 250, art. 2 (referring to the intent to destroy).
Article 30 of the Rome Statute discusses the mental element required for the crime of genocide. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 178, art 30. It states
that a person has intent where: “(a) in relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the
conduct; (b) in relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is
aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.” Id. Article 30 also specifies that
“’knowledge’ means awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the
ordinary course of events[,]” and that “‘[k]now’ and ‘knowingly’ shall be construed accordingly.” Id.
298
ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 182.
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Polish territory.299 Members of the Soviet Politburo based their decision to
shoot the Polish officers and other Polish prisoners on the fact that they
were “all hardened, irremediable enemies of Soviet power. . . .”300 By
approving the March 5th Execution Order, all members of the Soviet
Politburo had the knowledge that all Polish citizens listed in this order
would be killed, and they intended this killing to take place.
Stalin in particular spoke of his intent to kill people of Polish
descent at several different occasions. He clearly expressed his intent to kill
people of Polish ethnicity in connection with a mass extermination action
known as the Polish Operation, conducted in the Soviet Union between
1937 and 1938.301 In replying to Yezow, who led the extermination of ethnic
Poles in Ukraine, Stalin wrote: “Very well! Keep on digging up and
cleaning out this Polish filth. Eliminate it in the interest of the Soviet
Union.”302
Soon thereafter, on August 19, 1939, in a speech given to his most
trusted members of the Politburo (Molotov, Beria, Voroshilov, Kaganovich
and Malenkov), Stalin stated that “the first benefit from signing the pact [of
non-aggression with Germany] will be the destruction of Poland and the
movement of our borders up to Warsaw.”303
Four days later, on August 23, 1939, the Soviets signed a
nonaggression treaty with Germany known as the Ribbentrop-Molotov
Pact.304 The Secret Additional Protocol to this Pact spells out the intent of
Germany and the Soviet Union to wage a joint war of aggression on Poland
as follows:
In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas
belonging to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the
U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew,
Vistula, and San.
The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the
maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be
bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political
developments.305

It is important to point out that it was Joseph Stalin who ultimately
decided that it was not desirable to maintain any independent Polish State.
299

KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 118–20.
Id. at 119.
301
See SNYDER, supra note 18, at 96.
302
Id.
303
PIOTROWSKI, supra note 58, at 7. The speech was first broken by the German newspaper, Die Welt (The World) on July 23, 1996, after over 50 years of secrecy. Id.
304
See Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, supra note 60.
305
Id. (quoting Article 2 of the Secret Add. Protocol).
300
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In his telegram from Moscow dated September 20, 1939 German
Ambassador Schulenburg reported to Berlin that:
Molotov hinted that the original inclination entertained by the Soviet
Government and Stalin personally to permit the existence of a residual
Poland had given way to the inclination to partition Poland along the
Pissa-Narew-Vistula-San Line.306

Other members of the Soviet Politburo also acted with specific
intent to destroy the Polish national group. Lawrenti Beria prepared a plan
of executions, drafted the March 5th Execution Order, and spearheaded its
complex implementation.307 He also authored and orchestrated plans for the
deportation of hundreds of thousands Polish civilians to the Soviet Far
East.308 Viacheslav Molotov negotiated with Germany the destruction of
Poland and its partition, and publicly spoke of his satisfaction with the
destruction of Poland. At a meeting of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R.
on October 31, 1939, Molotov used the following explicit hate language
towards Poland:
The ruling circles of Poland boasted quite a lot about the “stability” of
their State and the “might” of their army. However one swift blow to
Poland, first by the German Army and then by the Red Army, and nothing
was left of this ugly bastard of the Versailles Treaty which has existed by
oppressing non-Polish nationalities.309

Molotov’s explicit admission of his intent to destroy Poland clearly
echoed Stalin’s and Beria’s attitudes.310 These statements demonstrate
common genocidal intent that incited the Soviet public to hatred of the
Polish people and aggression to destroy Poland. Thus, the above actions and
statements constitute direct proof, through perpetrators’ own words and
acts, that they acted in concert with knowledge and intent to destroy the
Polish national group, as such.
306

See Telegram No. 395 from Friedrich-Werner Graf von der Schulenburg, Ambassador,
Ger., to the German Foreign office, Berlin (Sept. 20, 1939), available at http://avalon.law.
yale.edu/20th_century/ns080.asp.
307
KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 385.
308
See id. at 114−15 (identifying the beginnings of Beria’s deportation plans).
309
THE POLISH DEPORTEES OF WORLD WAR II, supra note 132, at 213. Some translations of
this statement are as follows: “The ragtag State of Poland, the grotesque bastard of the Versailles Treaty, has ceased to exist.” EDMUND JAN OSMANCZYK, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED
NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 810 (Anthony Mango ed., 2004).
310
Compare THE POLISH DEPORTEES OF WORLD WAR II, supra note 132, at 213, with
SNYDER, supra note 18, at 96 (quoting Stalin as writing “Very well! Keep on digging up and
cleaning out this Polish filth. Eliminate it in the interest of the Soviet Union.”), and with
KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 385 (Beria submitted to Stalin the
resolution to shoot Polish POWs).

File: Szonert 2

Created on: 7/4/2012 2:02:00 PM

CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.

690
2.

Last Printed: 9/21/2012 8:33:00 PM

[Vol. 44:633

Motive

The drafters of the Genocide Convention made it very clear that in
deciding whether a perpetrator intended to destroy a protected group, the
concept of intent must be distinguished from that of motive.311 To establish
intent for purposes of genocide, it must be proven that the perpetrator
intended to destroy the protected group.312 Motives for this intent are not
specified or listed in the definition of genocide.313
This distinction between intent and motive is of great importance in
the Katyn case because this issue often emerges in connection with the
confusion between a political group, which is not a protected group under
the definition of genocide, and a political motive, which does not preclude
the finding of genocide.314 The following scenario illustrates this problem:
Consider a national group which is a protected group under the definition of
genocide and a political group which is not a protected group under the
definition of genocide. The destruction of any national group constitutes
genocide whether there is a political motive or not, as long as the genocidal
intent is established.315 On the other hand, the destruction of a political
group does not constitute genocide, no matter what the motive is.316 Under
the definition of genocide, motive is considered to be only one of many
tools in establishing whether there was “knowledge and intent” to destroy
the protected group.317

a.

Legislative history of the motive

The drafters of the Genocide Convention deliberated extensively
whether motives for destruction should be enumerated in the definition of
genocide. A representative of the Soviet Union argued that “a crime against
a human group becomes a crime of genocide when that group was destroyed
311

See GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 76th mtg. at 118, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (Oct. 15,
1948) [hereinafter Drafting Minutes] (Mr. Fitzmaurice, representative of the U.K., stated that
“[o]nce the intent to destroy a group existed, that was genocide, whatever reasons the perpetrators of the crime might allege.”).
312
See ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 182, art. 6(a)(3) (“The perpetrator intended to
destroy, in whole or in part, that national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.”).
313
See Genocide Convention, supra note 250, art. 2.
314
See id. (omitting political groups from the protected groups, but making no mention of
motive of the perpetrators).
315
See id. (omitting motive and requiring only intent).
316
See id. (omitting political groups from protected groups under the Genocide Convention).
317
See id. The destruction of a political group for whatever reason qualifies as a crime
against humanity. See Elements of Crimes, supra note 304, at 10 (stating that the crime
against humanity of persecution can be made if the perpetrator targets a political group).

File: Szonert 2

Created on: 7/4/2012 2:02:00 PM

2012]

Last Printed: 9/21/2012 8:33:00 PM

WAS KATYN A GENOCIDE?

691

for national, racial or religious motives.”318 However, a representative of the
United Kingdom was of the opinion that listing the motives was not only
useless but it was dangerous because a restrictive nature of such a list
“would enable those who committed a crime of genocide to claim that they
had not committed that crime on grounds of one of the motives listed in the
definition.”319 Drafters of the Genocide Convention voted down the
proposal of the Soviet Union to limit the list of motives as well as that of the
U.K. to leave out any reference to motives.320
In an effort to find a compromise, Venezuela recommended that the
words “as such” be introduced to the definition of genocide.321 This phrase
should meet the views of those who wished to retain a statement of motives
because the motives were implicitly included in the words “as such” but
were not listed separately, thus were not restricted to any list. By adopting
the language “as such” the drafters decided to include the concept of motive
in the definition of genocide but not to enumerate the motives. This
discussion was concluded with the adoption of Venezuela’s proposal to
delete the listing of motives but retain the phrase “as such.”322

b.

“As such”

Between October 14 and October 16, 1948, at the 75th Meeting of
the Contracting Parties, motive was extensively discussed in the course of
deliberations on the draft Genocide Convention.323 During the course of
these deliberations, numerous countries expressed their concern that the
requirement of motive would open the door to abuse through manipulation
of motives.324 Several participants commented that domestic criminal laws
do not include any references to motives.325 Panama stated that “according
318

Drafting Minutes, supra note 310, at 119.
Id. at 118.
320
See SCHABAS, supra note 198, at 301 (“The words ‘as such’, . . . an important element . .
. [were] deliberately included by authors of the Genocide Convention in order to reconcile
the two diverging approaches in favour of and against including a motivational component as
an additional element of the crime.” (quoting Niyitegeka v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 9614-1, Judgment, ¶ 49 (July 9, 2004))).
321
Drafting Minutes, supra note 310, at 119 (Venezuela submitted an amendment stating
that “as such” should be substituted for the list of motives).
322
See 2 HIRAD ABTAHI & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION, THE TRAVAUX
PRÉPARATOIRES 1864 (2008).
323
See Drafting Minutes, supra note 310, at 119 (nearly every country in the record for
those two days remarks on motive).
324
See id. at 117–120. The U.K. in particular, thought that the use of motives in the definition of genocide would be “dangerous” as it would permit those who committed Genocide to
evade conviction by claiming a different motive than one listed in the definition. Id. at 118.
325
See id. at 118 (Panama points out that under domestic law, intent and act are often all
that is required).
319
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to the penal codes of most countries, the establishment of crime presupposes
two factors, intent and act.”326 It was unnecessary to add the factor of motive
to the convention, since no provision was made for it in any penal code.327
Iran warned that mentioning motive “was dangerous because it allowed the
guilty to exonerate themselves from the charge of genocide on the pretext
that they had not been impelled by motives contained in the proposed list of
motives.”328 Ecuador observed that “those who committed the crime of
genocide might use the pretext of the political opinion of a racial or
religious group to persecute and destroy it, without becoming liable to
international sanctions.”329
The adopted compromise reflected in the words “as such” was
subsequently interpreted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
to mean that “the proscribed acts were committed against the victims
because of their membership in the protected group but not solely because
of such membership.”330 Consequently, even if motives are mixed, the
coexistence of other motives is no defense if the genocidal motive is
present.

c.

Manipulation of motive by the Soviet Union

The process of manipulating the motive for the destruction of the
Polish nation can best be demonstrated by the German-Soviet negotiations
leading up to the aggression and partition of Poland. Stalin’s true motive to
attack Poland; i.e., the destruction of Poland and movement of the Soviet
borders up to Warsaw, was top secret.331 He only revealed this motive at a
meeting of his closest advisors on August 19, 1939 and later included it in
the top secret protocol to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.332 However, Stalin
needed to find another, less jarring, motive for public consumption and
international opinion—one that would be plausible to the masses and at the
same time would avoid making the Soviet Union appear to be an aggressor.
Between signing the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact on August 23, 1939 and
attacking Poland on September 17, 1939, the Soviet leadership exerted
considerable effort to find a proper justification for the attack on Poland that
would be acceptable to the Soviet people and also useful in international

326

See id.
See id. (describing the basis for Panama’s support of the U.K.’s proposal).
328
Id. at 120.
329
Drafting Minutes, supra note 310, at 100.
330
Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR 96-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 53 (July 9, 2004).
331
See PIOTROWSKI, supra note 58, at 7 (describing Stalin’s masterplan to conquer Europe
which required a total mobilization of the USSR).
332
Id. at 7.
327
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diplomacy.333 The fabrication of the reasons to go to war of aggression
against Poland can be summarized as follows:
Initially, the Soviets wanted to justify the aggression on Poland as
a war of necessity in order to come to the aid of the Ukrainians
and the White Russians “threatened by Germany.”334
However, this argument did not go well with the Germans. They
expressed their dissatisfaction with this reasoning, replying that
the assignment of a motive of that sort would be out of the
question.335
In response, the Soviets conceded that the projected argument of
the Soviet Government contained a note that was jarring to
German sensibilities but stated that “the Soviet Government
unfortunately saw no possibility of any other motivation, since the
Soviet Union had thus far not concerned itself about the plight of
its minorities in Poland and had to justify abroad, in some way or
other, its present intervention.”336
333

KUŚNIERZ, supra note 20, at 30–31.
Telegram No. 317 from Friedrich-Werner Graf von der Schulenburg, Ambassador, Ger.,
to the German Foreign Office, Berlin (Sept. 10, 1939), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns069.asp.
Then Molotov came to the political side of the matter and stated that the Soviet
Government had intended to take the occasion of the further advance of German
troops to declare that Poland was falling apart and that it was necessary for the Soviet Union, in consequence, to come to the aid of the Ukrainians and the White
Russians “threatened” by Germany. This argument was to make the intervention of
the Soviet Union plausible to the masses and at the same time avoid giving the Soviet Union the appearance of an aggression.
Id.
335
Telegram No. 360, supra note 61 (arguing that assigning the threat to the Ukrainian and
White Russian populations would be out of the question in practice).
We assume in proposing such a communiqué that the Soviet Government has already given up the idea, expressed by Molotov in an earlier conversation with you,
of taking the threat to the Ukrainian and White Russian populations by Germany as
a ground for Soviet action. The assignment of a motive of that sort would be out of
the question in practice.
Id.
336
Telegram No. 371 from Friedrich-Werner Graf von der Schulenburg, Ambassador, Ger.,
to Joachim von Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister of Ger., (Sep. 16, 1939) [hereinafter Telegram
No. 371], available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns073.asp. “Molotov conceded that the projected argument of the Soviet Government contained a note that was jarring to
German sensibilities but asked that in view of the difficult situation of the Soviet Government we not let a trifle like this stand in our way.” Id.
334
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As a result of this debate, the Soviet Union omitted the reference
to the threat “by Germany” and did not specify against whom it
intends to protect the Ukrainians and Byelorussians. Instead, the
statement read: “Soviet Union considered itself obligated to
intervene to protect its Ukrainian and White Russian brothers and
make it possible for these unfortunate people to work in peace.”337
The German Ambassador in Moscow reported that “[t]he Soviet
Government intended to publicize the above train of thought by the radio,
press, etc., immediately after the Red Army had crossed the border, and at
the same time communicate it in an official note to the Polish Ambassador
here and to all the missions here.”338 The Soviets already tested these
arguments at the public rallies in the Gorki Park in Moscow. As foreign
diplomats and correspondents reported, Kremlin’s “line of thought,” that is
the latest version of propaganda, was first presented in public parks in
Moscow by party apparatchiks and later promoted by the media and spread
through the party channels to regional and local leaders. One such rally
ended with the following appeal: “And what? Do we, the Soviet Nation, are
to stand by and watch the suffering of our Byelorussian and Ukrainian
brothers from the hand of the Polish Pany?”339 The speaker did not give any
answer to this question but the people understood his appeal their own way:
“Let’s go to help Poland!” came the reply from the crowd.340 Others
shouted: “Let’s go against the vicious Germans!”341 Learning of the official
Soviet line presented in the Gorki Park, William Seeds, British Ambassador
in Moscow, concluded that the Soviet Union would be able to switch at any
time from defense of persecuted brothers to defense of oppressed victims of
capitalism regardless of their nationality.342 As history proved, his were
prophetic words.

337

Id.; Telegram No. 360, supra note 61.
In view of the complete collapse of the previous form of government in Poland, the
Reich Government and the Government of the U.S.S.R. consider it necessary to
bring to an end the intolerable political and economic conditions existing in these
territories. They regard it as their joint duty to restore peace and order in these areas which are naturally of interest to them and to bring about a new order by the
creation of natural frontiers and viable economic organizations.

Id.
338
339
340
341
342

Telegram No. 371, supra note 335.
ŁOJEK, supra note 38, at 59.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 201.
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Before its attack on Poland, the Soviet Union wrestled with yet
another problem. To protect its international image, the Soviet justification
for the invasion of Poland was to be based on an argument that the Polish
State had collapsed and no longer existed.343 Accordingly, the resistance of
the Polish Army, the presence of the Polish Government on the ground in
Poland, as well as effective defense of key strategic centers including the
capital city of Warsaw, contradicted the Soviet argument that Poland had
collapsed.344
The most visible and most important symbol of Polish resistance
was the capital city of Warsaw. The surrender of Warsaw was of utmost
importance to the Kremlin. Impatient Molotov sent Hitler a congratulatory
telegram on the capture of Warsaw already on September 8, 1939, despite
the fact that the stubborn capital of Poland would not succumb to the
German onslaught for the next twenty days.345
The Soviets’ efforts to cover up their true intentions towards Poland
are also documented in a telegram of the German Ambassador Schulenberg
sent from Moscow to Berlin on September 14, 1939.346 Schulenberg
reported:
For the political motivation of Soviet action (the collapse of Poland and
protection of Russian “minorities” it was of the greatest importance not to
take action until the governmental center of Poland, the city of Warsaw,
had fallen. Molotov therefore asked that he be informed as nearly as
possible as to when the capture of Warsaw could be counted on. . . . I
would direct your attention to today’s article in Pravda, carried by DNB,
which will be followed by a similar article in Izvestia tomorrow. The
articles serve [to prepare] the political motivation mentioned by Molotov
for Soviet intervention.347

But Warsaw did not budge.348 Therefore, the Soviets had to make a
decision: whether to risk the German takeover of their agreed-upon share of
343

Telegram No. 350 from Friedrich-Werner Graf von der Schulenburg, Ambassador, Ger.,
to the German Foreign Office (Sep. 14, 1939) [hereinafter Telegram No. 350], available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns071.asp.
344
KUŚNIERZ, supra note 20, at 34–36.
345
Telegram No. 300 from Friedrich-Werner Graf von der Schulenburg, Ambassador, Ger.,
to the German Foreign Office (Sep. 9, 1939), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu
/20th_century/ns065.asp. “I have just received the following telephone message from Molotov: ‘I have received your communication regarding the entry of German troops into Warsaw. Please convey my congratulations and greetings to the German Reich Government.
Molotov.’” Id.
346
Telegram No. 350, supra note 342.
347
Id. (alteration in original).
348
PIOTROWSKI, supra note 58, at 9 (explaining that the Soviet Union acted sooner than
expected against Poland because of the rapidly deteriorating Polish resistance and the fear
that the German army would expand into the Soviet’s prospective portion of Poland).
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booty, or to risk the damage to its international reputation. At the end, they
chose to protect their prey while taking the risk to jeopardize their
international standing, and attacked Poland while Warsaw was still
fighting.349 To minimize the damage to their international reputation, the
Soviets engaged in a ferocious anti-Polish propaganda offensive that
reverberates to this day.350 Together with the Goebbels propaganda machine
of Nazi Germany, they portrayed Poland as a vicious oppressor of its
minorities that needed to be destroyed.351 As the British observer ably
predicted, they quickly broadened this motive by mixing the message of
oppressing minorities with the image of oppressing the working classes,
thus portraying the Polish people as the oppressive bourgeois or the socalled “Polish Pany,” and making them the number one enemy of the Soviet
people.352
It is worth noting here that both Germany and the Soviet Union
officially justified their aggression on Poland by the need to protect “their”
minorities oppressed by the Polish Government.353 The minority protection
paradox is daunting in this context. While Poland was bound by the
restrictive International Treaty on Minority Protection signed with the
League of Nations in 1919,354 neither Germany nor the Soviet Union was
bound by any minority treaty or other international obligations to protect
their minorities.
It shall be further noted that no mass murders of any minorities took
place in pre-war Poland, while at that time both Germany and the Soviet
Union were actively engaged in exterminating the Polish minority on their
territory.355 While the Soviets murdered 111,000 ethnic Poles in the Polish
Operation of 1937–1938, the Germans, in August 1939 alone, arrested
2,000 ethnic Poles living in Germany.356
349

Id.
Grzegorz Joniec, Antypolskie kampanie prasowe w sowieckiej prasie polskojęzycznej w
latach 1939–1941, in 4 WSCHODNI ROCZNIK HUMANISTYCZNY 287–303 (2007).
351
SNYDER, supra note 18, at 131.
352
ŁOJEK, supra note 38, at 59; see also ANDRZEJ FRISZKE, POLSKA: LOSY PAŃSTWA I
NARODU 1939–1989 (2003).
353
SNYDER, supra note 18, at 131.
354
Polish Minority Treaty, (June 28, 1919), available at http://www.macalester.edu/ courses/intl245/docs/treaty_poland.pdf (last visited June 15, 2012). The Minority Treaty effectively limited Poland’s ability to defend itself against diversionary operations of its minorities
acting on behalf of the foreign governments. See also U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for
Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping: Rep. of the SecretaryGeneral, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992).
355
SYNDER, supra note 18, at 409.
356
U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking
and Peace-Keeping: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (June
17, 1992).
350
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Finally, it shall be noted that no meaningful Russian minority lived
in pre-war Poland.357 Thus, the Ukrainians and White Ruthenians were
considered minorities worth Soviet protection, the Jews and Lithuanians
were excluded from the groups worth protection, while the Poles were made
public enemies of the Soviet people.358 Accordingly, the minority protection
argument was used by both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union as
powerful pretext to destroy Poland.359

d.

Motive behind the Katyn crime

An argument is often made that the Katyn crime was committed out
of political rather than national motive, and therefore that it cannot be
classified as genocide.360 In other words, the Polish officer POWs were
murdered not because they were Polish patriots defending their country
against the Soviet aggression and the right of re-born Poland to exist, but
rather because they were anti-communist oppressors of the working poor,
and therefore political enemies of the communist system.
The language of the March 5th Execution Order offers important
insight into this debate. The key statement from the March 5th Execution
Order that provides the formal justification for shooting 25,700 Polish
citizens states: “they are all hardened irremediable enemies of the Soviet
power . . . .”361 This statement does not provide sufficient answer to the
fundamental question why the condemned men were such hardened
irremediable enemies of the Soviet power. Is it because the Soviet Union
destroyed their homeland, or is it because the Soviet Union sponsored
communism? The vagueness of this train of thought can be observed in
most NKVD documents pertaining to the persecuted Polish citizens.362
The victims’ selection criterion sheds more light on the motive
issue. The March 5th Execution Order explicitly states that people on this
357

See James Mayfield, Ethnic and Religious Map of Poland Before the Nazi Invasion,
EUR. HERITAGE LIBR., http://euroheritage.net/polandethnicmap.shtml (last visited June 15,
2012) (describing the minority groups in pre-war Poland as being comprised of mainly Jews,
Germans, Lithuanians and Ukrainians).
358
See Richard Doody, From Rebirth to the Establishment of the People’s Republic,
WORLD AT WAR: POLAND 1918–1952 (Feb. 28, 2012), http://worldatwar.net/timeline/Poland
/18-52.html (indicating that, upon the Soviet invasion of Poland, “the Soviets . . . [took]
measures to protect inhabitants of Beylorussia and the western Ukraine”).
359
Id.
360
See, e.g., Anna M. Cienciala, The Katyn Syndrome, 65 RUSS. REV. 117, 120 (2005)
(describing the Polish as “counterrevolutionaries” and enemies of the USSR).
361
KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 119.
362
PAUL R. GREGORY, LENIN’S BRAIN AND OTHER TALES FROM THE SECRET SOVIET
ARCHIVES 1–8 (2008), available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams
/11850.pdf.
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list are 97% Polish by nationality, and the categories of people listed refer to
the officers of the Polish Army, law enforcement personnel, and intellectual
leadership of the Polish nation.363 According to the March 5th Execution
Order, among the Polish POWs sentenced to death were over 6,000
lieutenants, 2nd lieutenants and ensigns, over 5,000 rank-and-file police
gendarmes, prison guards, and intelligence agents; over 1,000 police
officers, junior officers, border guards and gendarmerie; and 144 officials,
farmers, priests and military settlers.364 Clearly, the selection criterion for
these groups was based primarily on the function of these men within the
administrative and military structures of the Polish State and not on their
social class or wealth. All these factors explicitly and unequivocally point
out to the national motive.
The March 5th Execution Order also includes the following
phrases: “former officers of the Polish Army,” “former workers in the
Polish police and intelligence organs,” members of “Polish nationalist
counter-revolutionary parties,” and “participants in exposed counterrevolutionary insurgent organizations” who attempt to continue their
“counter-revolutionary work” and conduct “anti-Soviet agitation,” and
“enter actively into the battle against Soviet power.”365 In these statements
the anti-Polish national motive is clearly present and effectively mixed with
the political motive as phrases such as “former officers of the Polish army,”
“former workers in the Polish police,” “Polish nationalists” and
“insurgents” are mixed with “counter-revolutionaries.”366
The Soviet leadership was well aware that vague statements worked
to their advantage.367 Vagueness and imprecision in identifying the enemy
was intended to spread fear among the people and provide cover-up for the
masters.368 This strategy of vagueness was well developed and even spelled
out in the Internal Soviet Directives found in Poland after the war.369 The
363

Id.
KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 119.
365
Id.at 118–20.
366
Id. To put this language in the historical context, it shall be noted that it was a common
practice at that time in the U.S.S.R. to stigmatize all people subject to repression as the enemies of the people, i.e., counterrevolutionaries. Thus, all the enemies of the Soviet power
were always labeled as “counterrevolutionaries.” Id. It is important to note that some of the
most efficient murderers of the Katyn victims received NKVD rewards for the liquidation of
‘the Polish nationalists’ in the Smolensk oblast. Accordingly, the Russians in their own terminology classified the Katyn victims as belonging to the Polish national group. Id. at 119.
367
Boleslaw Bierut's Archives: NKVD Text Detailing the Soviet Takeover of Poland, Instruction No. NK/003/47, in 14 SARMATIAN REV. ¶14 (1994), available at http://www.ruf.
rice.edu/~sarmatia/194/instruct.html (stating that documents should deliberately be imprecisely written).
368
See id.
369
Id.
364
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directive provided: “See to it that all legal, economic and organizational
documents (except military documents) are written in such a way as to be
imprecise.”370
The national motive can be further confirmed by other genocidal
acts directed at the Polish national group at the same time by the same
people. For example, the data collected by the Polish Red Cross from nearly
120,000 Polish refugees soon after their 1942 arrival in Persia revealed that
over 50% of these deportees from Eastern Poland were workers, tradesmen,
farmers and member of the forestry service.371 Thus, half of the deportees
belonged to the poorest classes, which the Soviet communist regime was
supposed to liberate from capitalist oppression and protect.372 This data
directly contradicts the political class motive.
The argument that the victims of the March 5th Execution Order
were murdered for political rather than national motives cannot stand in
light of the explicit evidence of national motive; the clear intent of the
drafters of the Genocide Convention not to allow for political motive to be
used as pretext to evade the responsibility for genocide; and in view of the
case law on genocide.373 In fact, it would be in direct contradiction to the
intent of the drafters of the Genocide Convention to allow the perpetrators
of the Katyn atrocity to exonerate themselves on the pretext of political
motive: that tactic that was envisioned and clearly rejected by the drafters of
the Genocide Convention. 374
3.

Intent and knowledge inferred from facts and circumstances

Considering that the crime of genocide requires the proof of
specific intent,375 which is the highest standard of proof to be met, the above
explicit evidence of specific intent to destroy the Polish national group can
be corroborated by the vast body of evidence of specific intent that can be
inferred from facts and circumstances of the Katyn case. Considering the
370

Id. This Instruction was sent from Moscow to the KGB Headquarters in the Soviet
Embassy in Warsaw and was subsequently found in Boleslaw Bierut’s files after his sudden
death in 1956. Id.
371
THE POLISH DEPORTEES OF WORLD WAR II, supra note 132, at 219–20.
372
Id. at 220.
373
Prosecutor v. Niyitegaka, Case No. ICTR 96-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 49 (July 9, 2004),
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=41591f1b4 (describing how
the Genocide Convention drafters deliberately replaced an explicit reference to motives in
the definition of the crime of genocide).
374
Representatives of Iran and Egypt warned that any mention of motive was dangerous
because it allowed the guilty to exonerate themselves from the charge of genocide on the
pretext that they had not been impelled by motives contained in the proposed list of motives.
See Drafting Minutes, supra note 310, at 120.
375
Genocide Convention, supra note 250, art 2.
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enormity of indirect evidence, the most obvious examples of such implied
evidence of specific intent are highlighted below.

a.

Nazi-Soviet conspiracy to destroy Poland

The Katyn crime shall be considered, interpreted, and evaluated in
the context of the illegal and unprovoked war of aggression, waged jointly
by Germany and the Soviet Union on Poland in accordance with the Secret
Additional Protocol to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Accordingly, the
perpetrators’ intent and knowledge can be inferred from the facts and
circumstances of their jointly preparing, waging, and executing the war of
aggression against Poland, and by jointly planning and implementing
inconceivable repressive measures directed at the Polish civilian population
on the conquered Polish territory.
The Nazi-Soviet collaboration is outlined in greater detail in Section
C of the Presentation of Facts.376 Thus, only highlights of this collaboration
are listed below:
The Polish national group was singled out for special treatment in
the Secret Supplemental Protocol to the Friendship and Boundary
Treaty, in which Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union declared
their intention to work together to combat Polish resistance.377
The Extraordinary Pacification Operations conducted in Poland
between September and December 1939 by Nazi special
extermination squads resulted in 714 mass executions of civilian
population in the first fifty-five days of German occupation and
claimed the life of 16,336 Polish civilians.378 Special pacification
operations conducted by the Soviet NKVD and by special CheKa
operational groups that followed the Red Army to Poland to
cleanse the lands from intelligentsia, clergy and nobility resulted
in the unknown number of brutal murders and arrests of at least
11,817 civilians.379
The above “cleansing” operations were conducted at the same
time, in the same manner, based on proscription lists prepared in

376

See supra Part II.C.
German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty, supra note 57.
378
See Wystawa “Zagłada polskich elit. Akcja AB-Katyn,” INST. NAT’L REMEMBRANCE
(Sept. 28, 2006), http://www.ipn.gov.pl/portal.php?serwis=pl&dzial=47&id=4038.
379
Id.
377
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advance by local collaborators, without following any judicial
proceedings, with the aim to speed up the process.380
Four high-level NKVD-Gestapo meetings to coordinate SovietGerman actions in dealing with Polish resistance took place on the
conquered Polish territory between September 1939 and April
1940. They took place in Brest-Litovsk, Przemyśl, Zakopane and
Kraków.381
On March 2, 1940, Hitler ordered the AB Aktion against the
Polish leading elite.382 On March 5, 1940 the Soviet Politburo
issued an order to exterminate 25,700 Polish POWs of officer rank
and other leaders.383 Stalin made this decision on or about March
2, 1940, at exactly at the same time as Hitler made his decision to
begin the AB Intelligentsia Action.384 Stalin’s decision resulted in
the Katyn Massacre as we know it today.
As a result of the AB Intelligentsia Action, about 7,000 leaders,
professors, teachers, and priests considered suspected of criminal
activities were subsequently massacred at various locations
throughout Poland.385 By the summer of 1940, more than 61,000
Polish activists, intelligentsia, scholars, actors, former officers,
and other leaders were murdered.386
Both the Nazis and the Soviets supplemented their mass
extermination operations with mass deportations of the Polish
people from their homeland.387 While the Soviets were shipping
the Poles to Siberia and Kazakhstan, the Germans pursued their
own strategy of expelling the Poles from their homes.388 From the
380

Id.
See ŁOJEK, supra note 38.
382
See SNYDER, supra note 18, at 146–47. “Whereas the Germans preserved the PolishJewish elites . . . they tended to regard non-Jewish Polish elites in Poland as a political threat.
. . . [Hitler] told [Governor Hans] Frank that Polish ‘leadership elements’ had to be ‘eliminated.’ Frank drew up a list of groups to be destroyed . . . .” Id. Action AB was announced on
March 2, 1940. Id.
383
See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
384
Id.
385
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
386
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
387
See SZYMON DANTER, JANUSZ GUMKOWSKI & KAZIMIERZ LESCZYŃSKI, GENOCIDE 1939–
1945, at 41 (1962).
388
See id.
381
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Polish lands directly incorporated to the Reich, the Germans were
expelling the Poles and shipping them either east to the General
Government, designated as a dumping ground for all undesirable
humans of the Third Reich, or west to slave labor or concentration
camps in the Old Reich. Nearly one million Poles were evicted
from the Polish lands incorporated into the Reich between 1939
and 1944.389
The Germans engaged in extensive abduction operations of Polish
children in order to raise them as Germans. It is estimated that
about 250 thousand Polish children were abducted from their
Polish families to be raised as Germans.390 It is the massive scale
of the German abduction of Polish children that led to the
inclusion of the act of kidnapping children into the list of
genocidal acts.391 Recently, evidence has emerged that the Soviets
implemented similar practices on their side of the partition line.
For example, Irena Sienkiewicz-Mrówczyńska, born into a Polish
military family in Kowle, Wołyń, in 1930, was kidnapped at the
age of eleven directly from school and sent to a children’s camp in
Bojarka near Kiev.392 The purpose of the camp was to Russify
alien children through pioneer youth organizations. 393

b.

Hatred directed at the Polish national group

Some scholars argue that the organizers and planners of genocide
must have a racist or discriminatory motive, that is, a genocidal motive.
They point out that “evidence of hateful motive will constitute an integral
part of the proof of existence of a genocidal policy and therefore of a
genocidal intent”394 even if “individual participants may be motivated by a
range of other factors including financial gain, jealousy and political
ambition.”395
389

See id. at 43–44.
ROMAN HRABAR, HITLEROWSKI RABUNEK DZIECI POLSKICH 1939–1945 (1960).
391
Id.
392
Katarzyna Mrówczyńska, Wspomnienie Niezapomnianej Historii, BOHATEROWIE
OPOWIEŚCI RODZINNYCH http://www.patriotyzmjutra-korzenie.sto.org.pl/?action=papers&pid
=17 (last visited June 15, 2012) (telling a story of a grandmother who experienced
Russification).
393
Id.
394
SCHABAS, supra note 198, at 305.
395
Memorandum from Uma Arunachalam for the Deputy Prosecutor of the Int’l Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (Dec. 20, 2002), available at http://www.nesl.edu/userfiles/file/wc
memos/2002/uarunachalam.pdf; SCHABAS, supra note 198, at 305.
390
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Hatred directed at the Polish people was the foundation on which
both Stalin and Hitler built their genocidal policies towards the Polish
nation. While on the German side of the Ribbentrop-Molotov line the Poles
were hunted down and murdered for being “under-humans,” on the Soviet
side the Poles were hunted down and murdered for being “abovehumans.”396 Together with terror, propaganda of hatred became the main
tool to subjugate the conquered Poland on both sides of the
Ribbentrop-Molotov partition line.397 The ease with which the Germans and
Soviets were able to wage their wars of aggression against Poland by
assigning to ethnic Poles radically opposite characteristics in order to incite
hatred towards them among their own people is a somber reminder of how
easy it is for unscrupulous leaders to manipulate their own people into
committing grave atrocities in the name of the most absurd justifications for
war. The Nazi-Soviet propaganda portraying Poland as a tyrant state that
brutally oppressed its people was so intensely venomous that the echoes of
this propaganda of hatred effectively reverberate to this day in the Soviet
Union, in Germany, and also in the West.398
From the very beginning of the Soviet invasion, the Polish people
were singled out for special persecution.399 Top military commanders of the
Soviet Army made and disseminated statements loaded with hateful and
inflammatory language that incited violence against the Poles.400 For
example, General Timoshenko, who commanded the Ukrainian Front of the
Red Army, used the following hate language in his appeals directed at the
civilian population of the conquered multiethnic lands: “With weapons,
pitchforks, scythe and axes go after your eternal enemy, Polish ‘Pany.’”401
He also vilified the Polish Government by making the following remark:
“former Polish Government—mean, slothful and treasonous, covering up its
back” took shelter abroad.402 The Military Council of the Belorussian Front
in its order issued a day before the attack on Poland stated: “Polish
landowners and capitalists have enslaved the working people of Western
Belorussia and Western Ukraine. Through the use of White terror, field
396

M.B. SZONERT, NULL AND VOID POLAND: CASE STUDY ON COMPARATIVE IMPERIALISM
66 (2008) (discussing the hardships of the Polish people on both sides of the RibbentropMolotov Partition Line).
397
Id. at 58.
398
MIECZYSLAW BISKUPSKI, HOLLYWOOD WAR WITH POLAND 1939–1945 48 (2009); see
DANUSHA V. GOSKA, THE BRUTE POLAK STEREOTYPE IN POLISH-JEWISH RELATIONS AND
AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE 80–82 (2010) (discussing several instances when the mainstream press portrayed Poland as a tyrant state).
399
BISKUPSKI, supra note 397, at 48.
400
Id.
401
FRISZKE, supra note 351, at 25.
402
Joniec, supra note 349, at 295.
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courts-martial, and punitive expeditions, they are suppressing the
revolutionary movement, imposing national oppression and exploitation,
and sowing ruin and devastation.”403 The Order further stated:
In a lightning, crushing blow, rout the lordly-bourgeois Polish troops and
liberate the workers, peasants and laborers of Western Belorussia. Under
the slogans “For our happy Soviet homeland” and “For our great Stalin,”
let us fulfill our military oath and our duty to our homeland. 404

The Soviet propaganda was of mobilizing character, calling for
action and appealing to act. Based on the mythological dialectics of good
and evil, it contrasted the absolute good that is the Soviet State with the
Soviet enemy, never precisely defined but always represented as absolute
evil. To legitimize the Soviet aggression and annexation of Polish lands,
Poland and all those loyal to Poland became such an absolutely evil enemy
that they had to be destroyed. The Soviet press introduced the language of
“us” versus “them” and used emotionally loaded terms to mobilize the
Soviet people to action.405 The following hateful terms were used:
“cowardly and hated by all of us government of exploiters,” “the rulers of
robber truncheons,” “traitors of their own nation together with its hideous
constitution,” “ Yoke State,” “times of darkness,” “enemies of the
motherland,” “Polish Fascists,” and “nationalist Fascists.”406
The hate language intensified over time as the NKVD special
operational forces were cleaning out the conquered territory from all those
suspected of loyalty to Poland. To incite hatred towards the Poles, the
following statements were published: “destroyed cities, burning villages,
thousands of devastated workers—that’s what the Polish nobility left
behind,” or “high taxes, numerous penalties, executions, ignorance,
superstition, lawlessness, hunger, poverty and death—that’s the life of a
peasant in Western Ukraine.”407 This hateful language served as incitement
to violence against ethnic Poles and resulted in widespread ethnic cleansing.
It laid the foundation for the extermination of ethnic Poles by the
Ukrainians in Volhynia in 1943.408
403

KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 42.
This order addressed to the troops spelled out the goads of the Red Army and was read
out loud in all companies, batteries, squadrons and garrisons the night before the attack on
Poland. Id. at 43.
405
See SZONERT, supra 395, at 58–59 (discussing the Soviet’s propaganda and mass extermination of those loyal to Poland).
406
Joniec, supra note 349, at 296; see SZONERT, supra 395, at 58–59.
407
Joniec, supra note 349, at 296.
408
Ryszard Szawlowsi, Genocide Committed by Ukrainian Nationalists on the Polish
Population During World War II, ELECTRONIC MUSEUM, http://www.electronicmuseum.ca/
Poland-WW2/ukrainian_insurgent_atrocities/uia_ukrainian_genocide.html (last visited June
15, 2012); Genocide, Ethnic Cleasnsing, and Deportation: How Volhynia Became West
404

File: Szonert 2

2012]

Created on: 7/4/2012 2:02:00 PM

Last Printed: 9/21/2012 8:33:00 PM

WAS KATYN A GENOCIDE?

705

The national hatred was integrally connected with class hatred as
illustrated in this statement: “Capitalist and landowners, clergy and state
employees robbed our rich nation, sucking out last juices from the working
people, with sword and fire suppressing the slightest signs of protest.”409
The propagandist rejoiced that “with Stalinist sunshine, the workers of
Belorussia are building a new bright future.”410 Routinely and
interchangeably, the Soviet propaganda was referring to the Polish fascists,
Polish nationalists and counterrevolutionaries.411 Towards the end of the
war, the Soviet propaganda demonstrated its sophistication by calling
members of the Polish Home Army as “expectant dwarfs of reaction.”412

c.

Sovietization of the Polish nation

William Seeds, British Ambassador in Moscow, in his telegram to
Lord Halifax dated September 25, 1939 wrote:
When I learned that the soldiers called to military service by general
mobilization were being told that a revolution had broken out in Poland
against its government, and that pundits in public parks proclaimed similar
revelations stating that in this war caused by the bourgeois the people may
benefit and have the opportunity to be liberated, the situation looked very
different. It became clear to me that there were preparations under way to
take over the Polish territory under the cover up of bringing help to the
people’s movement in Poland. . . . If the sovietization process that is
currently under way in the borderlands with Poland will be extended to a
new demarcation line, it will became clear then that Sir. Stalin, similarly
like Herr Hitler in Sudeten and Czechoslovakia, will lose all the arguments
to justify his intervention as made on behalf of oppressed by Poland Soviet
brothers.413

That sovietization process took place with unprecedented brutality
on a massive scale on the entire Polish territory conquered by the Soviet
Union.414 The Polish language was banned in official use.415 The educational
system was turned into a monstrous tool of Soviet indoctrination.416
Compulsory study of the Russian language and history replaced the study of
Ukraine, 1939–46, KENNAN INST. (Jan. 30, 2002), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event
/genocide-ethnic-cleansing-and-deportation-how-volhynia-became-west-ukraine-1939-46.
409
Joniec, supra note 349, at 299.
410
Id.
411
See SZONERT, supra 395, at 116.
412
Id.
413
See ŁOJEK, supra note 38, at 201 (translated by the author).
414
See SZONERT, supra 395, at 59.
415
PIOTROWSKI, supra note 58, at 10.
416
SZONERT, supra 395, at 59.
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Polish language and history.417 Polish monuments were razed, streets
renamed, bookshops and publishing houses closed, libraries destroyed, and
books burned.418 The Polish language press became a vehicle for Soviet
propaganda.419 Religious education was forbidden.420 The Polish children
remember these first days of Soviet rule as follows: “In school they were
breaking all the portraits, broke down crosses, arrested teachers for being
Polish, and sent their own. Those taught to sing songs against God and
against Poland and other unheard-of things.”421 Another student remembers:
“We saw tearing of the national emblem off the walls, destruction of the
library which contained about 200 volumes.”422
By late 1939, terror, fear, and secrecy pervaded the atmosphere in eastern
Poland. In the initial days after the entry of the Red Army, the invaders inflamed tensions among Ukrainians, Belorussians, and ethnic Poles, which
often resulted in bloody conflicts and the seizure of property. Individuals
were prompted to denounce neighbors and coworkers. Many people lost
their jobs, others had to accommodate to the new conditions to keep their
positions by learning Ukrainian, Belorussian, or Russian languages.
Teachers, in particular, had to make significant adjustments in their work,
including removing all mention of God or Poland from their lessons. The
Soviet regime disbanded social, charitable, and cultural organizations; it
viewed even scout leaders as politically dangerous and, therefore, targets
for arrest. 423

F.

Manifest Pattern of Similar Conduct

The Katyn crime, understood as a pattern of genocidal acts directed
at the Polish national group by the Soviet leadership between September
1939 and June 1941 on the Polish territory conquered and controlled by the
Soviet Union, took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar
conduct by the Soviet leadership directed against the Polish people before
September 1939 invasion and after the 1944 recapture on its way to
Berlin.424

417

Id.
Id.
419
Id. at 58
420
PIOTROWSKI, supra note 58, at 10.
421
Id.
422
Id.
423
JOLLUCK, supra note 82, at 8–9.
424
See, e.g., SNYDER, supra note 18, at 96–104 (documenting the history and pattern of
genocidal acts against the Poles in the era before and after the Katyn massacre).
418
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Polish operation of 1937–1938

The Polish ethnic group living in the Soviet Union before the
outbreak of World War II consisted of ethnic Poles who inhabited these
lands for centuries and decided not to relocate within Poland’s new borders
upon Poland’s reemergence as an independent state in 1918.425 They
represented a group distinct by its language, history, culture, tradition, and
Roman Catholic religion.426 In August 1937 the NKVD Central Committee
issued Order Number 00485 on total liquidation of the Polish diversionist
and espionage groups.427 This order became the basis for an action of mass
extermination of ethnic Poles living in the Soviet Union, known as the
“Polish Operation.”428 Unlike previous NKVD orders which targeted
familiar categories of enemies at least theoretically defined by class, Order
00485 targeted a national group as an enemy of the state.429
The extermination of the ethnic Poles and people considered having
ties with Poland or sympathetic to Poland took place between August 25,
1937 and November 15, 1938.430 Out of the total number of 143,810
arrested, the staggering number of at least 111,091 Poles and people
accused of ties to Poland were executed.431 An additional 28,744 were
sentenced to labor camps, for a total number of persecuted reaching
139,835, according to NKVD archives.432 Considering that Poles
represented less than 0.4%of the Soviet population, their rate of death by
execution is the highest of all ethnic groups persecuted in the national
operations of the late thirties in the Soviet Union.433 According to Timothy
425

Id. at 98.
Id.
427
ROZSTRZELA POLAKÓW: LUDOBÓJSTWO POLAKÓW W ZWIAZKU SOWIECKIM W LATACH
1937–1938: DOKUMENTY Z CENTRALI [SHOOT THE POLES: GENOCIDE OF POLES IN THE SOVIET
UNION 1937–1938: DOCUMENTS FROM THE HEADQUARTERS] (Tomasz Sommer ed., 2010)
[hereinafter ROZSTRZELA POLAKÓW]. Order No. 00485 purported to be aimed at espionage
groups of the Polish Military Organization. This organization was officially dissolved in
1918. Subjected to extermination of this order were all people of Polish ethnicity regardless
of their class status. Having relatives in Poland or having correspondence from Poland was
the sufficient ground for execution. Mass graves of ethnic Poles murdered in the Polish Operations are located all over the Soviet Union. Id.
428
SNYDER, supra note 18, at 93–96 (discussing the particularly ethnic characteristics and
targeting of ethnic Poles and referring to these acts as the Polish operation).
429
Id. at 93–96 (discussing the particularly ethnic characteristics and targeting of ethnic
Poles and referring to these acts as the Polish operation).
430
See, e.g., PIOTROWSKI, supra note 58, at 8–13 (discussing the protracted assault by the
Soviets against the ethnic Poles.
431
SNYDER, supra note 18, at 103.
432
Id. at 103–04. Some Polish historians argue that these numbers are much higher. See,
e.g., ROZSTRZELA POLAKÓW, supra note 426.
433
SNYDER, supra note 18, at 104.
426
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Snyder, “Soviet Poles were about forty times more likely to die during the
Great Terror than Soviet citizens generally.”434
Most of the persecuted Poles lived in Soviet Belarus and Soviet
Ukraine, lands that Poles inhabited for centuries.435 These are the lands that
had been part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the sixteenth and
seventeenth century but were annexed to Russia during the eighteenth
century partitions of Poland.436 Thus the Poles represented indigenous
population on these lands. The Rychalski family had been living in the
steppes of Ukraine for as long as they can remember.437 Their forefathers
built roads, railroads, and factories there. Anatol Rychalski who found new
home in the U.S. reflects on the fate of his family as follows: “the
multileveled Rychalski clan, counted in hundreds had been exterminated
during the revolution in 1917, collectivization in 1929–1933, Stalin-Yezov
genocide of 1937–38, and it hurts.”438 As a young boy, Anatol was deported
with his family to the desert of Kazakhstan during the collectivization
action.439 In 1938 the NKVD sent the black raven for his father and no one
ever heard from him again.440 For his entire life, Anatol searched for any
information about the fate of his father.441 In 1993 the Ukrainian Security
Service replied to his numerous inquiries stating that as a result of the 1938
repressive action, his father, Joseph Rychalski, was killed on April 15,
1938.442 The Ukrainian Security Services was not able to establish the burial
location of Joseph Rychalski.443
During the Polish Operation, “[b]iographies became death
sentences, as attachment to Polish culture or Roman Catholicism became
evidence of participation in international espionage.”444 While Polish men
were routinely shot, their wives were sent to special settlements in Siberia
and Kazakhstan and their children over the age of ten were abducted and
sent to orphanages, thereby assuring that they would not be raised as

434

Id.
Id. at 98.
436
Id.
437
Anatol Rychalski, Personal Reflections: Honoring Poland’s Millennium Plus Year of
Courage, paper prepared for the Polish Club of the University of Pittsburgh (May 1, 2011)
(on file with author).
438
Id.
439
Id.
440
Id.
441
Id.
442
Id.
443
Document of the Ukrainian Security Services (Jan. 13, 1993) (on file with Anatol Rychalski).
444
SNYDER, supra note 18, at 96.
435
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Poles.445 Some of the persecuted people were Belarusians and some were
Jews, but the overwhelming majority of them were ethnic Poles.446 The
targeting of a person on the ground of his ethnicity, as was the case with the
cotemporaneous persecution of Jews in Nazi Germany, did not mean that
the persecuted person actually identified himself or herself with the Polish
ethnic or national group.447 It meant however that the perpetrators perceived
such person as belonging to the persecuted group.
The Polish Operation was the bloodiest of all ethnic operations
conducted during the Great Terror in the Soviet Union.448 At one point,
Yezhov, who was in charge of the Polish Operation, reported to Stalin that
in twenty days, 23,216 arrests were made.449 Stalin rejoiced: “Very good!
Keep on digging up and cleaning out this Polish filth.”450 In 2002, mass
graves were found near Tavda and Tomsk, east of the Urals.451 It is believed
that these mass burial sites contain remains of ethnic Poles massacred in the
Polish Operation of 1937.452 The extermination of ethnic Poles in the Soviet
Union between 1937 and 1938 meets the test of genocide as defined in the
Genocide Convention and the Statue of Rome.
2.

1943 and thereafter

The intent of the Soviet leadership to destroy Poland is corroborated
by a series of actions taken by the Soviet Union against Poland after the
Battle of Stalingrad. On June 22, 1943 Stalin ordered to combat the Polish
underground in the eastern territories of Poland “with every possible
means.”453 On July 14, 1944, when the Red Army reentered Polish territory
on its way to Berlin, Stalin ordered the execution of members of all Polish
underground forces.454 Members of Polish resistance who had been fighting
against Nazi Germany for five years suddenly were labeled by the Soviet

445

Id. at 102.
Id. at 99.
447
Id. at 98.
448
Id. at 103–104.
449
Id. at 96.
450
SNYDER, supra note 18, at 96. Michael Ellman asserts that the ‘national operations,’
particularly the Polish Operation, may constitute genocide as defined by the U.N. Genocide
Convention. Michael Ellman, Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932–33 Revisited, 59 EUR.ASIA STUDIES 663, 690 (2007). His opinion is shared by Simon Sebag Montefiore. SIMON
SEBAG MONTEFIORE, STALIN: THE COURT OF THE RED TSAR 229 (2004).
451
Fischer, supra note 128.
452
See id. (noting that the Tavda and Tomsk graves contained Polish corpses).
453
PIOTROWSKI, supra note 58, at 19.
454
Id.
446
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propaganda as “nationalist fascists,” and thousands of them were executed
while tens of thousands were once again deported to the Soviet Far East.455
In July 1945, the Red Army together with NKVD Special Forces
conducted an extraordinary pacification action in the Augustów region of
north-east Poland against the Polish Home Army.456 Two thousand people
were arrested and subjected to torture during the investigations; six hundred
of them were sent to the Soviet Union and were never heard from again. 457
A formal request of the Polish Government submitted to the Russian
Federation to assist in locating the burial sites of the people who
disappeared in the Augustów operation in 1945 was formally rejected in
2006 by the Russian Federation on the grounds of the statute of
limitations.458
The Soviet withholding of military assistance to the capital of
Poland during the Warsaw Uprising of August–September 1944 against
Germans represented an act of support for German genocidal destruction of
Warsaw that claimed close to 200,000 lives, more than the Hiroshima and
Nagasaki losses combined, and resulted in Warsaw being leveled.459
The postwar strategy of luring members of the Home Army to
reveal themselves to the communist authority through amnesty resulted in
subsequent mass arrests, executions and new deportations to the Soviet
Union.460 The following acts demonstrate the consistent intent of the Soviet
leadership to prevent the reemergence of Poland as an independent state: the
1945 kidnapping of sixteen Polish leaders associated with the Polish
Government in London for a show trial in Moscow and subsequent
elimination of all of them in the Lublianka prison; the creation in Moscow
of a puppet government that replaced the legitimate Polish Government; the
introduction of the Soviet oppression apparatus in post-war Poland, postwar murders and persecutions of members of the Home Army, deportations

455

See id. (discussing the treatment, execution, and deportation of members of the Polish
resistance).
456
Adam Bialous, Unsolved Communist Crimes: The Augustów Roundup in July, 1945,
DOOMED SOLDIERS, http://www.doomedsoldiers.com/augustow-roundup.html (last visited
June 15, 2012).
457
Id.
458
See id. (declaring that numerous requests for information about the Augustów Roundup
have not been answered by the Russian government).
459
PIOTROWSKI, supra note 58, at 19. Studies show the death toll for Hiroshima to be as
much as 130,000, while Nagasaki lost 60,000 to 70,000 people. Jerald Richards, Hiroshima,
Morality, and Democracy, in PROBLEMS FOR DEMOCRACY 83, 84 (John Kultgen & Mary
Lenzi eds., 2006).
460
PIOTROWSKI, supra note 58, at 19.
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of Polish patriots to gulags, and the illegal seizure of Poland’s eastern
territories after the war.461
The list of heinous crimes committed upon the Polish people by the
Soviet Union after 1943 goes on and on. This policy of destruction can be
succinctly summarized by a simple statement from the 1947 NKVD
Instruction to the Soviet agents controlling Poland: “While rebuilding the
industry and building new industry make sure that industrial waste is
directed to rivers which will be used as reservoirs of drinking water.”462

IV. STATUS OF THE KATYN CRIME SEVENTY YEARS LATER
While the Soviet Union denied its responsibility for the Katyn
crime, destroyed the evidence of the crime and conducted massive cover-up
operations, the Russian Federation seeks to minimize the scope and
significance of the Katyn crime and works on developing an anti-Katyn
doctrine to justify the crime.463 This strategy of anti-Katynism is consistent
with a decree of President Gorbachev dated November 3, 1990 directing the
Russian Academy of Science and other institutions to search for “archival
materials relating to the events and facts in the history of bilateral SovietPolish relations, which resulted in losses to the Soviet side.” 464 The
following examples illustrate the strategy employed by the Russian
Federation to justify and minimize the Katyn crime and evade responsibility
for it:
Selectively declassifying Katyn-related documents465
Minimizing the number of victims;
a) The Polish Red Cross positively identified 2,916 bodies in
the Katyn forest during the investigation conducted by the
International Red Cross in 1943.466
461

Id.; see also Sowieckie Deportacje, SOWIECKIE DEPORTACJE (Sept. 1, 2008), http://www.
deportacje.eu.
462
Boleslaw Bierut's Archives, supra note 366, ¶ 29.
463
See Michael P. Scharf & Maria Szonert-Binienda, Katyn: Justice Delayed or Justice
Denied?, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 541–44 (describing the Russian government’s response
to the Katyn crime and the Anti-Katyn doctrine).
464
Decree by President Gorbachev, in Connection with the Visit of Minister of Foreign
Affairs Krzysztof Skubiszewski, on Speeding up the Investigation of the Fate of the Polish
Officers Held in the Three Special Camps, reprinted in KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT
PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 346.
465
See Fischer, supra note 128 (noting that documents turned over to Polish authorities in
1990 did not amount to “a full and complete disclosure”).
466
See LISTA KATYŃSKA, supra note 187, and accompanying text.
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b) In disregard of the official Russian records that 21,857 Poles
were murdered, the Russian investigation established that
14,542 persons were detained, 1,803 died, and 22 persons
were identified.467
Emphasizing other victims of the Stalinist regime persecuted
within the Soviet Union;468
Putting blame on “totalitarianism;”469
Pointing to World War II losses as a common Russian and Polish
tragedy;470
Emphasizing non-Polish ethnic groups among the persecuted
Polish citizens;471
Pointing to political as opposed to national motives of the
crime;472
Justifying the Katyn crime by implementing the anti-Katyn
strategy that points, inter alia, to the maltreatment of Soviet
POWs by Poland in the 1920 war;473
Treating the Katyn crime as an ordinary crime of “exceeding
official authority” subject to a 10-year statute of limitations;
467

Press Release, V.K. Kondrashov, Prosecutor General’s Office (Mar. 24, 2005), available at http://www.memo.ru/daytoday/5katyn2.htm. This statement came in response to the
Letter from Arseny Roginsky, Chairman of the Board & Alexander Guryanov, Coordinator
of the Polish Committee, Memorial, to Alexander Savienkov, Deputy Att’y General, Russ.
Federation, available at http://www.memo.ru/daytoday/5zaprgwp1.htm (last visited June 15,
2012); see also Fischer, supra note 128 (stating that the death toll was 21,857 and that Russian pronouncements have often not reflected this figure).
468
See Fischer, supra note 128 (quoting a Russian official’s pronouncement that millions
of Russians had been killed).
469
Id. President Yeltsin in 1995 proclaimed: “[T]otalitarian terror affected not only Polish
citizens but, in the first place, the citizens of the former Soviet Union.” Id.
470
Id.
471
Id.
472
See id. (noting President Yeltsin’s contention that thousands of bodies found in Katyn
were of various nationalities, not just Polish).
473
See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 262 (noting that the
Politburo justified executing Polish prisoners of war by labeling them “counterrevolutionaries” who were “enemies of Soviet power”).
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a) Such treatment is contrary to the position of the Soviet
Union’s treatment of the Katyn crime at the Nuremberg Trial
where the Soviet prosecutor, accusing German leaders of this
crime, referred to the Katyn murder as “one of the most
important criminal acts for which the major war criminals
were responsible.”474
b) Such classification stands in sharp contrast to the
determination of the U.S. Special Committee to Investigate
the Katyn Forest Massacre that described the Katyn massacre
as “one of the most barbarous international crimes in world
history.”475
c) Such classification of the Katyn crime contradicts the
conclusion of the Committee of Experts of the Main Military
Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation that classified
the Katyn crime as genocide according to international law as
well as the public proclamation of the leading Russian
scholars dated January 18, 1995 that refers to the Katyn
crime as “genocide aimed at Polish citizens.”476
Classifying as top secret the 2004 decision of the Russian Military
Prosecutor General to discontinue the Russian investigation into
the Katyn crime, the legal justification for discontinuance of the
Katyn case, and all evidentiary documentation from the Katyn
investigation;477
Denying legal standing to families of the Katyn victims who
attempt to obtain information about the Russian investigation into
the Katyn crime and/or pursue compensation claims before the
Russian courts.478
474

7 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL: PROCEEDINGS 5 FEBRUARY 1946 - 19 FEBRUARY 1946, at 425 (1995).
475
H.R. REP. NO. 82-2505, at 1 (1952).
476
See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 260 (providing the view
of the Committee of Experts and the Military Prosecutor that the Katyn crime was genocide).
477
Scharf & Szonert-Binienda, supra note 462, at 542. After the crash of the Polish presidential plane in Smolensk on April 10, 2010, President Putin promised to release documentation from the Katyn investigation. One year later, Russia was still withholding thirty-six
volumes of documents from the Katyn investigation. Id.
478
Janowiec and Others v. Russia, Judgment, App. Nos. 55508/07, 29520/09, ¶¶ 49–54
(Eur. Ct. H.R., 2012), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&
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On April 10, 2010, the President of Poland and eighty seven top
officials of the Polish State were on their way to Katyn for the
commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Katyn crime when their plane
crashed on landing in Smolensk near Katyn, killing everyone on board.479 In
response to this tragedy, the leadership of the Russian Federation made
conciliatory gestures and promised to release more documents from the
Russian investigation into the Katyn crime but was slow in fulfilling this
promise.480 Furthermore, on November 26, 2010, the Parliament of the
Russian Federation adopted a resolution that officially recognized Stalin and
his associates as the main perpetrators of the Katyn massacre.481
As much as the political declarations and gestures of the Russian
Federation are welcome, they do not correspond with the legal treatment of
the Katyn case by the Russian courts. The legal position of the Russian
Main Military Prosecutor’s Office that classified the Katyn crime as an act
of “exceeding official authority” remains unchanged. As of spring 2012,
conciliatory gestures have not been aligned with any change regarding the
legal treatment of the Katyn case by the Russian Federation.482
On the first anniversary of the 2010 tragic crash of the Polish
presidential plane in Smolensk, near Katyn, leading Polish historians
warned of dangerous developments in Russia regarding the Katyn
massacre.483 The “anti-Katyn doctrine” that aims at justifying the Katyn
crime had been widely promoted in Russia. Arguments have been raised
that the Soviet Union took revenge on the Polish officers for the
mistreatment of the Soviet prisoners of war during the Polish-Soviet War of
1920.484 Such arguments not only trivialize the Katyn crime but also
represent a fundamental threat to Poland’s liberty and sovereignty.
Arguments that seek to justify the Katyn murders go to the very heart of
Poland’s right to exist as a sovereign and independent nation.
documentId=888266&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB8
6142BF01C1166DEA398649.
479
Nicholas Kulish, Ellen Barry & Michal Piotrowski, Polish President Dies in Jet Crash
in Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2010, at A1.
480
Scharf & Szonert-Binienda, supra note 462, at 542 (noting that Russia still has yet to
release thirty-six of the 183 volumes from its investigation into the Katyn crimes).
481
Duma Votes to Blame Stalin for the Katyn Crime, MOSCOW TIMES (Nov. 26, 2010),
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/duma-votes-to-blame-stalin-for-katynmassacre/425136.html.
482
See Scharf & Szonert-Binienda, supra note 462, at 553 (detailing the Russian Federation’s legal position that prosecution is barred by a ten-year statute of limitations and that the
Katyn investigation is terminated).
483
See Jest Zamówienie na Anty-Katyń, NASZ DZIENNIK, Aug. 13–15, 2011,
http://www.naszdziennik.pl/index.php?dat=20110813&typ=po&id=po37.txt.
484
See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 263.
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V. CONCLUSION
The primary focus of this analysis has been on the question of
whether the Katyn crime, as redefined in light of the latest evidence, meets
the legal definition of genocide under the Genocide Convention of 1948.
This article deals mainly with one type of genocidal activities, that of
“killing members of the group” as spelled out in the March 5th Execution
Order. The remaining four types of genocidal acts, such as: (i) causing
serious bodily or mental harm to the members of the group; (ii) deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part; (iii) imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group; and (iv) forcibly transferring children of the
group to another group, were discussed or mentioned but not analyzed
separately due to space limitations. Nevertheless, the facts as presented
herein demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the Soviet Union
committed all five types of genocidal acts on the Polish population on the
conquered Polish territory between 1939 and 1941.
By focusing just on one type of the genocidal act—that of killing—
it has been proven beyond all reasonable doubt that the leadership of the
Soviet Union, while acting in collaboration with Nazi Germany between
September 1939 and June 1941, had engaged in carefully planned genocidal
killings directed at the Polish POWs of officer rank and members of the
Polish state apparatus such as the judiciary, law enforcement and security
forces, Polish intelligentsia and civic leaders. These selective killings must
be viewed in conjunction with other genocidal operations. Based on the
analysis presented herein, it has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
the action of mass killing was augmented by large-scale arrests and massive
actions of forced removal from the conquered Polish territory of the civilian
population consisting of the entire families perceived as Polish nationals
and/or supporters the Polish State, and by forced conscription of the Polish
citizens into the Soviet Army. These policies of destruction and dispersal of
Polish nationals throughout the Soviet Union directly impacted the ability of
the Polish national group, as such, to survive on the Polish territory
incorporated to the Soviet Union. Accordingly, it has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that during the twenty-one month period of Nazi-Soviet
collaboration, the officials of the Soviet Union acted with specific intent to
destroy the Polish national group, as such, on the Polish territory conquered,
incorporated, and controlled by the Soviet Union, and therefore committed
the crime of genocide as defined by the Genocide Convention of 1948.
The group of Soviet leaders who committed the crime of genocide
on the Polish national group consists of, but is not limited to, the following:
(1) the top leadership of the U.S.S.R. consisting of Joseph Stalin, Lawrenti
Beria, and Vyacheslav Molotov; (2) members of the Soviet Politburo:
Kliment Voroshilov, Anastas Mikoyan, Michail Kalinin, and Lazar
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Kaganovich; (3) members of the execution troika as specified in the March
5th Execution Order: Vsevolod Merkulov, Bakhcho Kobulov and Leonid
Bashtakov; (4) NKVD employees listed in the Rewards Order issued on
October 26, 1940 for “Clearing out” the Prisons and the Three Special
Camps;485 (5) other NKVD functionaries who directly participated in the
killings of the Polish citizens;486 (6) NKVD functionaries who actively
participated in the destruction of evidence of the crime by destroying files
and mass graves of the Polish victims;487 and (7) the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.488

VI. EPILOGUE
Despite clear evidence against the Soviet Union and subsequent
admission of guilt by the Soviet Union’s successor in the U.N., the Russian
Federation, justice has not been served in the Katyn case.
When in 1943 mass graves were discovered in the Katyn forest, the
families of the victims cried in vain for justice. When in 1952, the U.S.
Congress took no action upon recommendations of its own Select
Committee on the “Katyn Forest Massacre,” the families of the victims
cried in vain for accountability. When in 1991 Mikhail Gorbachev officially
admitted that the Soviet NKVD committed the Katyn crime, and the full
scope of the crime began to emerge, Franciszek Herzog wrote to the
President of the United States:
Mr. President, as a US citizen and a son of the Polish officer, Lt. Col.
Franciszek Herzog, murdered in Kharkov I beg you and implore you to
look at the facts again. And then, in the name of the US Government,
please apologize to the Polish people, and especially to the families of the
victims, for sheltering the criminals for over half a century. It will not
resurrect the men, but will give moral satisfaction to the widows and
orphans of the victims. It will also gain you respect and undying gratitude
of the Polish Nation.489

After many more letters and some assistance from Senator
Christopher Dodd, in August of 1992 the U.S. Department of State replied
485

Order of the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR for [the Year] 1940,
No. 001365, in KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 272.
486
See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 271 (stating that it was
“customary” for NKVD workers to engage in “special tasks,” including executions, with
some workers trained to kill and others “participat[ing] in support roles”).
487
See Fischer, supra note 128 (describing NKVD efforts to destroy evidence, including
graves).
488
See Janowiec and Others, Judgment, App. Nos. 55508/07, 29520/09, ¶ 51.
489
Letter from Franciszek Herzog to President George H.W. Bush (Dec. 26, 1991) (on file
with author).

File: Szonert 2

2012]

Created on: 7/4/2012 2:02:00 PM

Last Printed: 9/21/2012 8:33:00 PM

WAS KATYN A GENOCIDE?

717

that “changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union that have
occurred in the past three years have made it possible to uncover the truth”
and that “in 1990 the Russians officially apologized to Poland for this
atrocity.”490 Herzog replied:
Unfortunately, [your letter] does not answer my question and concerns. . . .
Changes that occurred in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
uncovered not the truth, as this was known since 1943 to all people of
good will, but the places of massacres of POWs from Starobelsk and
Ostaszkow camp. . . . I hope that one day US Government will officially
declare who was guilty of this horrendous crime against Polish Nation and
humanity.491

The day of accountability for the Katyn crime has not yet arrived,
even though the prosecution of serious international crimes such as
genocide is required as a matter of law. The Katyn families and the Polish
people wait in vain for justice to be served for one of the greatest crimes of
World War II.

490

Letter from Thomas Gerth, Deputy Dir. of the Office of E. Eur. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of
State, to Francisek Herzog (Aug. 12, 1992) (on file with author).
491
Letter from Franciszek Herzog to Thomas Gerth, Deputy Dir. of the Office of E. Eur.
Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 1, 1992) (on file with author).

